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Abstract
According to T. F. Torrance, all authentic knowledge involves the nature of the 
object impressing its inherent rationality on our minds. Consequently, knowledge 
involves thinking in accordance with the nature of the object given for thought. Given 
that this epistemological position is not presuppositionless, we shall explore the place 
and function of "ultimate beliefs" in Torrance's epistemology, as well as the question as 
to whether such beliefs imply a retreat to either foundationalism or fideism.
The inescapability of ultimate beliefs in all human knowledge requires a shift in 
the traditional notion of objectivity. Consequently Torrance's understanding of 
objectivity, and the reasons for his insistence that the subject-object relation cannot be 
transcended, are analyzed. Additionally, our ability to keep our tendency toward 
subjectivity in check is considered. It is also argued that Torrance's epistemological 
position implies an alternative notion of truth. Drawing on distinctly Christian sources, 
Torrance emphasizes the distinction between truth and truthfulness thereby reorienting 
the discussion from a focus on statements to a focus on being. This shift challenges the 
dichotomy between correspondence and coherence theories of truth and provides one 
way of transcending the scientific realism/anti-realism debate. Torrance's position on 
truth is located relative to other well-known thinkers.
Torrance's epistemological convictions give rise to a practical epistemological 
tool, disclosure models. These function as self-correcting, self-marginalizing lenses 
through which we encounter reality, allowing it to disclose itself to us. It is this constant
disclosure and revision that enables our concepts to remain rooted in reality and yield 
knowledge in accordance to the nature of the thing known.
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xIntroduction
Bruce McCormack has called T. F. Torrance "the most significant theologian of 
the late-twentieth century."1 This claim seems to be supported by the fact that the 
literature exploring and evaluating Torrance's thought is already rather large and 
growing steadily.2 This bears witness to his tremendous influence in theological areas 
such as Christology, Trinitarian theology, atonement, and other classical loci in the 
study of Christian faith. What is comparatively underrepresented is Torrance's 
considerable work in epistemology. This is not to say that Torrance's commentators 
have utterly neglected his epistemology - indeed, most of the major works on Torrance 
include at least some discussion of it. What is remarkable, however, is that it has not yet
received a detailed analysis, nor has it been brought into dialogue with the significant 
works in secular philosophy of science that were available during his academic career.3 
Given that over forty-five years have passed since the publication of Theological 
1 Endorsement for Alister McGrath, T. F. Torrance, an Intellectual Biography. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1999. 
2 The interested reader can pick up the following monographs: an intellectual biography covering 
Torrance's life (McGrath, T. F. Torrance, an Intellectual Biography. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999)), 
an overview of the major themes in Torrance's work (Elmer M. Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance: 
Understanding His Trinitarian and Scientific Theology. (Illinois: Intervarsity Press, 2001)), an 
engagement with Torrance's doctrine of the Trinity (Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian 
of the Trinity. (Burlington, VT : Ashgate Pub. Ltd., 2009)), an analysis of the function of doctrine in 
Torrance's thought (Elmer M. Colyer, The Nature of Doctrine in the T. F. Torrance's Theology. (Eugene,
OR: Wipf and Stock, 2001)), an extended dialogue between Torrance and philosopher Paul Feyerabend 
(Is Theology a Science?: The Nature of the Scientific Enterprise in the Scientific Theology of Thomas 
Forsyth Torrance and the Anarchic Epistemology of Paul Feyerabend. Studies in Systematic Theology.,
edited by Bevans, S. V. D., Miikka Ruokanen. Vol. 7. (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, NV, 
2011)), a treatment of Torrance's engagement with the natural sciences (Tapio Luoma, Incarnation and 
Physics: Natural Science in the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), and several others, more coming into print every year.
3 By “secular philosophy of science” is merely meant the work of philosophers of science who are 
doing their work without any explicit theological concerns. This would exclude the work of those 
working explicitly in the theology-science dialogue.
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Science,4 and the considerable amount of work Torrance published after it, it seems 
surprising that this lacuna has not yet been filled when one might have expected a host 
of works providing commentary on this important topic.
The aim of this thesis is to unpack and critically explore what has been called 
the "fundamental axiom of Torrance's theology,"5 the conviction that we know 
something authentically only when we know it according to its own nature, what 
Torrance describes as knowledge that is "kata physin." This claim seems 
uncontroversial and yet we see in Torrance's theology that it has far-reaching 
implications.
Chapter one introduces the concept of "kata physin" as well as how it functions 
in Torrance’s thought. It will be argued that Torrance's resistance to dualist, positivist, 
and reductionist ways thinking flows from his conviction that such thinking is not 
implied by the objects of our knowledge but that they are generated by other concerns 
and then imposed upon such objects. Unpacking this conviction will allow for an 
evaluation of whether Torrance, for all his dislike of dualism, might be harboring some 
dualistic tendencies of his own.
The conviction that one knows something truly only when one knows it in 
accordance with its nature is not value-neutral but relies upon certain key suppositions; 
namely, that there exists something to know and that one has some kind of epistemic 
access to it. This raises the question as to whether background beliefs of this kind, 
especially those that can be neither verified nor falsified, have a legitimate place within 
epistemology and, if so, how they function. It is this question over what Torrance calls 
“ultimate beliefs” that lies at the core of actual and potential criticisms that he is a 
foundationalist or a fideist. These are the concerns explored in chapter two.
If it is the case that ultimate beliefs are, as Torrance claims, unavoidable, it has 
implications for our understanding of objectivity. If it is the case that we are never able 
to speak unambiguously of “the facts,” then this raises the question as to whether there 
is any other conclusion than that we are stuck with radical subjectivism in all our 
interactions within the world of space-time in which we live. Chapter three examines 
4 TS.
5 Colyer,  The Nature of Doctrine in the T. F. Torrance's Theology, 15.
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the problems faced by a traditional concept of objectivity when it is granted that we 
may never ignore the knowing subject, that the subject-object relationship can never be 
utterly transcended. Torrance's concerns push us to conceive of objectivity primarily in 
terms of the object we seek to know rather than in terms of the knowing subject. That is 
to say, rather than asking how it is that we may be objective, we must learn to ask and 
answer the question, "How can we let what we seek to know be objective to us?"
Torrance's insistence that we allow the objects of our knowledge to have utter 
primacy over our statements about them leads to an alternative theory of truth. Chapter 
four engages with the question as to how our statements, theories, and doctrines relate 
to the reality they intend. We shall see that both a correspondence theory of truth, which
roots truth in our individual statements, and a coherence theory of truth, which roots 
truth in our systems of statements, rely upon the subject-object dualism that Torrance 
rejects. In their place, Torrance stresses that the truth of our statements must always be 
secondary to the reality to which they refer (what Torrance calls the “truth of being”). 
Torrance's ontological notion of truth will be shown to be different in some crucial ways
from that developed by other theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas. 
In our scientific age the most relevant of these implications is how Torrance's 
notion of truth shapes his understanding of the function of scientific theories, discussed 
in chapter five. For Torrance, theories function as "disclosure models" that self-
consciously subordinate themselves to that to which they bear witness. Historic issues 
within the philosophy of science such as verifiability, falsifiability, paradigm shifts, 
meaning variance, the underdetermination of theory by evidence, and approximate truth
are transformed and given an interpretation that might provide one possible way toward
their resolution.
If Torrance's epistemology is as relevant as we seek to argue, he is truly a 
theologian for our times. In his writings we find one way of theology and science 
interacting with one another, challenging one another, and bringing into constructive 
relationship what society, since the Enlightenment, has widely assumed must remain 
separate. Although we shall move beyond Torrance's position in certain ways and 
correct it in others, he seems to provide a model of one way for theologians to critically 
engage the world of natural science. If Torrance can be shown to have achieved even 
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modest success in this endeavor, this is highly significant not least, but not only, for 
those who wish to live as committed Christians within this scientific culture and not 
merely against it. 
11. What is (Authentic) Knowledge?
We know things strictly in accordance with their natures or what they are
in themselves and at the same time we allow what things actually are to 
reveal themselves to us and thereby to determine for us the content and 
the form of our knowledge of them. Proper knowing takes place through 
a steady dynamic interaction between our minds and objective reality. 
We encourage our thinking to adapt itself to the structural relations and 
coherent patterns already inherent in nature independent of our knowing 
of it and so to predominate over any antecedently conceived frames of 
thought on our part, and thereby we learn more and more to appreciate 
the contingency, subtlety, richness, variability, and complexity of nature. 
Thus epistemological and ontological considerations are dynamically 
wedded in our inquiries and formulations.1
For T. F. Torrance, all authentic knowledge is knowledge according to the nature
of that which is known; it is knowledge κατά φύσιν. This conviction is the basic axiom 
of Torrance's epistemology.2 Knowledge of anything, whether of God or of creation, is 
primarily an act of submission, an allowing of that-which-we-seek-to-know to dictate 
for us how we shall know it. Kataphysic knowledge is not based on good reasons for 
belief, but that the reality we seek to know is what it is and not something else. In order 
to appreciate Torrance's position, it must be noted that his views are not to be 
understood as part of the tradition, in analytic philosophy, to provide a formal definition
of knowledge.
One particularly influential definition of knowledge is that it is justified true 
belief. Edmund Gettier, in his well-known 1963 paper, "Is Justified True Belief 
1 CT&SC, 27-28.
2  Elmer M. Colyer, The Nature of Doctrine in T. F. Torrance's Theology. (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock, 2001), 15. Cf. DM, 141, 211; G&R, 52-53, 89-95, 114-116; R&ST, 50; CFM, 72; G&G, 8-10, 
33; MC, 2-5; TS, 25-26, 198; T&C, 221.
2Knowledge?"3 critiqued this view, revealing its inadequacy. One major response to the 
so-called "Gettier Problem" is to attempt to articulate what must be added to the notion 
of knowledge as justified true belief so as to secure it from its weaknesses. In 
contemporary philosophical theology, such an approach is represented by Alvin 
Plantinga and his development of the idea of "warrant"4 and the associated debates 
involving Swinburne and others.5
It is more helpful to consider Torrance's position in light of the discussions we 
find within the philosophy of science, a field with its own epistemological concerns. In 
the decades since Thomas S. Kuhn published his Structure of Scientific Revolutions,6 
philosophers of science have been forced to ask of even would-be scientific knowledge,
"Justified to whom, or against the background of which point of view?" It has largely 
reached consensus that we cannot assume that attempts at justification weigh equally 
heavily against a variety of conceptual backgrounds and so we cannot assume that 
"justification" is an unambiguous term that is in no need of further analysis.
Related to this, we must ask what we mean when we say that a belief is "true." 
For example, the belief in absolute space and time or action at a distance would have 
been considered justified and true when considered against the background of classical 
physics. However, the same cannot be said when we take the same beliefs within the 
context of relativity physics. The very notion of "truth" seems to have been approached 
very differently within the philosophy of science than it has been within other areas of 
analytic philosophy, such as that represented by contemporary analytic epistemology.
3 Edmund L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23, no. 6 (June, 1963): 121-123.
4 See Warrant: the Current Debate. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1993), Warrant and Proper 
Function. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1993), and Warranted Christian Belief. (New York: 
Oxford University Press. 2000).
5 Richard Swinburne, "Plantinga on Warrant." Religious Studies 37, no. 2 (June., 2001): 203-214.
6 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996).
3What does Torrance mean by "kata physin" and what are the origins of this 
concept?
Torrance, it seems, approaches the question as to what makes knowledge 
authentic from an entirely different perspective. He claims that "knowledge is real only 
as it is in accordance with the nature of the object, but the nature of the object 
prescribes the mode of rationality we have to adopt towards it in our knowing, and also 
the nature of the demonstration appropriate to it."7 The term that Torrance uses to 
describe this kind of knowledge is the Greek expression κατά φύσιν.
This technical term comes primarily, as Torrance understands it, from Greek 
Patristic sources. Athanasius used the phrase "according to nature" as effectively 
equivalent to "according to truth" or "according to the economy."8 However strong this 
connection was made in antiquity, it is certainly the case that, for Torrance, knowledge 
according to nature (episteme kata physin) is to be understood as being identical with 
knowing something in truth.
In any rigorous scientific inquiry you pursue your research in any field in
such a way that you seek to let the nature of the field or the nature of the 
object, as it progressively becomes disclosed through interrogation, 
control how you know it, how you think about it, how you formulate 
your knowledge of it, and how you verify that knowledge. I often speak 
of this as kataphysic inquiry, a term that comes from the Greek 
expression κατά φύσιν, which means "according to nature." If you think 
of something in accordance with its nature like that, you think of it in 
accordance with what it really is — so that here thinking κατά φύσιν is 
to think κατ' αλήθειαν.9
While it is clear that Torrance sees his understanding of authentic knowledge to 
be in continuity with that of the ancient Nicene theologians such as Athanasius10 and, 
7 TS, 198. See also TReconstr, 15.
8 DM, 383.
9 PCT, 45.
10 DM, 204-205.
4before him, Irenaeus,11 he does not think that it is necessarily a distinctly Christian 
conviction. Indeed, he argues that "Irenaeus was applying the disciplined, scientific 
approach in knowledge that had been handed down in the Aristotelian and Stoic 
philosophies."12
Even though a commitment to knowing kata physin is not inherently Christian, it
seems clear that Torrance believes that the converse is true, that Christian convictions 
press one to affirm such an epistemological position, even if expressed in different 
terms. Torrance frequently articulates what he believes to be the core of Christian 
convictions in the expression, "What [Jesus Christ] is toward us He is eternally and 
antecedently in Himself, but what He is in Himself He is toward us within our life in 
space and time."13 This is one of Torrance's favorite ways to express the importance and 
centrality of the doctrines of the Incarnation and Hypostatic Union in all Christian 
thought. Indeed, he describes this conviction as being "the crucial issue" at the first 
Council of Nicaea and its affirmation as giving voice to what the church had always 
believed.14
This expression of Torrance's understanding of the core convictions of Christian 
faith makes it clear that, at least as far as our knowledge of God is concerned, Christians
must make something like kata physin their epistemological position since, in Jesus 
Christ, we encounter one who is God according to God's own nature at the same time 
that he shares our human nature in our world of space-time. Because we are given a 
revelation of the very being of God, it would be manifestly inappropriate to attempt to 
develop knowledge of God upon grounds independent of those provided in Christ.15 
Merely apophatic or abstract accounts of God cannot count as "knowledge" of God 
since they do not represent God according to God's nature as revealed in Jesus Christ 
11 DM, 106.
12 DM, 106.
13 TS, 208. For this expression and variations of it, see D&CO, 7; R&ET, 24, 110, 124; R&ST, 183; 
TReconstr, 182; TF, 339; TS, 141, 234; “TR,” 185; G&G, 40, 118, 158, 161; CDG, 1, 99, 136, 142, 
172.
14 “TR,” 185; CT&SC, 30-31.
15 This is the core of Torrance's opposition to natural theology in anything resembling the traditional 
sense. This resistance would certainly seem to be every bit as strong as Barth's.
5but derive from elsewhere. It is only because God has made his own nature known to 
humanity in Christ that we can have kataphysic knowledge of God and therefore 
consider theology to be scientific.16
It must be noted that simply demonstrating that Torrance believes that Christian 
faith implies something like kata physin as an epistemological principle for theological 
knowledge is not sufficient to make the same claim for knowledge more generally. One 
cannot make the a fortiori claim that "If we must know God according to his nature, 
how much more must we know creation according to its nature." Once the existence of 
God is granted, one could easily argue that we know reality truly, not when we know it 
in accordance with its own nature independently conceived but in accordance with the 
nature of God and God's intentions for it.
Though theological epistemology cannot prescribe a general epistemology it 
may suggest one. When speaking of our knowledge of the objects of natural science, 
Torrance does so in precisely parallel language to our knowledge of God. "If nature is 
not in itself what it is in its relations toward us, if we are not able to grasp nature in the 
depth of its own reality, then we are not really concerned with science but only with 
useful arrangements of our own observations and experiments."17 Though Torrance 
never makes an explicit argument that we can take the same approach, mutatis 
mutandis, in our epistemological engagement with created things as with God, he seems
to see them as parallel with one another. This capacity of the findings of theological 
science to suggest, though never prescribe, courses of action for the natural sciences is 
one important aspect of Torrance's philosophy of science.
Torrance always wrote as a theologian and never primarily as a philosopher of 
science or historian. As such, his appropriation of various ideas throughout the history 
of philosophy are somewhat uneven. When Torrance takes up an idea or argument from 
a historical thinker it is to bring it into service of his larger theological concerns. This 
means that, when Torrance reflects on the nature of science, he is not attempting to 
16 It is because of the unique status of Christ within the context of Christian faith (which, for Torrance, 
is always Nicene) that it would seem that Torrance would not suggest that theology can equally be 
considered scientific within the context of other religious views.
17 “TR,” 189. See also G&G, 161-162, which makes the same point with a closer allusion to an 
Einsteinian aphorism to which we shall return in chapter 2.
6answer the question, "How does (or should) science function" but rather, "How should 
science function if the gospel is true?" While Torrance's philosophy of science arises 
from a distinctly Christian starting point, it provides an understanding of science which 
could conceivably be appropriated even by one who does not share his Christian faith.
What does Torrance think are the Conditions of knowing Kata Physin and how does 
Torrance address this question?
The idea that true knowledge is knowledge according to a thing's nature is not 
value-neutral. There are some conditions that must be satisfied in order to obtain such 
knowledge. The first requirement is that there must be a "reality" actually existent in the
universe in the sense that the objects of our knowledge are not merely constructs, either 
of individual minds or of communities. If there is no such independently existing 
reality, then there is no nature in accordance with which it is to be known.18
Additionally, if one is to have knowledge of such a reality, there must be some 
kind of epistemic access to it.19 The requirements for this access are very weak 
inasmuch as it need not be complete nor infallible, though it must be reliable. In other 
words, when we have access to a reality, our conceptual grasp of it need not be entirely 
adequate. We may, in the process of our inquiry, discover another aspect of the reality 
than we expected at the beginning. Consider, for example, the development of atomic 
and sub-atomic physics. Knowledge of the existence of atoms is possible without being 
aware of the existence of electrons and other sub-atomic particles.
Our epistemic access to reality also need not be (and never is) infallible. It is 
entirely possible that our first contacts with a particular reality are baffling and only 
18 This is not to say that, for the principle of kata physin, existence logically precedes essence. Rather, 
the two are equally primordial.
19 Making a similar point, Tapio Luoma, Incarnation and Physics: Natural Science in the Theology of 
Thomas F. Torrance. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 65, writes, "Torrance's realism does 
not, therefore, contain only the belief in the existence of reality independent of an observer but also 
the conviction that, in the ideal case, this independent reality can and must be allowed to determine 
what we can know about it."
7after long and hard work are we able to bring our understanding to conceptual clarity. 
We are aware that it often takes time to develop the conceptual framework or perceptual
skills necessary to discern what is really the case.20 However, our access must be 
reliable in the sense that we actually do come into contact with the reality and that, as 
we continue our investigation, we are not being fundamentally deceived.21
It must be noted that such an analysis of the conditions of kataphysic knowledge
is entirely absent from Torrance's own writing. Indeed, there is no point where there is 
even a hint that the question as to what is required for his epistemology to be intelligible
bothers him or has even occurred to him. There are a few places where Torrance seems 
to hint that such conditions are required,22 but he is utterly untroubled by it. It seems 
that he would find any sincere objection to the conditions of knowing kata physin to be 
unthinkable. For Torrance, God is not merely an idea but an existent reality whose 
existence he feels he cannot deny without denying his own rationality.23 Additionally, in 
Jesus Christ, we have epistemic access to God in God's own being. As long as we are 
considering theology from the point of view of Nicene Christianity, authentic 
knowledge of God according to the divine nature is indeed possible.
It would seem that Torrance would find a sincere objection to kataphysic 
knowledge within the realm of natural science to be preposterous as well. Physicists, for
example, do not prove the existence of the reality they are studying; rather, they assume 
it.24 The fact that physicists proceed in their studies through the use of experimentation 
shows that they believe that there is, in fact, epistemic access to physical reality.
20 Polanyi discusses the development of skills in Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 49-65. See also Feyerabend, Three 
Dialogues on Knowledge. (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1991), 104-106.
21 It is in this way that Torrance's views require a belief in a form of induction. We shall return to this in
chapter 2 in the discussion on ultimate beliefs.
22 Most directly in TS, 89. See also JL&PL, 3; TF, 52.
23 TS, ix.
24 Torrance quotes Einstein with approval. "The belief in an external world independent of the 
perceiving subject is the basis of all natural science." CT&SC, 57-58. Also see TS, 3.
8Torrance does not claim that his position is radically new. Rather, it is a recovery
of what he calls "the classical attitude of mind."25 Indeed, he sees it as implied in our 
ordinary epistemological procedure in our everyday lives. His reflections on this are 
worth considering at length.
The fundamental principle that I have been concerned with is a very 
simple one, but its implications are deep and far-reaching when worked 
out consistently over the whole range of human knowledge. We know 
things in accordance with their natures, or what they are in themselves; 
and so we let the nature of what we know determine for us the content 
and form of our knowledge. This is what happens in our ordinary, 
everyday experience and knowledge, when, for example, we treat trees 
in accordance with their nature as trees and not as rocks, or treat cows in 
accordance with their nature as cows and not as horses, or treat human 
beings in accordance with their nature as persons and not as things. 
Science, in every field of our human experience, is only the rigorous 
extension of that basic way of thinking and behaving. This is a way of 
understanding scientific activity that is much more appropriate to the 
complexity and richness of nature as it becomes disclosed to us through 
the great advances of the special sciences than is that way to which we 
became accustomed within the compass of a mechanistic universe and its
rigid instrumentalism. This is particularly evident in the field of biology, 
where advance has been obstructed through reduction of organismic 
relations into mechanistic concepts. Nature must be respected and 
courted, not imposed upon. We must let it develop and flower, as it were,
under our investigations. That is surely required if we are really to know 
anything in accordance with what it is in itself, and not simply along the 
lines of its artificial reaction to our tormenting distortion of it. Science is 
not, therefore, something to be set against our ordinary and natural 
experience in the world, but, on the contrary, is a development and a 
25 For the classical attitude of mind as contrasted with the "modern," see "Classical and Modern 
Attitudes of Mind," in R&ST, 1-31.
9refinement of it, with a deeper penetration into the natural coherences 
and patterns already embedded in the real world and already governing 
our normal behavior day by day.26
It is Torrance's conviction that he is advocating nothing more than a "rigorous extension
of [our] basic way of thinking and behaving."27 However, he is also aware of differing 
perspectives. We shall return to these rival positions presently, after exploring 
Torrance's position in relation to other forms of realist epistemology.
How does Torrance's approach differ from other forms of realist epistemology?
Reality and realism are frequent topics of discussion in Torrance's writing. This 
makes it important to examine where Torrance's realism differs from other forms of 
realist epistemology. It should be noted right away that Torrance differs from certain 
forms of realist epistemology inasmuch as he seems to be completely uninterested in 
settling the question as to whether abstract entities exist. For example, nowhere in the 
Torrance corpus can one find a discussion of whether numbers truly "exist." Questions 
of moral realism also seem conspicuously absent from Torrance's thought, especially as 
one might expect him, as a theologian, to take a stance on whether Christian morality is 
"real."28 Additionally, there is no attempt to understand reality or realism by using 
formal language as we see in someone such as Alfred Tarski.29 This means that there are
26 G&G, 8-9.
27 G&G, 33. Similar expressions can be found in G&R, 42; T&C, 92; TS, 107, 317.
28 When considered in the light of Torrance's whole theological approach, this absence is not so 
surprising. To claim ontological status for virtue, even Christian virtue, in any way that would make 
it seem as though such a discussion could take place independently of the self-revelation of God in 
Christ, such as we find in the Platonic Socrates, would likely, to Torrance, seem to be a form of 
traditional natural theology which he categorically rejects.
This is the case even in Torrance's pamphlet, "The Being and Nature of the Unborn Child," (Scottish 
Order of Christian Unity, 2000). Torrance's argument derives its force from the concrete revelation of
God in Christ rather than some abstract and transcendent notion of the "good."
29 Alfred Tarski, "Truth and Proof." Scientific American, vol 220 (6), (Jun 1969). 63-77. The aspects of 
Tarski's work that can be brought into dialogue with Torrance will be discussed in chapter four.
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entire discussions of what it means to be a "realist" that cannot even be brought into 
dialogue with Torrance.
If one turns one's attention to where Torrance falls within the landscape of 
scientific realism, he seems to be difficult to place. He consistently asserts his 
commitment to realism, yet he is silent with regard to the stereotypically realist 
concerns as to whether our theories ought to be interpreted literally or whether they may
legitimately speak of entities that do not exist. Indeed, Torrance affirms the validity and 
rationality of theoretical concepts which, while important in the historical development 
of doctrines, have had to be rejected, such as transubstantiation.30 He rejects what he 
calls "picturing models" and the one-to-one correspondence theory of truth that they 
imply,31 and he acknowledges the importance of the phenomena described by Kuhn as 
paradigm shifts, though he prefers to speak of changes in "frameworks of thought."32
One of the intriguing aspects of Torrance's realism is that it seems to be so 
different from other forms of scientific realism. We never find, for example, a notion of 
"approximate truth" or "inference to the best solution," so common in realist literature 
contemporary with and subsequent upon Torrance's career.33 It would seem that, if one 
did not take Torrance's vehement declarations of realism to heart, one would have to 
conclude that, in the end, Torrance is an anti-realist. Closer examination of Torrance's 
own writing as well as the discussion in secular philosophy of science on the topic of 
scientific realism as it existed during Torrance's career, however, will reveal that 
Torrance, for all his resonance with certain aspects of scientific anti-realism truly is a 
30 T&C, 326-327; ST&R, 124-125.
31 For Torrance's rejection of “picturing models,” see T&C, 255, 274-275; TReconstr, 92, 96; G&G, 
124.
32 For Torrance's use of “frameworks of thought,” see BS&CL, 19; PCT, 49-50; R&ET, 9-10, 81; 
R&ST, 115-116; T&C, xii, 3, 81; MC, 3-4; G&G, 93; CDG, 28; ST&R, 14-15, 174.
33 See Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. Philosophical Issues in Science., 
edited by Newton-Smith, W. H. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 261-279; Jarrett Leplin (ed.), 
Scientific Realism. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); André Kukla, 
Studies in Scientific Realism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); André Kukla and Joel 
Walmsley. "A Theory's Predictive Success does Not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it 
Postulates." In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, edited by Hitchcock, Christopher, 
133-148. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004).
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realist. Indeed, his understanding of "the real" and its relation to theoretical 
representation is one of the more interesting, and underexplored, elements of his 
theology. Unpacking this issue is one of the major tasks of this thesis, so we shall leave 
this analysis until we have probed Torrance's realist epistemology further.
Torrance cites various thinkers throughout history as exemplifying his 
epistemological values and demonstrating the kind of thinking that is demanded by the 
principle of kata physin. These thinkers, theologians and scientists, are separated 
temporally, from the fourth century to the twentieth, and represent a group of people 
who, it would seem, would not be grouped together for any other reason.
The first example of the kind of kataphysic thinker that Torrance recommends is 
Athanasius. In spite of the numerous references to the great Alexandrian theologian 
scattered throughout Torrance's work, the key methodological lesson we can learn from 
Athanasius can be found in his two works, Contra Gentes and De Incarnatione.34 In 
them, Torrance argues,
All a priori arguments are set aside and any argumentation from an 
epistemological or cosmological system people may have inherited prior 
to or independently of their actual knowledge of God as the Father of 
Jesus Christ. Nor is there any attempt made to derive knowledge of God 
abstractively from the Holy Scripture or out of the manuals of earlier 
theologians, but rather through a reasoned movement of thought within 
the field of Christian experience and faith to penetrate into its intrinsic 
order and intelligibility.35
That Athanasius was committed to knowing God in his own nature is manifest by his 
rejection of conceptual systems derived from outside of the gospel and his rejection of 
abstractive ways of thinking.
The second thinker Torrance cites as an example of kataphysic thinking is 
Anselm of Canterbury. 
Here again we find a way of open inquiry that refuses to operate logico-
deductively from fixed principia or traditional authorities, whether they 
34 R&ST, 86-88. See also T&C, 276-277.
35 R&ST, 86-87.
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are ecclesiastical or biblical, but insists on keeping close to the ground of
actual faith and experience...Anselm proposed a way of inquiry which 
methodologically sets aside even biblical statements regarded as formal 
premisses, or which passes through them to the solid truth on which they
rest, in order that the mind may be brought directly under the 
compulsion of the truth and the impress of its rationality.36
For Torrance, one of the great lessons to learn from Anselm is the idea that truth is 
something far greater than can be captured in our statements.
He worked with a hierarchy of different levels in which his thought 
moved from the truth of statement through the truth of being to the 
Supreme Truth of God. This had the effect of clarifying the coherent 
structure of theology and of showing that theological concepts are 
formed and theological statements are made rightly only when they point
beyond themselves to the Truth of God to which they are indebted as 
their Source. But it also has the effect of showing that, while all 
theological concepts and statements are inadequate, for God infinitely 
transcends all our thought and speech of him, nevertheless they are not 
for that reason necessarily false, for their truth as concepts and 
statements does not rest in themselves but in him to whom they refer. 
Expressed the other way round, Anselm showed that since God makes 
his own supreme Truth the objective ground of our knowledge of him he 
thereby confers relativity upon it. Thus theological inquiry and humility 
go hand in hand.37
Torrance's dialogue with Anselm will prove to be crucial when we turn our attention to 
what Torrance means by the term "truth" in a subsequent chapter. We shall leave him 
now to consider the next example of kataphysic thinkers.
Kierkegaard, particularly in his Philosophical Fragments, is yet another 
example of someone who resisted the constraints of formal logic.38 "Once again we 
36 R&ST, 88. See also T&C, 277-278.
37 R&ST, 89.
38 R&ST, 89-90. See also T&C, 278-279.
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have a thinker who rejected the patterns of formal argument and engaged in an open-
structured movement of thought which, judged from the perspective of logic, represents
no more than a set of fragments."39 Kierkegaard was one of the first major philosophers 
who recognized the incredible importance of taking time into account in our knowledge 
of God.
But what really gripped Kierkegaard and forced him to come to terms 
with [time] was the fact that in the Incarnation “absolute” truth moved 
into time in Jesus Christ and became “historical fact,” which implies that
we cannot know the truth except in a dynamic way involving a temporal 
or historical relation to it.40
It is this kind of thinking that Torrance claims was taken up by James Clerk 
Maxwell in his dynamical interpretation of the electromagmetic field. This 
abandonment of attempting to think from a center of absolute rest by Clerk Maxwell is 
interpreted by Torrance as an example of scientists taking the same kind of step in 
science that thinkers like the ones just considered took in the field of Christian theology,
setting the stage for the advances of people like Albert Einstein.41
What, for Torrance, are the alternatives to thinking kata physin?
After considering this idiosyncratic list of thinkers who represent the kind of 
epistemological engagement that Torrance thinks should be the norm, the question must
be asked, "Are there any viable alternatives to Torrance's principle of kata physin?" 
When Torrance describes authentic knowledge as knowledge of a thing 
according to that thing's nature, especially with its implicit claim that we do not 
properly know a thing when we know it according to something other than its nature, it 
is hard to see how this might be controversial. It might seem like nothing more than a 
truism. However, Torrance realizes that this has not been the only way people have 
39 R&ST, 89.
40 R&ST, 90.
41 R&ST, 90-91.
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approached knowledge. There are several epistemological approaches that Torrance 
feels undermine knowledge according to the nature of a thing.
Is dualism a problem?
The first and most dominant epistemological concern for Torrance is what he 
believes to be the distorting influence of dualistic ways of thinking. There are a variety 
of dualisms that have been developed throughout history that Torrance believes to be 
damaging to authentic knowledge and interpretation of the world. Speaking of the 
problem of dualism, though not by name, Torrance writes, "From time to time there 
have arisen in the course of human culture ways of thinking in which aspects of reality 
that are naturally integrated have been torn apart from each other, with damaging effect 
in different areas of knowledge."42
It would seem that Torrance's major concern with the effects of dualistic ways of
thinking is their tendency to separate what Torrance believes are unified and integrated. 
Whether this separation is between the heavens and the earth (or between the sensible 
and the intelligible), how a thing appears to us and what it is in itself, or between the 
knowing subject and the object of their knowledge dualisms, for Torrance, drive a 
wedge between different facets of an integrated whole.
Torrance might argue that there is no reason, a priori, to assume that there must 
be such dualisms in our approach to the world and so their imposition is a falsification 
of reality itself. Regardless of what weight such arguments might have, the issue seems 
to go deeper. In order for knowledge according to the nature of reality to necessarily 
imply a non-dualist or unitary approach, there must also be a basic conviction about the 
ultimate nature of the universe; that reality does, in fact, have this unitary character. We 
shall return to the issues surrounding these so-called "ultimate beliefs" in the next 
chapter.
At the moment, we must ask if it is possible to give an account for why 
Torrance thinks that knowing things according to their nature implies a rejection of 
dualistic ways of thinking. As we shall see below, when Torrance argues for the 
inadequacy of dualistic ways of thinking, he does not do so by arguing on the basis of 
42 MC, 1.
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general human experience or some kind of secular philosophy. He argues deliberately 
and concretely from the standpoint of Christian faith. Though Torrance's radical 
commitment to unitary ways of thinking is not, in itself, distinctly religious and can thus
be useful in self-consciously secular fields, such as the philosophy of science, it is clear 
that he feels driven to such a position because of distinctly religious, indeed distinctly 
Christian, convictions. If we begin, as Torrance does, by taking our cue about the nature
of reality from God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ, it would seem that Torrance's anti-
dualistic stance is justified.
Torrance's affirmation of kataphysic thinking, as exemplified by the great 
thinkers discussed above is, in part, rooted in the rejection of a priori judgments 
regarding what a thing is or must be. The moment it is suggested that Torrance's 
rejection of dualism is the result of his Christian convictions, one must ask whether his 
anti-dualistic position is not a judgment a priori, the very kind of judgment that he 
opposes so strongly. It might be argued that Torrance's Christian convictions prevented 
him from fully understanding dualistic claims about the universe and our knowledge of 
it and so prevented him from appropriately discerning the relation of dualism to 
authentic knowledge.
Torrance, it would seem, would reject the accusation that his condemnation of 
dualism is a priori. Such an accusation might seem plausible if Christian convictions 
have universally and uniformly led Christians to radically anti-dualist positions, but this
has not been the case. Not only does Torrance see dualistic tendencies alive and well in 
the contemporary church,43 he has made a careful study of the intellectual trends that 
were current in the early church. Indeed, one might view his entire monograph, The 
Trinitarian Faith,44 as a detailed exposition of how the various dualisms inherent in 
what have come to be known as the Christological and Trinitarian heresies are 
destructive to the most basic claims of the gospel. It seems that Torrance can be 
defended against the charge of condemning dualism a priori because it is not initially 
clear that basic Christian convictions are not compatible with dualistic approaches to 
knowledge, as is manifest by the many attempts to explain Christian faith within a 
43 R&ET, 15-17.
44 TF.
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dualistic framework such as we find in Arianism or Sabellianism,45 and that it is only 
when it is seen how dualism undermines those Christian convictions in the actual 
unfolding of history that one can say with confidence that one cannot have knowledge 
of God in a dualistic framework and so, as a Christian, such frameworks must be 
rejected.
As has already been mentioned, Torrance's opposition to dualism is rooted in his
Christian convictions. While such anti-dualistic commitments can have effects far 
beyond the field of Christian theology, it is because of their incompatibility with 
Torrance's basic understanding of Christian faith, expressed in the phrase "What [Jesus 
Christ] is toward us He is eternally and antecedently in Himself, but what He is in 
Himself He is toward us within our life in space and time" that Torrance comes to reject
dualism wherever he finds it. It would seem to be an accurate reconstruction of 
Torrance's general anti-dualistic stance to say that, however plausible dualistic ways of 
thinking may appear in fields outside of Christian theology, they are revealed to be 
utterly unacceptable within that field and so must be rejected, by Christians, in every 
field. 
The issues of cosmological dualism seem to lend themselves to a more 
picturesque description than others. Torrance invites us to envisage three ways to 
consider the relation "between the divine and earthly realms."46
Picture in your mind the three ways in which two hemispheres may be 
related to one another: (1) as adjacent to one another but with a clear gap
between them; (2) as touching one another tangentially; and (3) as 
intersecting one another or overlapping with one another. (1) and (2) 
presuppose a dualist framework of thought, whereas (3) rejects dualism 
in favor of interactionism.47
Within the context of the early church, dualistic presuppositions were given expression 
in the sharp differentiation between the kosmos aisthetos and the kosmos noetos, the 
45 TF, 115, 273-276.
46 PCT, 51-52.
47 PCT, 51.
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world of sensible experiences and the world of intelligible reality.48 Reflecting on the 
nature of such a separation, Torrance writes, "Pushed to its extreme point the chorismos 
[separation] between the kosmos aisthetos and the kosmos noetos means that the signs, 
words, statements, images, and conceptions arising within the world have only a this-
worldly reference."49
Torrance saw this kind of destructive dualism at work in Arian interpretations of 
Christian faith.
On the other hand, if God and the world are separated, as in the Arian 
scheme of things, and if the cosmos noetos and the cosmos aisthetos are 
disjoined from one another, then theology in the strict and proper sense 
is impossible, and there can be only mythology. Mythology is possible 
only on the axiomatic assumption of a radical dichotomy or chorismos 
between God and the world, for then our attempts to think of God are 
only epinoetic acts grounded in our own this-worldly self-knowledge 
and projected into God across the great gulf between us. But when that 
kind of gulf is eliminated by the condescension of the living and loving 
God who interacts with our world and human existence, and becomes 
incarnate in Jesus Christ, then a dianoetic way of thinking is possible, in 
which our thoughts, while remaining fully human, nevertheless repose 
upon the reality of God himself and are determined by his hypostatic 
self-communication to us in this world.50
To put Torrance's conviction surrounding the problems of a cosmological dualism for 
Christian faith in other words we might say that if it is indeed true that, in Jesus Christ, 
God has crossed the alleged divide between the intelligible and the sensible and come to
meet with us, such a dualism would falsify the Christian claim that, in Christ, we may 
come face to face with God. As such, cosmological dualism deprives Christianity the 
ability to think theologically and it is left only with the ability to think mythologically.51
48 DM, 45.
49 DM, 158. See also 159, 188-190.
50 DM, 203-204.
51 TF, 133-134. See also DM, 264; G&R, 45-46; PCT, 49-50; TS, 329.
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The problem of cosmological dualism extends beyond the Trinitarian heresies. 
Torrance also finds that Christological positions condemned as heretical tend to flow 
from a tacit assumption of a cosmological dualism. In such a case, Christ is considered 
either "from above," in which case he is truly part of the intelligible world and not part 
of the sensible world, or "from below," in which case the opposite is true. Torrance 
considers these two approaches as being fundamentally the same, since they flow from 
the same dualistic tendencies, and classifies all such Christologies as either "docetic" or 
"ebionite," respectively.52
A further concern over cosmological dualism is that Torrance feels it is linked in
some way with the development of traditional natural theology. "It is rather curious that 
natural theology seems to have flourished only in times when a cosmological dualism 
dominated thought and to have partaken of that dualism."53 It is important to note that 
the very thing that does so much to separate Christ from our world of space-time, and 
so eliminate the primary way that Christians can come to know God would also seem to
be responsible for the attempt to know God through another, entirely different, way.
Another dualism that Torrance finds destructive to authentic knowledge is what 
he calls "the Kantian idea that we cannot know things in themselves or in their internal 
relations, but only in their external relations as they appear to us."54
There are several ways in which Torrance finds this Kantian dualism to be 
problematic. A dualism of this sort can have dramatic consequences for Biblical 
interpretation.
By cutting out any possibility of immediate apprehension of rational or 
intelligible elements in any field of investigation, dualism limits the 
theological component in biblical knowledge to what is logically derived
from observations or appearances...This means, for example, that it is 
impossible for us ever to know anything of Jesus Christ as he is in 
himself, for we are restricted to Jesus as he appeared to his 
52 On the issue of docetic and ebionite Christology, see especially TF, 111-113. See also DM, 35; 
R&ET, 58-59; G&G, 124; CDG, 114-115.
53 R&ST, 37.
54 G&G, 28.
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contemporaries - and indeed to the impression he made upon them as it 
is mediated through the structures of their consciousness, by which they 
made him an "object" of their faith and knowledge.55
As Torrance understands it, approaching the Biblical text within the context of a 
Kantian dualism will necessarily place the reader in a position where they are at least 
two stages removed from the actual revelation of God through Christ. The Biblical 
authors cannot bear witness to Christ as he is in himself, but only as he appeared to 
them. Further, the reader can never know what the Biblical text is communicating in 
itself but only as it appears to them. Such would, for Torrance, eliminate any authority 
of the scriptural witness.
The fact that Kantian dualism is, for Torrance, antithetical to Christian faith is 
made clear when it is noted that the phrase we have cited as a kind of summary 
statement of Torrance's conception of Christian faith is worded in such a way that 
stands starkly against such a dualism. One cannot believe that "what [Jesus Christ] is 
toward us He is eternally and antecedently in Himself, but what He is in Himself He is 
toward us within our life in space and time" and yet affirm that we can only know a 
thing as it appears to us as opposed to what it is in itself.
Torrance does not limit himself only to theological reasons for rejecting Kantian 
dualism. Scientific practice, as he understands it, is also overturning its influence as it 
was manifest, according to Torrance, in people like Ernst Mach.56
Science has been shedding its abstractive character, in which, through a 
predominantly observationalist approach, it tended to tear the surface 
patterns of things away from their objective ground in reality, as though 
we could have no knowledge of things in themselves or in their internal 
relations, but only in their appearances to us...But now all that is being 
cut back, as - in sheer faithfulness to things as they actually are in 
themselves - science is concerned to understand the surface patterns of 
things in the light of the natural coherences in which they are actually 
embedded, and it therefore operates with the indissoluble unity of form 
55 G&G, 8-9.
56 CT&SC, 21; T&C, 272-273; G&G, 34-35, 42-43.
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and being, or of theoretical and empirical elements in human 
knowledge.57
Torrance's opposition to Cartesian dualism is somewhat more complicated than 
other forms of dualistic thought. The reason for this is that it is somewhat difficult to 
pin Torrance down on precisely what he means by Cartesian dualism. Traditionally, 
Cartesian dualism is the sharp differentiation between the mind and the body. Torrance 
certainly uses the term in precisely this way from time to time.58 However, he more 
often uses the term "Cartesian dualism" to describe a radical break between subject and 
object,59 though he also seems to see this as implying a radical break between 
phenomenal events and their alleged "meaning."60
There is no point in Torrance's writing where he fleshes out the relations 
between these three meanings of the term, but it seems possible to provide something of
an account of how they might be linked. In a definition of "dualism," Torrance considers
"a dualism between the mind and the body," which certainly seems like the usual 
understanding of Cartesian dualism, and describes it as a situation "in which a physical 
and mental substance are conceived as either interacting with one another or as running 
a parallel course without affecting one another."61
It seems reasonable to suggest that a sharp separation between the mind and 
body could result in the kind of subject-object dualism which Torrance sets himself up 
against if one could say that, under dualist considerations, it is the mind that is the 
knowing subject as detached and abstracted from the body, unlike what we find in 
someone like Michael Polanyi, with whom Torrance was in significant agreement. 
Unpacking this further, it would mean that a separation between physical and mental 
substances within the human person, when generalized, is a separation between the 
mind/subject and the physical/object.
The connection between the dualism between mind and body and that between 
meaning and phenomena might be something along these lines. If a dualistic way of 
57 G&G, 10-11.
58 T&C, 156.
59 R&ST, 15, 56-57, 72; T&C, 13-14; TS, 306.
60 T&C, 156.
61 BS&CL, 136.
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viewing the human person locates things such as "intention" and "meaning" within the 
mental side of the dualism as opposed to the physical side, it would not take much to 
extend this conviction to the rest of experience. If the "meaning" of human actions 
cannot be understood in light of physical states and actions, or vice versa, why should 
one not conclude that the actions of other humans are similarly separable from their 
"meaning." Once this step is taken, why should one not conclude that "meaning" does 
not require accompanying phenomena and phenomena are inherently devoid of 
meaning, completing the dualism?
It should be repeated that this kind of analysis or exposition of the connections 
between these different uses of the phrase "Cartesian dualism," is not found in 
Torrance's writings. To a certain degree, it is of little consequence whether such 
connections can be entirely justified with reference to historical development. Torrance 
was far more interested in general tendencies, intellectual trends, and unspoken 
philosophical presuppositions than specific instances of them. Additionally, for the 
purposes of this thesis, it is not crucial that Torrance connected his concepts in this way,
since he clearly opposes all three interpretations of the phrase. It is, however, important 
that these ambiguities in Torrance's presentation be brought out for the reader who may 
not be sensitive to the fact that his use of the term is somewhat non-standard.
The form of Cartesian dualism that Torrance opposes most consistently and 
vehemently is the sharp separation between subject and object. As this is the subject of 
chapter three where the issues at stake are explored at length, we shall pass over 
Torrance's problems with it briefly, with a pithy statement of what Torrance feels are its 
problems.
Whenever we operate, as we have been tempted to do regularly in post-
Cartesian thought, with a subject/object relation in which the object is 
regarded as standing opposed to the subject, and therefore with an 
impersonal model of thought, we become trapped in detached, 
objectivist relations to what is other than ourselves. Thus the very model 
of thought which we use inevitably tends to exclude the place of 
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personal agency in our knowing and in the nature of what we seek to 
know.62
It seems strange that Torrance did not make much of the problems that Christian 
theology, as he understood it, has with a mind-body dualism, especially when the 
theological controversy in which the issue arose for the church, Apollinarianism, was a 
major issue in Nicene theology and was even a topic upon which Torrance wrote, 
though perhaps not as often as on some other issues found in the Nicene theologians. 
Torrance summarizes a fairly long exposition of the consequences of Apollinarianism 
for Christian worship.
In allowing no room for the mental and moral life of Jesus as man and in
denying to him authentic human agency in his saving work, it left no 
place for the vicarious role of the human soul and mind and will of Jesus
in the reconciling “exchange” of like for like in the redemption of man. 
And by destroying his representative capacity, it had no place for his 
priesthood or human mediation in our worship of the Father, and by the 
same token it took away the ground for any worship of God with our 
human minds. A mutilated humanity in Christ could not but result in a 
mutilated Christian worship of God.63
In spite of all these problems that arise in Christology when a mind-body 
dualism is not rejected it seems, to the best of my knowledge, that Torrance never 
explicitly connects the two. However, if it is appropriate to make this connection, that to
affirm a mind-body dualism is catastrophic to Christian faith, it would certainly be in 
substantive agreement with Torrance's rejection of other dualisms. Regardless of how 
plausible such ways of thinking may seem outside of Christian theology, they are 
contraindicated by the most basic of Christian convictions and so, according to 
Torrance, if one is to think philosophically as a Christian, they must be rejected.
62 R&ST, 132-133.
63 TReconcil, 150. See also "The Reconciliation of Mind: A Theological Meditation upon the Teaching 
of St. Paul," in Theology in the Service of the Church: Essays in Honor of Thomas W. Gillespie. 
(Grand Rapids, Mich: W. B. Eerdmans Pub., 2000), 198-200.
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After considering several dualisms and Torrance's rejection of them, one might 
be tempted to conclude that Torrance simply believes all forms of dualism to be 
problematic. We have already discussed some of the inadequacies of this charge to the 
degree to which it is equivalent with the charge that Torrance's rejection of dualism is a 
decision made a priori. However, there are ways of thinking that some might consider 
dualistic that are not only considered appropriate by Torrance but are even demanded by
Christian faith. The relation between God and the world, for example, is just such an 
instance.
The rejection of radical dualism, however, must not be taken to imply 
the advocacy of any oneness or even any proportion between God and 
the world, but rather the rejection of a deistic disjunction between them. 
God’s interaction with the world He has made maintains a proper 
dualism between them.64
The problem here is not the significant differentiation between God and the world since 
Torrance has no interest in defending views such as pantheism or panentheism. Rather, 
the problem arises when the difference between God and the world hardens, so to 
speak, into a conviction that God is unable to interact with the world that God has 
created. Torrance's rejection of dualism, again, is not an a priori position, but a careful 
response to reality as he understands it.
Torrance's rejection of dualism is so sustained and vigorous that it is not 
surprising that there are some, even among those sympathetic to his position, who 
might wonder if he "doth protest too much," and actually harbor dualistic tendencies. 
John Douglas Morrison, in his monograph, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God in the
Thought of Thomas Forsyth Torrance, suggests precisely this.
In fact, [Torrance] seems to open himself to the very charge of 'dualism' 
that he levels against others. If God is utterly different, if the Logos of 
God is radically different from created logos and historicity then what of 
unitariness and interrelation and real knowledge of God arising out of 
creation and redemption. Has he not either left Jesus Christ behind (in 
his true, real humanity) or made Christ/Word beyond history and human 
64 ST&I, 71.
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apprehension, given the fact that he speaks of the Truth as utterly 
transcendent and beyond all creatureliness, yet somehow apprehensible. 
A real “leap” of the “quantum” variety must occur given the fact that for 
Torrance Truth is not to be found in linguistic truthfulness itself.65
There are a few misunderstandings evident in Morrison's critique. First, it would
seem that Torrance would hesitate to speak of real knowledge of God "arising" out of 
creation and redemption. Surely Torrance would not want to deny that creation and 
redemption are conditions of real human knowledge of God since such knowledge 
could not occur in humans if there had been no creation or redemption. Indeed, for 
Torrance revelation, and thus real knowledge of God, cannot be separated from 
reconciliation.66 However, to speak of knowledge as "arising" seems to connote a 
process of gaining knowledge of God that is more automatic or mechanistic than 
Torrance's thinking would allow.
A second problem with Morrison's treatment is that, when he claims that "a real 
'leap' of the 'quantum' variety must occur given the fact that for Torrance Truth is not to 
be found in linguistic truthfulness itself,"67 he implies that Torrance's real problem is his
refusal to locate Truth primarily in the truthfulness of statements, as if an appeal to an 
inerrant Bible would solve Torrance's alleged dualistic problems.68 In point of fact, such 
an appeal would solve nothing. If the gap between the uncreated Logos of God and the 
created logos of humanity cannot be crossed in the person of Christ, how can we 
believe that it has been crossed in a text?
The most significant problem with this charge of dualism is that Morrison has 
misunderstood the epistemological significance of the Incarnation for Torrance.
The Incarnation involves a hypostatic union not only between the Word 
of God and the word of man, the Rationality of God and the rationality 
65 John D. Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas Forsyth 
Torrance. (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 270.
66 See chapters 1 and 2 in MC.
67 My emphasis.
68 The fact that Torrance would seem to resist such an appeal to biblical inerrancy lies in his conviction 
that, since Christ is the truth in his own person, we are not free to treat the scriptures as if they were 
true in the same sense. R&ET, 124.
25
of man, but between the uncreated Truth of God and the created truth of 
this world which God has made and to which we belong. Hence in Jesus 
Christ we have to reckon with one who is God's ultimate Truth and our 
contingent truth in the indivisible oneness of his personal Being, and 
therefore with one in whom God's ultimate Truth has become humanly 
articulate and communicable in words and truths within the reciprocities 
and intelligibilities of our contingent existence in space and time. Thus 
when our contingent statements refer away from themselves to the Truth 
of God as it is in Jesus Christ, they do not have to bridge the infinite 
difference between the creature and the Creator in order to terminate 
upon that Truth, for they may refer to it in its incarnate Reality, and 
insofar as they are true they may actually terminate upon that incarnate 
Reality and thus upon the Truth of God Almighty himself.69
For Torrance, the dualism that Morrison posits is not just overcome by Christ but in 
Christ. It is a real hypostatic union that overcomes the separation. In spite of the radical 
difference between the Divine and human logoi, there is no separation between the two 
within the Incarnate Christ. We are therefore led to conclude that, if Torrance is guilty 
of dualistic tendencies within his own theology, it is not where Morrison thinks he has 
found them.
How is Positivism perceived as undermining kataphysic knowledge?
A frequent theme in Torrance's writing is that he considers positivism to be one 
of the greatest dangers to our knowledge of reality. However, looking at how the term is
actually used leads to somewhat less clarity than one would like.70 On this topic, we 
may turn to the glossary which Torrance wrote to accompany an edited (by Torrance) 
volume of essays exploring the implications of the thought of Michael Polanyi for faith 
and life. He provides a lengthy explanation of what he understands by positivism.
69 R&ET, 125, my emphasis.
70 For some passages where we get hints regarding particular aspects that Torrance dislikes about 
positivism see CDG, 47; D&CO, 95-96; R&ST, 21-22, 54; T&C, 200-201; G&G, 81-82, "TR," 183.
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Positivism - the view which denies that we can know more than tangible 
external facts. It seeks to purify science from metaphysics by avoiding 
any ontological reference of knowledge to reality, and aims at the 
achievement of strict detachment and impersonality by discarding all 
unprovable beliefs as arbitrary personal manifestations. According to the 
positivist view of knowledge scientific theories must not go beyond 
sense experience by affirming anything that cannot be experimentally 
observed or tested, so that whenever an empirical observation turns up 
that conflicts with it, a theory is deemed to be falsified and must be 
dropped immediately. Scientific theories are ultimately only useful 
mental constructs or sets of useful conventions for the handling of 
observational data, or devices like maps, time-tables or telephone 
directories with reference to which we may record events and compute 
their future course in our observations. Theories of this kind deny any 
claim to inherent rationality, so that, as Polanyi argues, they lack any real
persuasive power. In common with empiricism and phenomenalism, 
positivism offers a complete mechanico-causal interpretation of man and
human affairs which disintegrates all rational grounds for human 
convictions and actions. Moreover, it offers a mechanistic account of the 
human mind, in identifying the mind with the physio-logical mechanism 
of the brain, and thereby denatures man and denies him any capacity for 
independent thought.71
Torrance's explanation of positivism begins with a fairly straightforward account
that might just as easily come from someone who endorses the program. Toward the 
end, Torrance's distaste for positivism enters into his explanation, drawing on the 
similar distaste that Polanyi had for the view.
There are several places where Torrance's understanding of positivism clashes 
with his own epistemological position. He is concerned that a view that, a priori, rejects
any knowledge that goes beyond tangible and external facts or sense perception, will 
never be able to know things in accordance to their own nature, since he does not 
71 BS&CL, 142-143.
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believe that the nature of a thing can be reduced to its manifestation in sensibly 
perceptible ways. It is, in some ways, functionally Kantian in the sense that it restricts 
knowledge only to things as they appear to us rather than things as they are in 
themselves which, as we have already seen, is not compatible with knowledge in 
Torrance's view. It is less clear that Torrance's explanation is sufficient to account for 
why positivism necessarily implies a mechanico-causal interpretation of reality. Such 
would require a reductionistic and naturalistic philosophical project which, while 
certainly compatible with positivism as portrayed by Torrance, is not a logical 
consequence of the other aspects of positivistic thinking mentioned by him.
Occasionally, Torrance will refer to positivism as having been defeated within 
the natural sciences.72 He is not alone in this view; it has been rejected by philosophers 
as different as Karl Popper,73 Roy Bhaskar,74 and Bas Van Fraassen.75 This widespread 
agreement sheds light on Torrance's attack on positivism in a two major ways.
First it shows that, though Torrance chooses to be almost casually dismissive of 
positivism rather than arguing against it, he is not simply ignoring a view with which he
disagrees. Positivism has indeed been rejected, not only by practicing scientists, who 
are Torrance's preferred sources for his philosophy of science,76 but by professional 
philosophers of science. Problems within the positivistic program itself77 as well as 
increasing pressure from philosophers in the tradition associated with Thomas S. Kuhn 
have made the radical rejection of a theoretical component to knowledge untenable.
72 "TR," 175; T&C, 65.
73 Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Fourth (Revised) 
ed. (Frome and London: Butler & Tanner Limited, 1976), 21-22. Popper claimed that the kind of 
empiricism put forward by some positivists was "quite unsatisfactory."
74 "My subsidiary aim is thus to show once-and-for-all why no return to positivism is possible." Roy 
Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science. 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2008), 8.
75 "Logical positivism, especially, even if one is quite charitable about what counts as a development 
rather than a change of position, had a rather spectacular crash." Bas C. Van Fraassen, The Scientific 
Image. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 2.
76 Ground and Grammar of Theology, Lecture 2 Q&A. Grace Communion International, 
http://gcitv.net/download/MiscVid/TorranceGrammar-Tape2-QA.mp3. Accessed March 18, 2014.
77 As revealed by the development from Carnap through Popper to Lakatos.
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There is a second consequence of this consensus that positivism is no longer a 
viable philosophical position that must be taken with the utmost seriousness. Though 
we can say that, for all intents and purposes, positivism is dead, the impulse that gave 
rise to positivism in the first place is alive and well. The fall of positivism has not 
resulted in the fall of scientific anti-realism more generally. The fact that one of the 
most important anti-realist philosophers of science in recent decades, Bas Van Fraassen,
can agree with Torrance that positivism is not viable, means that we must be prepared to
examine the issue on a somewhat deeper level.
Van Fraassen's philosophical position, which goes by the name "constructive 
empiricism,"78 is a form of scientific anti-realism that avoids some of the major 
problems that Torrance has with positivism. It would be hard to charge Van Fraassen 
with limiting knowledge to tangible, external facts as he seems to be relatively 
unconcerned with speaking of "knowledge" at all. He is far more interested in speaking 
of the grounds upon which we stand when we "accept" a scientific theory, which he 
claims is empirical adequacy at a particular moment in time rather than "truth."79 
Constructive Empiricism does not require the discarding of unprovable beliefs; indeed 
it relies upon them for Van Fraassen's view is that "scientific activity is one of 
construction rather than discovery."80 Because of this, theories must necessarily go 
beyond sense experience. 
Much more could be said regarding how Van Fraassen's scientific anti-realism is
exempt from Torrance's critique of positivism and yet stands, at least in part, within the 
tradition flowing from it. The lesson we must learn from this example is that the 
philosophical background of the discussion between scientific realism and anti-realism 
is more nuanced than one who has read only Torrance's views on the subject might 
realize. This has some practical implications regarding Torrance's place in this 
discussion to which we shall return in chapter four.
78 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 5.
79 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 12.
80 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 5.
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What kind of reality is implied by kata physin?
As stated above, in order to insist that we have authentic knowledge only when 
we know something according to its nature there must be a reality that exists 
independently of the knower. We turn our attention now to what this reality ought to 
look like if Torrance's epistemological convictions are valid.
Though Torrance would claim that in both natural and theological science we 
investigate any particular reality according to its own nature, the distinction between the
object of theological knowledge and the objects of our natural knowledge can become 
somewhat confusing, even in Torrance's own writing. For example, there is an instance 
where Torrance claims that our knowledge of God is different than our knowledge of 
natural objects because, 
Natural objects, when we know them, have to be objects of our cognition
- that is part of their determinate nature. This is not to deny that 
knowledge of them requires effort on our part, and indeed discovery. 
Even though we must engage in intuitive and discursive thought we do 
not discover God by our own efforts, and when we know Him He does 
not have to be an object of our cognition in the same way as in natural 
knowledge.81
What, precisely, does Torrance mean by this "have to be" that sets natural objects apart 
from the Divine Object? The specific expression that Torrance uses is unfortunate in 
that it seems to connote a kind of unreliability or capricious element in God's being. 
What could Torrance mean by this? Does he simply mean that God always 
transcends our forms of thought and speech about him? This is hardly unique to 
theological knowledge, as Torrance points out several times within the same book.82 
Does he mean nothing more than that we can gain knowledge of created being without 
having to let it disclose itself to us out of its own volition while we cannot do so with 
God? This might hold true when comparing theology with physics or chemistry, but 
there is certainly a parallel, mutatis mutandis, with fields such as psychology, where we 
81 TS, 37.
82 This will also become more clear throughout the course of this work.
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must take the actual self-disclosure of the subject into account.83 Does Torrance intend 
to imply that, whereas God continually objects to being confined by our theoretical 
expressions, natural objects have no analogous resistance? This again would seem to be 
inconsistent with Torrance's larger concerns.
We get a sense that these interpretations are not what Torrance intends when we 
examine the footnote to the above passage that reads, "By 'natural knowledge' is meant 
here knowledge of natural phenomena." When we realize that the difference is not so 
much, as the main text implies, knowledge of natural objects as knowledge of natural 
phenomena, then the problems become less difficult, for there is a marked difference 
between how we come to know natural phenomena and how we come to know God.
Though there is a sense in which both the objects of natural and theological 
science are given in the sense that they are truly objects and not merely constructs of 
our own subjectivity,84 there is a crucial difference in this given-ness. In spite of all the 
sweat and hard work that goes into natural scientific inquiry, there is a sense in which 
the objects are given for the taking. We are limited in our ability to investigate them 
only by the difficulties inherent in accessing them, whether it be a matter of traveling to 
a particular part of the world (such as in biology or zoology), developing the right 
equipment (as in astronomy or particle physics), or acquiring a way of looking at the 
problem in order to make sense of it (as in relativity theory).
We might also say that the Object of theological science is given for human 
knowledge. However, we must conceive of God as being given for the receiving rather 
than taking. Indeed, this giving must also be understood as God's free self-giving, for 
God is not coerced. God is not such that we can storm his kingdom and demand 
revelation of him in the way that we can with much of creation. Rather, we are at the 
mercy of God, and mercy is the correct word here, to reveal himself to us. At no point 
does God "have" to be the object of our knowledge as there is no point where we can 
make such a demand of him. God is eminently faithful to himself and we need not fear 
83 Or even in knowing other persons. See T&C, 198, for Torrance's appropriation of the distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary objects.
84 Torrance makes this point in the main text immediate before the previously quoted material. The 
term "given" must not be understood as implying "bare facts" or "theory-free data.”
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that a genuine insight into the reality of God will prove fundamentally false, though it 
might need to be significantly transformed, as in other sciences. What is at stake is the 
source or agent of knowledge. In this it is always God who graciously gives himself to 
be known by us in Christ and through the Spirit.
Here we are making explicit a distinction that seems to be implicit in Torrance's 
thought. Though there is, to my knowledge, no text in Torrance's work which states this,
it seems that the comparative accessibility of the objects of natural science as compared 
to that of theological science might find theological rooting in Genesis 1:28, where 
humanity is given authority over creation, while no parallel authority over God is given.
Is there a structure to reality?85
Once an external reality is affirmed, the question arises as to whether this reality
has a structure and, if so, what that structure is. Torrance believes there is a structure to 
reality, that it is characterized by what he calls "inherent intelligibility" or "inner logic," 
which is to play a considerable role in our understanding of it.86
For Torrance, the structure of reality is revealed to us in the fact that, in our 
scientific engagement with reality, we have had to develop a stratified series of 
sciences, each of which engaging with different levels of reality, attempting to explain 
phenomena ranging from the purely physical, through the organismic to the 
sociological.87 As such, the conclusion that reality is stratified is made a posteriori, after
considering the necessity, in practice, of a plurality of natural sciences.
Each science examines this stratified reality at different levels, with their 
methodological concerns being driven by the unique nature of the object of each 
science. In physics, for example, we have to do with purely physical reality, largely 
amenable to mathematical and deterministic description. In biology, we have to do with 
85 See, inter alia, TS, 106-116.
86 Torrance also use the phrase “inherent rationality,” though this is less common. For Torrance's use of
such phrases, see CT&SC, 67-68; G&R, 202-203; R&ST, 7-8, 77-78, 85-86; TS, 262-263; G&G, 117;
T&C, 273-274.
87 T&C, 208-209. See also CT&SC, 37-38; D&CO, 20.
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living beings, which react differently to experiment than inanimate reality, which 
naturally exist in communities and environments that cannot be artificially closed off 
for scientific purposes without changing their very nature. In psychology, we are 
dealing with human persons who have minds. In addition to whatever we can discover 
through external experimentation, we must also take account of the fact that human 
subjects can speak to us and can tell us about themselves.
The objection might be made that Torrance is simply reading an accidental fact 
of history, that we happen to have a series of sciences, into a fact about reality, that the 
reality studied by those sciences is similarly stratified. Why should the organization of 
our sciences necessarily be rooted in how things are independently of them? Is it not 
equally defensible that our natural sciences are what they are because our minds have 
imposed that kind of structure upon reality?88 How is it that Torrance can be confident 
that the structure of our sciences is the consequence of a structured reality and not that 
our conception of a structured reality is the result of our development of stratified 
sciences?
On one level, this conviction is an "ultimate belief" in the broad sense described 
in the next chapter, where it is a decision made that, from one point of view seems 
entirely arbitrary but, from another point of view, is made under the impress of reality 
itself. However, some more justification can be offered.
The affirmation that our epistemology is undergirded by a logically prior 
ontology can be seen as rooted in Christian convictions. According to Torrance, we rise 
up from our evangelical and doxological experience to a doctrine of the Evangelical 
Trinity and posit the existence of an Ontological Trinity and claim that these two are, in 
fact, one and the same.89 That is to say, the Trinity that actually exists is not something 
other than the Trinity we encounter in Christ and through the Spirit.90 It is true that one 
might object that there is no logical bridge between our theories and reality and so we 
cannot use epistemology to justify ontological claims.91 However, as it seems the 
88 T&C, 7, 38.
89 A fuller account of how this happens will be provided in chapter 5.
90 The connection between the economic Trinity and the ontological Trinity can be found in DM, 213; 
G&G, 158, 168; CDG, 7, 83-84, 90-91, 109, 136, 254.
91 Indeed, Torrance is aware of this. See TS, 184, though Torrance uses the term "purely theoretical 
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entirety of Torrance's book, The Trinitarian Faith, is concerned to demonstrate, if our 
doctrine of the Evangelical Trinity does not arise from a previously existing Ontological
Trinity, Christian faith collapses to the ground.92 It seems that the reasoning from the 
stratification of our sciences to the stratification of reality is parallel. If reality is not 
stratified, it renders the stratification of our sciences unintelligible.
There is another argument, rooted in common sense and thus simpler if not as 
rigorous, that could be raised. Whatever one wishes to say at the level of abstract 
epistemology, we actually behave as though reality is stratified since we do not attempt,
generally, to reduce one science to another. One might object, as has been done by 
various anti-realist critiques of scientific realism, that we cannot assume that entities 
exist simply because our theories posit them.93 This is certainly true. However, if there 
is no relation at all between our theories and reality, the entire scientific endeavor 
collapses to the ground. This is not to say that, if reality does not agree entirely with our
current theoretical formulations, science is doomed, but that, if our theories are not 
arising from something independent, science is doomed.94
This kind of stratification is precisely what we would expect to find according to
Torrance's epistemology. Scientific inquiry generates particular sciences whenever it is 
applied to a new object or subject of study. This includes the science generated when 
the "nature" under investigation is the living God, revealed in our spatio-temporal world
in Jesus of Nazareth: Christian theology.95
bridge" here.
92 See TF and CDG, the entirety of which are largely concerned with this and related topics.
93 See the two essays in Christopher Hitchcock (ed), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell), 2004. Jarrett, Leplin, "A Theory's Predictive Success can Warrant Belief 
in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates," 117-132 and André Kukla and Joel Walmsley, "A 
Theory's Predictive Success does not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates," 133-
148.
94 Indeed, it is the conviction that our theories are rooted in an independent reality beyond themselves 
that not only allows for theory change over time, but demands it. More on this in chapter 5.
95 It is because of its devotion to its proper object that Torrance argues for theology being a science 
alongside the other sciences. TS, xvii. See also G&R, 114; KB, 211; Treconstr, 268-269; TS, xiii-xiv, 
22-23.
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The different levels of reality and the sciences can be both distinct yet intimately
related. When writing about this, Torrance uses concepts that we find in the philosophy 
of Michael Polanyi. Though there are distinctions between the sciences, there are 
"boundary conditions" where two sciences, and the realities they study, come up against
each other. At such boundary conditions, a level of reality can influence others to a 
greater or lesser degree.96 Cross-level influence takes place in two ways. Just as a 
"lower" level of reality, by being what it is, marks off theoretical possibilities as being 
impossible in fact, action at a higher level can make lower levels behave in unexpected 
ways. It is precisely because cross-level interaction is a matter of this "dual control" 
(any level is influenced by activity at both "higher" and "lower" levels) that our science 
of engineering is possible.
One example of how dual control can be made manifest is with an airplane. Air 
molecules when left alone will seldom, if ever, spontaneously generate the conditions 
necessary for sustained heavier-than-air flight. The laws of aerodynamics do not 
prohibit such flight which is clear from the fact that such flight actually occurs, but such
conditions are unlikely to arise purely on the molecular level, due to the second law of 
thermodynamics. However, we are consistently able to create such conditions, not by 
manipulating the molecular system directly and as such, but by engineering a wing 
whose shape is such that the desired pressure systems result. This feat of engineering at 
a higher level was not done by ignoring the levels below it, but precisely by taking them
very seriously into account. All the engineering in the world cannot make an unsuitable 
material suitable or change the conditions under which flight is possible. What we are 
able to do, though, is influence lower levels by creative advancement on higher levels. 
When speaking of reality as a stratified series of levels, it begs the question as to
whether there is one level that is the single most "basic" in every meaningful sense of 
the word. In other words, does there exist a single level of reality such that every other 
level of reality can be understood and interpreted as nothing more than as a function of 
96 References in Torrance to boundary conditions and dual control can be found in CT&SC, 38; 
D&CO, 102-103, 127; R&ET, 37-39, 73-74; R&ST, 92-93; ST&I, 84; T&C, 136, 142, 146-148, 179-
180, 208-209; ST&R, 188-190. Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension. (Magnolia, MA: Smith, 
1983), 35-36.
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that level? Torrance's definition of reductionism is that it is "the belief that everything 
can be explained by recourse to a single simpler principle, or that all knowledge can be 
reduced to a single level of explanatory connections."97
Torrance is opposed to reductionistic ways of thought, regardless of whether one
is speaking of reducing one level of reality to another or reducing one conceptual level 
to another.98 He follows up his above definition with the following, "More generally, 
reductionism is the fallacy of redefining one set of entities and their relations, instead of
treating the latter as a limiting case of the former."99 Though there may be considerable 
overlap between "adjacent" levels, one can never be reduced to another without 
remainder. Torrance cites Oppenheimer with approval.
Every science has its own language...Everything the chemist observes 
and describes can be talked about in terms of atomic mechanics, and 
most of it at least can be understood. Yet no one suggests that, in dealing 
with the complex chemical forms which are of biological interest, the 
language of atomic physics would be helpful. Rather it would tend to 
obscure the great regularities of biochemistry, as the dynamic description
of gas would obscure its thermodynamic behaviour.100
The fact that attempting to reduce "higher" sciences to "lower" ones obscures the 
regularities of the "higher" science implies that the order manifest at these different 
levels are of different kinds. Torrance often speaks of this kind of relation by saying that
the levels are "open upward but not reducible downward."101
Every time Torrance mentions reductionist ways of thinking, he is critical of it. 
However, it should be noted that there is a sense in which the sciences are reducible to 
one another, but we must be clear that there is more than one way to speak of one field 
being "reducible" to another. Roy Bhaskar, a philosopher of science who was a later 
contemporary of Torrance, distinguishes between three different ways we can speak of 
97 BS&CL, 144.
98 See CT&SC, 15-17; T&C, 264-265 for the former; CDG, 86; G&G, 36; R&ET, 45, for the latter.
99 BS&CL, 144.
100 TS, 111.
101 D&CO, 20; T&C, 177, 208; CDG, 86; ST&R, 188.
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one science or field being reducible to another.102 First, the lower level is the "basis" of 
the higher, out of which it arises and is bounded. A second sense is that the higher level 
can be "explained" in terms of the lower level. Lastly, the higher level can be 
"predicted" by the lower level. Bhaskar clearly affirms the possibility of the first sense, 
in that we can say that chemistry is "reducible" to physics inasmuch as the object of 
chemistry could not exist without the object of physics and that chemistry cannot break 
the laws of physics. However, he absolutely rejects the third sense, as one cannot 
predict what will happen chemically by an analysis of the relevant laws of physics any 
more than one can predict how a game of cricket will unfold simply by analyzing the 
rules of the game.103 It would seem that Torrance is largely in agreement with Bhaskar 
on this point. When he speaks against reductionism, it is clearly of the third kind. His 
appropriation of Polanyi's distinction between "higher" and "lower" levels seems to 
imply that he would, in fact, affirm the first, and perhaps even the second, variety of 
reductionism. Torrance did not distinguish between these different kinds of 
reductionism. This is, in part, because these distinctions had not yet been widely made; 
Bhaskar was attempting to examine an under-analyzed concept. When most writers in 
the twentieth century speak of reductionism, it is in its third form which both Torrance 
and Bhaskar reject. However, it should be noted that Torrance's blanket condemnation 
of “reductionism” tends to obscure the distinction made explicit in Bhaskar. As such, 
Torrance can be seen as making the distinction between the sciences a bit “harder” than 
may be warranted.
A note on Torrance's use of “science”
Torrance often speaks of science as if it were neatly divided up into clearly 
demarcated eras. He speaks casually about “Newtonian” science and “post-Einsteinian”
102 Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, 114-116.
103 Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, 112. Torrance will occasionally draw on the Polanyian insight 
that we cannot determine the purpose of a machine merely by physico-chemical analysis but must 
have a distinct science of engineering to do this. See CT&SC, 15-17; R&ET, 37-39; T&C, 146-148; 
ST&R, 188-190. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, 38-41.
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science. Within the realm of physics, it is hard to doubt that Newton and Einstein have 
had a significant enough impact so as to make such descriptions fairly reasonable 
within a narrow field. However, Torrance's frequent reference to favorite scientists such 
as Einstein and Clerk Maxwell could raise the question as to whether Torrance is really 
in dialogue with “science” or perhaps only, to a significant degree, with a handful of his
favorite scientists.
It must first be noted that Torrance's preferred dialogue partner within the 
scientific disciplines is physics. This is evident from Torrance's frequent references to 
physics and the works of physicists and the noticeable shortage of references to other 
scientific fields. This is particularly interesting because Torrance claims that theology, 
due to the nature of its subject matter, has more in common with other scientific fields 
than physics, especially classical physics. At one point, Torrance suggests that 
theology's inability to fit into the kind of logic that characterizes classical physics 
makes it similar to “quantum physics and biology,” which also resist that kind of logical
description.104
However, in spite of this resonance, Torrance does not engage with either 
quantum physics or biology in any significant depth. Not only are references to sciences
outside of physics rare in Torrance's writing, he occasionally makes comments to the 
effect that other sciences have not made the kind of advances he finds in relativity 
physics and are therefore to be seen as somewhat behind the times. Torrance laments 
this failure of scientists to make the same kind of step in biology as relativity physicists 
have made in their own field. 
Modern biology has yet to achieve a 'break-through' in this direction comparable
with that in physics, but when it does, the organized space-time structures of the 
biological field should supply historical science and theological science with 
more apt analogues than those which are not available in physics.105
104  TS, 271-272.
105  ST&I, 84-85. Torrance believes that this advance has been obstructed by reductionistic ways of 
thinking. See T&C, 264-265 and G&G, 8-9.
38
Again, we read that Torrance wants to affirm a closer kinship between theology and 
biology than between theology and physics, but we do not see this conviction fleshed 
out in his writings.
Torrance's interaction with quantum physics is somewhat more complicated. 
Tapio Luoma points out that, while in early works like Theological Science, Torrance 
makes many references to quantum physics, “though never in a critical tone,” in later 
works like Divine and Contingent Order, he “applies consistent criticism to the 
Copehagen/Göttingen interpretation, accusing it of lapsing back into determinism.”106 
This shift is important as it connotes that Torrance, earlier in his career, felt that 
quantum physics was compatible with his theological perspective while later on came to
believe that the mainstream of quantum physics was hostile to his views.107 Luoma 
suggests that Torrance's “appreciation of Einstein” has tended to impede his ability to 
engage with quantum physicists who disagree with Einstein's interpretation of the 
field.108
Torrance appropriates the insights of one more branch of science that it is 
important to note here. In Torrance's later works, we find periodic engagement with the 
field of non-equilibrium thermodynamics or the thermodynamics of open systems.109 
While such an engagement has profound implications, for Torrance, with regard to the 
kind of non-deterministic order that can characterize open systems, it must be noted that
this is, once again, a branch of physics. Indeed, one might say that, when Torrance 
speaks of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, he is actually referring to the work of Ilya 
Prigogine, whom he mentions by name with some frequency.110 If this is so, and it 
seems that it is, we are left with Torrance, rather than extending his engagement with 
106  Luoma, Incarnation and Physics, 67n.
107  Luoma, Incarnation and Physics, 67n.
108  Luoma, Incarnation and Physics, 67.
109  References to non-equilibrium thermodynamics, or the thermodynamics of open systems, can be 
found in CT&SC, 17; D&CO, 50; T&C, 185-188; G&G, 12-13, 141-143; CFM, 21-24, 99-100, 101-
102; PCT, 69-70.
110  References to Prigogine in Torrance's writings can be found in D&CO, 50, 121; T&C, 186-187; 
G&G, 12-13, 141; CFM, 92, 99-100, 103, 152; PCT, 41-42, 69-70. Note there is a great deal of 
overlap between the lists of references to non-equilibrium thermodynamics and those to Prigogine.
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the natural sciences by adding another branch of science, has merely extended his 
engagement by adding the work of another individual scientist with whom he finds 
resonance.
What shall we make of Torrance's selective use of modern science? A 
sympathetic reading of Torrance on this topic would emphasize that he was likely just 
trying to find and explore the relevant points of resonance between theology and 
science and that he should be applauded for this work. However, even if this is the case,
it is not sufficient for Torrance to characterize his work as engaging with “science” as a 
whole or even with “post-Einsteinian science.” Rather, Torrance's engagement is 
primarily with a handful of scientists who have done important work that reveal ways in
which Torrance's theological vision is not only compatible with elements of modern 
science but has significant resonances with it. While this work is not unimportant and 
scientifically minded Christians may have much to celebrate in Torrance's work, one 
must be more careful than Torrance was and refrain from speaking so broadly of 
Torrance's appropriation of “science.”
Above, we considered that Torrance's epistemology is not value-neutral. There 
are some conditions that must be taken into consideration in order for it to be 
intelligible. If Torrance's epistemology requires that we must believe certain things, 
those mentioned above were a belief in an external reality and the belief that we have 
some kind of epistemic access to that reality, it is important to examine the role of such 
convictions in our knowledge and how Torrance deals with them within the context of 
his epistemological concerns. It is to this topic that we turn in the next chapter.
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2. Ultimate Beliefs
In the last chapter, it was argued that Torrance's epistemological conviction, that 
authentic knowledge is knowledge according to a thing's nature, is not value-neutral but
is only intelligible if certain conditions hold; namely, that the object of knowledge 
exists and that we have epistemic access to it. This acknowledgement raises several 
questions. Is it possible to have epistemological convictions that do not rely, explicitly 
or implicitly, upon conditions of this kind? Do such conditions of knowledge invalidate 
a given epistemological position? If one grants the necessity of such conditions of 
knowledge, does this not open up the gates to substantial criticism? Before such 
questions can be addressed with regard to Torrance's position, a further point about his 
realist convictions must be articulated.
Torrance's realism, as opposed to empiricism or positivism, asserts that we may 
know more of reality than we encounter through our senses. This has several relevant 
implications, the most important of which at this point in our discussion is that 
knowledge cannot be reduced to sense-experience. Someone from an empiricist 
perspective might object to this and ask Torrance, "Where does this knowledge come 
from?"
In answer to this, it must be noted that Torrance believes that reality can bear 
upon us in a dynamic and holistic way that involves our senses but cannot be reduced to
what we experience through them. In a moment of personal reflection in the preface to 
his major work, Theological Science, we get a glimpse into the kind of thing Torrance 
might be talking about within the context of his fundamental theological convictions.
I find the presence and being of God bearing upon my experience and 
thought so powerfully that I cannot but be convinced of His 
overwhelming reality and rationality. To doubt the existence of God 
would be an act of sheer irrationality, for it would mean that my reason 
had become unhinged from its bond with real being.1
Here, Torrance is giving expression to a kind of knowledge that is empirical in one 
sense but not in another. It is clear that Torrance is speaking of God as experienceable, 
1 TS, xi.
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for God can "bear upon" his experience in a powerful way. However, although Torrance
articulates this in terms of experience, he does not do so in terms of sense-data.2 What 
this means is that Torrance is implying that one can have experience that cannot be 
reduced to sense-data. The upshot of this in epistemological terms is that one cannot use
sense-data as the exclusive means by which to verify or falsify certain epistemological 
claims.
Can we have presupposition-less knowledge?
For a theist to affirm that there are certain epistemological claims that can be 
neither verified nor falsified by sense-data is potentially controversial. To assert that 
claims about the existence and character of God are exempt from verification or 
falsification by sense-data is likely to sound to many ears like a double-standard that 
illustrates precisely why theistic belief is unreasonable.
Torrance is not positing a fundamental difference between the kind of 
knowledge we gain in the natural sciences and the kind of knowledge we gain in 
theological science. Instead, Torrance suggests that for all their differences, the natural 
and theological sciences are in the same epistemological situation, mutatis mutandis. 
Natural and theological science are both governed by what Torrance calls "ultimate 
beliefs" which are neither verifiable nor falsifiable, yet exert a controlling influence on 
scientific thinking.3
The controlling statements with which we operate in science are both 
unfalsifiable and unverifiable. They are statements which express what 
2 John Wesley alludes to a notion of "spiritual senses." "Sermon 130: On Living without God." In The 
Works of John Wesley, edited by Outler, Albert C. Vol. 4, 168-176. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1987), §9-11, 172-173. It is important to note that Torrance uses "experience" to describe what 
happens when someone encounters an independently existing reality, whether divine or mundane. 
Within Torrance's writing, the term functions as stressing the accessibility of that external reality. In 
some contexts, Torrance uses the term "participation" in a similar way, though it must be noted that 
this term is used in a distinctly non-Platonic way. 
3 BS&CL, 12.
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we have called ultimate beliefs, beliefs without which there would be no 
science at all, beliefs which play a normative role in the gaining and 
developing of all scientific knowledge. Yet these ultimate beliefs are by 
their very nature irrefutable and unprovable. They are irrefutable and 
unprovable on two grounds: (1) because they have to be assumed in any 
attempt at rational proof or disproof; and (2) because they involve a 
relation of thought to being which cannot be put into logical or 
demonstrable form. Ultimate beliefs, then, are to be understood as 
expressing the fundamental commitment of the mind to reality, which 
rational knowledge presupposes and on which the reason relies in any 
authentic thrust toward the truth. Far from being irrational or non-
rational, these ultimate beliefs have to do with the ontological reference 
of the reason to the nature and structure of things, which all explicit 
forms of reasoning are intended to serve, and without which they are 
blind and impotent. It is indeed not finally through formal reasoning that 
knowledge and understanding are advanced, but through the responsible 
commitment to reality in which our minds fall under its intelligible 
nature and power, and thereby gain the normative insights or ultimate 
beliefs which prompt and guide our inquiries, which enable us to 
interpret our experiences and observations, and which direct the 
reasoning operations of our inquiries to their true ends.4
For Torrance, it is impossible to get away from having ultimate beliefs at work 
in our scientific thinking. Even if one were to present one's knowledge in such a way 
that did not explicitly acknowledge the role of ultimate beliefs, they would be at work 
in the background, tacitly conditioning all other knowledge and significantly 
influencing which concepts are understood to be reasonable and which are not.
4 T&C, 194. Cf. BS&CL, 10.
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Do ultimate beliefs necessarily invalidate knowledge based on them?
Once it is asserted that it is not possible to eliminate the role of ultimate beliefs 
in human knowledge, it must be asked whether the mere existence of ultimate beliefs 
necessarily invalidates knowledge that is gained under their influence. It must first be 
noted that, if the answer to this question is "yes," it would have a dire consequence. It 
would mean that no human has ever had knowledge, since no human knowledge is 
devoid of such ultimate beliefs. This is a conclusion that strikes at knowledge gained by
the natural sciences as well as theological knowledge, as it has become increasingly 
clear that scientific knowledge does not exist in a conceptual vacuum, but exists within 
"paradigms."5
It is in a similar way that Torrance deals with the threat of skepticism. Torrance 
lays out some observations made by "critical philosophers"6 about how theology relates 
(or doesn't relate) statements to the being of God that must be taken seriously. In 
addition to taking the observations under consideration, he makes the following 
comment.
In regard to these observations it should be noted that they do not apply 
to theological statements only, that is, to the case where the referent is 
infinitely beyond the statement itself, but also to the basic statements of 
empirical science where the referent is an existent or a process and not 
an idea, that is, where it is quite another thing than the statement itself. If
the critical observations are meant to demolish theology, they also 
demolish empirical science and lead to pure scepticism. If they are meant
5 The notion of a "paradigm" comes from Thomas S. Kuhn's incredibly influential The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), which has shaped a 
large portion of subsequent discourse on scientific knowledge. Even though elements of Kuhn's 
account of paradigms have been challenged in subsequent philosophy, the basic point relevant to this
discussion is widely affirmed. The importance of viewing scientific knowledge against a conceptual 
background has also been noted, in various ways, by Duhem, Quine, Lakatos, Laudan, and others.
6 TS, 183. Torrance names Ayer and the early Wittgenstein in the footnotes.
44
to be sceptical, they involve a serious error, in presuming that thinking of
a thing is identical with making actual contact with it.7
Torrance's point is that at least some of the arguments that might be marshaled against 
theology are faced with a choice: Frame the question in a way that is critical but neither 
destructive nor unanswerable from a theological perspective or destroy theology but at 
the price of destroying natural science as well. Indeed, even if one were to choose the 
latter option, such arguments for skepticism make some problematic assumptions. In 
these ways, theology is only in danger of being destroyed if the other sciences are as 
well.
Are ultimate beliefs philosophically neutral?
We are now at a crucial point in understanding the role of ultimate beliefs in 
Torrance's thought. We have considered already that ultimate beliefs are necessary for 
human knowledge in the sense that they cannot be eliminated. Additionally, if the mere 
existence of ultimate beliefs invalidates knowledge gained under their influence, then 
there is no such thing as knowledge. The question that presses upon us at this stage in 
our discussion is whether all would-be ultimate beliefs are equally appropriate.
Torrance does not believe that the descriptor "ultimate belief" can be applied 
arbitrarily to any conviction that one happens to not want to give up. In its more precise 
sense, ultimate beliefs are the beliefs that are objectively forced upon us by the fact that 
reality is what it is and not something else.8 That is to say, if a given conviction does not
arise from the actual, ontological state of reality, it cannot properly be called an ultimate
belief. If Torrance had said no more about ultimate beliefs, he would be open to the 
charge of evading the problem at hand. It is one thing to claim that some beliefs are 
forced upon us by reality itself and that there are no reasonable alternatives to them. It 
is quite another thing actually to provide some examples as to what might count as a 
truly ultimate belief. Torrance provides precisely this.
7 TS, 184.
8 CFM, 75.
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Among ultimate beliefs of this kind we must put the existence or reality 
of the universe, and the order and intelligibility of the universe, together 
with the stability, constancy, and simplicity of that rational order. Along 
with the affirmation of these ultimate beliefs must surely go dependent 
beliefs or corollaries, such as the belief that we can apprehend, at least in
some measure, and bring to theoretical expression that rational order, or 
belief in the validity of mathematical or logical reasoning, which we 
have to presuppose from beginning to end in all mathematical and 
logical operations. That is to say, along with ultimate belief in the 
intrinsic rationality and lawfulness of the universe goes our belief in 
rational and scientific thought, although this belief, properly held, admits
of the limitations of our science.9
The practical upshot of this is that Torrance believes that the kind of beliefs 
upon which scientific inquiry relies are ultimate beliefs. This position is bolstered by an 
appeal to three Einsteinian aphorisms about "God:" "God does not play dice," "God 
does not wear his heart on his sleeve," and "God is deep but not devious."10 Torrance is 
well aware of the fact that Einstein was not a Christian and so is aware that it would be 
inappropriate to read a Christian conception of "God" into those statements.11 However, 
though Torrance agrees that reality is such that we cannot seriously entertain any real 
alternatives to the regularity, contingent reality, and reliability of nature, we can 
nevertheless ask the question as to why things are this way rather than another way; 
that is, why reality has those characteristics instead of being chaotic, unreliable, or 
characterized by logico-causal necessity at every level. To this, Torrance suggests a 
distinctly theological interpretation: the universe was created by a God who gave the 
universe its own order distinct from - yet dependent upon - the divine order and who is 
fundamentally characterized by faithfulness.12 For Torrance, this certainly seems 
consistent with the cosmological claims of Christian faith.
9 T&C, 202-203. Note that the two convictions which are required by Torrance's realism are included 
in this passage; one as a properly ultimate belief and the other as a "dependent belief."
10 See T&C, 250-259; G&G, 112-131.
11 CT&SC, 60-61.
12 D&CO.
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It would seem that this could be considered a form of "natural theology." 
Torrance might suggest that this way of reasoning makes no claim to teach us anything 
concrete about God. It merely suggests that these ultimate beliefs, without which 
science could not even get off the ground, require a sufficient reason which, on balance,
tends to favor the Christian notion of creation more than its alternatives.13
There are difficulties that arise when defining ultimate beliefs this way to which 
we shall turn our attention in a moment. It must be noted, however, that these problems 
are practical rather than theoretical. They are difficulties in working out the 
epistemological implications of ultimate beliefs and not difficulties in the concept of 
ultimate beliefs itself.
Can we know our ultimate beliefs with certainty?
If the only beliefs that are entirely appropriate for serving as conditions of our 
knowledge are the ones that are forced upon us by reality itself and that, outside of 
these ultimate beliefs, they exercise a distorting (though not necessarily falsifying) 
effect on our knowledge, then our epistemological problem is sorting out whether our 
beliefs are ultimate or whether they arise from somewhere other than reality itself.
Are we always able to know which of our beliefs are ultimate? What would be 
implied if it were asserted that we were? If we could always know precisely which 
beliefs are ultimate the epistemological challenges would be more straightforward. It is 
precisely because we cannot know this with the kind of certainty we would like that we 
are faced with epistemological difficulties surrounding ultimate beliefs. There are times 
when convictions we had hitherto considered to be certain are called into question.14
When the advance of knowledge reaches the point where really 
fundamental change is demanded of us, and profound epistemological 
13 G&G, 105. See also D&CO, 9, 45-46; T&C, 29, 97-98; G&G, 70; CFM, 113. Whether Torrance is as
hostile to natural theology as Karl Barth has been contested. However, Alister McGrath, among 
others, finds resonances with Torrance in such a way as to develop a revised natural theology.  A 
Scientific Theology, Vol. 2 - Reality. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2002), 279-286.
14 It is something of this kind that takes place when what had been considered mere "anomalies" within
a Kuhnian "paradigm" begin to be suspected of being "counter-instances." Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, 77-91.
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decisions have to be made, then our ultimate beliefs are forced out into 
the open. That is to say, we reach the stage where we have to ask if the 
regulative principles with which we have been operating are really 
grounded in reality or not, whether our ultimate beliefs are really 
ultimate, or whether we have been operating with substitute-beliefs 
which have misled us. This is what happens when the normative 
principles with which we have been operating begin to show evidence of
conflict with each other.15
We find ourselves in need of a term to describe beliefs that, up to a certain point, 
seemed like ultimate beliefs but have been revealed to be something else. Torrance 
provides just such a term. Such convictions are termed "penultimate beliefs."
What are penultimate beliefs?
As the term might suggest, penultimate beliefs bear a resemblance to ultimate 
beliefs but fall short of what it means to truly be an ultimate belief. Torrance 
distinguishes between ultimate and penultimate beliefs in this way. "A distinction 
should be drawn within our fundamental beliefs and their normative function in 
affecting our on-going scientific inquiries. This is a distinction between ultimate beliefs,
for which we have no alternatives, and penultimate beliefs, for which we are faced with 
alternatives."16
What does Torrance think a choice between alternative penultimate beliefs looks
like? Before we look at some concrete examples of this kind of choice let us consider, at
length, Torrance's exposition of the importance of such decisions.
There are...beliefs which carry normative authority in our basic outlook 
upon things and thus exercise a regulative function in our scientific 
activity. I have called these beliefs penultimate, because we can hold 
them only by rejecting alternatives which can, it is claimed, be 
15 T&C, 199-200.
16 T&C, 202.
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'reasonably' held. In respect of these controlling beliefs, the context of 
our affirmation or choice of them is of particularly acute importance, for 
decision is demanded of us as a result of a conflict in our operative 
beliefs which is not logically resolvable: we have to choose one way or 
the other, and the way we actually choose excludes the alternative. We 
cannot balance these alternatives, for belief at this penultimate level is 
demanded of us by our ultimate belief in the nature of things. We have to
make our decision to accept or reject these operative beliefs on the 
ground of whether they are epistemically correlated to the nature and 
structure of reality independent of our perceiving and conceiving. In the 
great scientific transition in outlook in which we are now caught up, 
such deep conflicts in beliefs have arisen that clarification and change in 
our regulative beliefs are unavoidable.17
The decisions one makes among alternative penultimate beliefs has enormous 
consequences. Two people proceeding with shared ultimate beliefs but divergent 
penultimate beliefs may end up generating two entirely different ways of understanding 
the world. One is reminded of the differences that emerge in geometry depending on 
whether one accepts Euclid's "parallel postulate" and, if not, which alternative is 
accepted.
Torrance explicitly names three choices that one must make in attempting to 
understand the universe. Ignoring or attempting to avoid making a choice between them
does not make one more neutral and thus more authentically scientific. Rather, it 
condemns one to make an uncritical decision between them and it is when we are 
unaware of our controlling beliefs that we are most ensnared by them.18
These three choices are between "belief as to the dualist or non-dualist character 
of the universe,"19 "belief and disbelief in the singularity and uniqueness of the created 
universe,"20 and "belief in the primacy of the visible and tangible over the invisible and 
17 T&C, 203.
18 CT&SC, 13.
19 T&C, 204-206.
20 T&C, 206-208.
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intangible."21 Ancient Greek thought would have believed that the universe was 
dualistic, that the universe was not singular or unique, and in the primacy of the 
invisible and intangible. Newtonian thought would have agreed on the first two 
decisions but prioritized the visible and tangible. Post-Einsteinian science, as portrayed 
by Torrance, would have a non-dualist universe which is singular and unique and a 
conviction that the invisible and intangible is primary over the visible and tangible.22 
The fact that, for all their similarities, these three understandings of the universe can be 
so different is a illustration of what is at stake in choosing between alternative 
penultimate beliefs.
Torrance thinks that the fact that there are genuine alternatives at this important 
level is significant. "The very possibility of alternatives, even in the regulative beliefs 
with which we operate in science, is itself grounded in the belief that the universe might
have been other than it is, that it could well have been different, and it is not a necessary
universe."23
We now have Torrance affirming two distinct but related notions: ultimate 
beliefs which are forced upon us by the very nature of reality and thus have no 
alternatives, and penultimate beliefs which exercise a controlling influence on all our 
thinking, yet are not required by reality in the same sense as ultimate beliefs. The 
question that rises to the surface in light of this distinction is, how are we to distinguish 
between properly ultimate beliefs and penultimate ones? If we posit an ontological 
21 T&C, 208-212.
22 Torrance is uneven in the evidence he provides for the character of post-Einsteinian science. He is 
weakest on the claim that post-Einsteinian science is non-dualist in character, for he simply asserts 
that it is (T&C, 205). However, he gives stronger support for his other two claims. Torrance sees “the
universally recognized discovery of the 2.7ºK background microwave radiation,” as turning opinion 
decisively in favor of a “big bang” cosmology against a “steady state” one (T&C, 206-207). Torrance
claims that any idea that the visible and tangible is to be seen as primary over the invisible and 
intangible “suffered a severe set-back (a) by the discovery that is the space-time metrical field, 
which is inherently invisible and profoundly objective, that controls all observable objects in our 
experience; and (b) by the disclosure of the multi-leveled structure in our scientific knowledge of it” 
(T&C, 208).
23 T&C, 203.
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distinction between ultimate and penultimate beliefs, do we have epistemological 
criteria such that we can tell the difference between the two?
Torrance does not analyze this issue in any depth. It is his general tendency 
simply to state that there are some beliefs that are ultimate and some that are 
penultimate, either treating the difference as self-evident or leaving it to the reader to 
decide in each case which is which. Torrance leaves much unsaid that could and should 
be said about ultimate and penultimate beliefs. We shall attempt to fill this lacuna.
One weakness in Torrance's presentation is that he is a bit quick to dismiss 
alternatives to what he has called ultimate beliefs. For example, it is perfectly possible 
to conceive of the reality of the world as being nothing more than a fantasy. While this 
view is not likely to be taken seriously among the ranks of practicing scientists, it is still
a question whose answer is not as obvious as Torrance would make it seem. The fact 
that there can be sincere discussions within epistemology about the "problem" of other 
minds, where we can never be utterly certain that minds other than our own exist, for 
they might all be merely projections of our own mind, shows that there is a sense in 
which there are alternatives to what Torrance claims are ultimate beliefs.
It might be that, while solipsism is a theoretical alternative to the belief in a 
world external to the mind, it is not a practical one in the sense that people do not 
actually behave as though they believe that the world they experience is nothing more 
than a construction of their mind. If Torrance believes that we can make a decision 
between two alternative penultimate beliefs, even in trivial cases such as this,24 based on
practical commitments, which it would seem he does, it has implications for the 
problem in the philosophy of science of the underdetermination of theory by evidence.
While Torrance can be careful to distinguish between ultimate and penultimate 
beliefs when speaking explicitly on the topic, there are places where these concepts are 
clearly in the background where it is not always so unambiguous. It seems as though 
Torrance only spoke of penultimate beliefs by name in one essay.25 They crop up again 
24 It is trivial because, though there is a "problem" of other minds, the existence of other minds is not 
seriously denied by anyone, to my knowledge. It is a problem, not because there is a credible 
movement to deny their existence but because a strictly empiricist epistemology would seem to 
imply that we cannot know that other minds exist.
25 "Ultimate Beliefs and the Scientific Revolution," in T&C, 191-214.
51
and again, however, though without the clarity in that essay and under different terms. 
Torrance sometimes uses the term, "framework of thought" as a shorthand expression 
for "set of ultimate and penultimate beliefs."26 It is important to note, however, that 
when Torrance uses "ultimate beliefs" in an abstract sense, that is, without stating the 
concrete beliefs he is referring to, it often bears the meaning of "framework of thought" 
without concern to distinguish which beliefs may be ultimate or penultimate.27
An example of such a use of the term occurs when Torrance is explaining 
Einstein's vision of science overcoming the dualism between empirical and theoretical 
elements. Under such circumstances, he writes, "the scientist must learn to operate 
under the control of his [sic] ultimate beliefs and intuitive insights, but of course not 
without readiness to have them constantly put to the test in the course of his scientific 
reasoning which must always end with experience as well as begin with it."28
It may be that this passage can be read as unambiguous, in which case Torrance 
is simply advocating that scientists never assume that their conceptual framework is 
settled and always allow it to be tested. On this reading, there is no reason to 
necessarily assume that Torrance is referring to penultimate as well as ultimate beliefs. 
Do we not put our ultimate beliefs to the test by our experience as much as our 
penultimate ones? This may be so, but it reveals a very important relation between 
Torrance's metaphysical claims and his practical advice. While Torrance believes that 
ultimate beliefs, beliefs forced upon us by ontological necessity, exist and can actually 
be held by human beings, we may never be able to know, in the sense of "know with 
utter certainty," that we are not operating under some misunderstanding as to which of 
our beliefs are penultimate and which are truly ultimate.
It might seem that this advice belies Torrance's belief in the reality and 
attainability of ultimate beliefs. If we can never know for sure whether we hold ultimate
beliefs to which there are no alternatives, how can we know that they even exist? 
Without going into too much detail, as such would be the subject of an independent 
paper, the roots of this conviction seem to be Christological. Torrance believes that, as 
26 This usage can be found in BS&CL, 19; T&C, xii, 81.
27 Such usage can be found in TReconstr, 143; ST&R, 16-17; T&C, 196.
28 CT&SC, 57.
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the word that inheres in the very being of God become flesh, Christ is not merely 
historical fact but historical fact which provides its own interpretation.29 Though the 
interpretations of individual theologians or even of the church may not infallibly grasp 
Christ's self-interpretation, it does not change the fact that there actually is a correct 
doctrine of God, one unique understanding of God demanded by the reality of God 
himself, namely the one believed by Christ in his vicarious humanity. If there exists a 
humanly attainable, as it was indeed attained in Christ, entirely true and appropriate 
understanding of God, it stands to reason, a fortiori, that such is true of created reality.
Merely affirming that there is a difference between ultimate and penultimate 
beliefs is not sufficient. We must be able to discern, at least in some cases, whether we 
are dealing with ultimate or penultimate beliefs. It is not possible to know, a priori, 
whether a particular belief is ultimate in any instance. If a belief is ultimate, this is not 
something that we may come to know through an argument. Such beliefs can be 
justified only by the sheer force of reality itself. As such, there is no authority above or 
beyond reality which can declare our beliefs to be ultimate. To paraphrase Imre Lakatos
who was discussing a slightly different, though related, aspect of epistemology, reality 
is not able to shout "Yes!" to our would-be ultimate beliefs but only "Inconsistent!"30
It would seem that beliefs might be shown, a priori, to be penultimate after the 
method discussed above, where an explanation which is empirically equivalent though 
theoretically quite different is dreamed up, regardless of how implausible it may seem 
to the scientific mind. However, this would make all beliefs penultimate, for such 
alternatives can always be devised. The metaphysical value of Torrance's ultimate 
beliefs is that some alternatives which seem possible to the abstract reason are not 
possible as a matter of fact.31
29 TS, 148.
30 Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." In Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of 
Science, London, 1965, Volume 4, edited by Lakatos, Imre and Alan Musgrave, 91-196. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 130.
31 For this kind of reasoning see G&R, 145; R&ET, 88-89; ST&I, 66; T&C, 269; TS, 341-342; G&G, 
108-109; CDG, 23-24.
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If we are interested in actually making progress in science, whether natural or 
theological, the kind of information we get from a priori speculation is not particularly 
helpful. At best we can question whether a belief is truly ultimate but, since we never 
have a guarantee that any particular belief is ultimate, this is a trivial epistemological 
gain. More interesting is what we can learn a posteriori about our beliefs.
While ultimate beliefs can be neither verified nor falsified, and penultimate 
beliefs cannot be verified, for they are not true in addition to the other problems 
surrounding verification, they can be falsified on the grounds of reality itself. This can 
be seen in various revolutions in scientific knowledge. A belief might seem to be 
demanded by reality itself; let us take the absolute space and time of classical 
mechanics as an example. It is simple, fruitful, and seemed demanded by the scientific 
insistence upon objectivity. However, there can come a time when, however helpful the 
concept had been, it is replaced by one that does a better job of explaining a wider range
of phenomena. When this happens, there is no guarantee that the new belief is ultimate 
but we become quite sure that the previous one was not ultimate.
What are some parallels to Torrance's ultimate beliefs in secular philosophy of 
science?
This way of thinking is not without parallel in secukar philosophy of science 
contemporary with Torrance's career. In many important ways, Torrance is not saying 
anything fundamentally different on this topic than Thomas Kuhn in his Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn provides a more detailed account of how the scientific 
community becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the old "paradigm" and moves 
toward a phase of "revolutionary science,"32 but the two men are agreed that we spend 
most of our time operating within a particular "framework of thought" (Torrance) or 
"paradigm" (Kuhn), that these frameworks or paradigms are unavoidable, that they do 
not falsify knowledge gained within them, and that they occasionally get overturned by 
32 Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 66-91.
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others deemed more adequate but with no guarantee that the same will not happen to 
this new framework or paradigm.
While Torrance's notion of a framework of thought has some striking resonances
with Kuhnian paradigms, there are some very interesting similarities between Torrance's
approach to basic questions about reality and that of philosopher of science Roy 
Bhaskar.33
Bhaskar's name is associated with a movement called “Critical Realism,” 
stemming from a combining of two terms coined by Bhaskar to describe the positions 
articulated in two of his early monographs. “Transcendental Realism,” developed in his 
work, A Realist Theory of Science, and “Critical Naturalism,” developed in his work, 
The Possibility of Naturalism.34 His work has proved influential among some of those 
engaged in the theology-science discussion, such as Alister McGrath, who described 
Bhaskar's work as helping to provide the “breakthrough” in his own understanding of 
realism.35
It must be noted that the term “Critical Realism” has been used by a variety of 
thinkers representing different trajectories of thought.36 It has also been used by others 
in the theology-science discussion, such as Ian Barbour, who introduced the term into 
the field, as well as Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, who followed him in this 
usage.37
33 This discussion will be drawing on Bhaskar's "Transcendental Realism" as expounded in his book, A 
Realist Theory of Science. 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2008), rather than on the later developments of 
"Critical Naturalism" or the further development under the name "Critical Realism." The reasons are 
three-fold. First, It is here where Bhaskar's realism is laid out most clearly. Second, Bhaskar 
develops his theory in this work most closely in dialogue with the natural sciences as opposed to the 
social sciences of some of his later writing, which makes it closer to Torrance's context. Thirdly, 
Bhaskar once said in an interview, "Really the whole of my work has stemmed from this essay [A 
Realist Theory of Science] into ontology." Roy Bhaskar and Christopher Norris. "Roy Bhaskar 
Interviewed." Accessed 08/13, 2013, http://www.criticalrealism.com/archive/rbhaskar_rbi.html.
34 Roy Bhaskar,  The Possibility of Naturalism. 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 1998).
35 McGrath, A Scientific Theology, Vol. 2, xvi.
36 For a discussion of the different ways the term has been used, see Andreas Losch. “On the Origins of
Critical Realism.” Theology and Science 7, no.1 (2009): 85-106.
37 Kees Van Kooten Niekerk. “A Critical Realist Perspective on the Dialogue between Theology and 
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While a discussion of Torrance's place in the larger theology-science discussion 
would certainly be of great interest, the scope of this thesis demands a much more 
modest aim here. Torrance's thought will not be brought into dialogue with “Critical 
Realism” in general, but with Bhaskar in particular, in part to ensure that such 
reflections are concrete in nature. However, the reader should be aware of the fact that 
“Critical Realism” has developed into a tradition, even multiple traditions, of its own.
In Torrance's writing, when specific ultimate beliefs, and here we are using the 
term in its more general sense of "framework of thought," are brought up, it is 
frequently for the purpose of asserting convictions, arising from what Torrance believes 
are distinctly Christian sources, without which science would not be possible. Using 
these beliefs as premises, Torrance concludes that certain positions, such as positivism, 
are untenable.
Bhaskar is every bit as determined as Torrance to reveal the inadequacy of 
positivism to account for scientific knowledge.38 However, he approaches the issue from
precisely the opposite direction: by analyzing scientific practice and concluding that the
basic beliefs behind positivism are inadequate to account for it. To accomplish this, 
Bhaskar employs a transcendental argument. "The status of propositions in ontology 
may thus be described by the following formula: It is not necessary that science occurs. 
But given that it does, it is necessary that the world is a certain way."39 This approach 
has the practical advantage of rooting the validity of the question whether his 
theoretical account of reality is appropriate in the validity of scientific practice. Since it 
is scientific activity that the philosophy of science is attempting to explain and account 
for, this is a wise move. Indeed, inasmuch as it is an expression of allowing the object 
of study to have authority over the one who knows it and to stand in judgment over our 
theoretical formulations, it is a fitting expression of an attempt at kataphysic philosophy
of science.
Science.” in Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current Dialogue, edited by 
Gregersen, Niels Henrik and J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1998), 52.
38 Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 8.
39 Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 29.
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Specifically, Bhaskar begins with the scientific procedure of conducting 
experiments to learn about reality. He points out that the positivist understanding of 
science requires an understanding of natural laws going back to Hume, where such laws
are constant conjunctions of events where, whenever A happens, B also happens.40 
Bhaskar argues that, outside of fields such as astronomy, we almost never have a 
constant conjunction of events as described by our natural laws outside of the controlled
environment of the experiment. As it happens, experimental practice presupposes that 
the mechanisms or tendencies (Bhaskar's terms) which are at work in the closed 
environment of the laboratory are also at work outside of that environment where the 
constant conjunction does not attain.41 Bhaskar concludes that, if science is to be 
meaningful at all, it must presuppose that there exist mechanisms or tendencies that are 
more ontologically basic than phenomena which give rise to those phenomena.42 In 
short, if science is to be intelligible at all, it must be realist in the sense that scientific 
knowledge cannot be reduced to an organization of sense-data. To put this in a 
Torrancean idiom, scientific behavior is not value-neutral, but is the outflow of 
particular ultimate beliefs.
In spite of the fact that there is much to suggest that there is no closer parallel in 
secular philosophy of science to the realism advocated by Torrance than that put 
forward by Bhaskar, especially in his Realist Theory of Science, there are some notable 
differences between the two approaches, though it should be stated that these 
differences do not detract from the profound resonances that exist.
While Torrance writes self-consciously as a Christian theologian, Bhaskar writes
from a secular perspective, with no reference to Christian notions of God or even a 
"higher power." This likely explains, at least in part, why Torrance is so quick to speak 
in fiduciary terms whereas Bhaskar elects to confine himself to an analysis of praxis. 
Related to this is Torrance's clear preference to discuss the relation between theory and 
practice in accordance with the ordo essendi. That is to say, Torrance prefers to begin 
with the reality of God and the creation, then transition to the kinds of beliefs we hold 
40 Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 12.
41 Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 33, 65, 103.
42 Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 20, 25, 46-47, 202.
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as a result of those realities and then to how we behave in light of those things. By 
contrast, Bhaskar's approach could be viewed as proceeding according to the ordo 
cognoscendi. He attempts to account for how we actually come to know the 
characteristics of reality by beginning with our behavior and then attempting to discern 
what beliefs such behavior implies.
In spite of the clear sympathies that a committed Christian might have with 
Torrance's approach, it seems that the fact that he nowhere provides an analysis of 
scientific behavior will make his presentation less appealing to those who are not 
already accustomed to speaking in fiduciary terms. Conversely, for all of its value, 
Bhaskar's analysis is not likely to be seen as going far enough by many Christians. 
Positivism was able to avoid speaking of metaphysical concepts such as God because it 
claimed to deal only with what was accountable in terms of sense-data. The question, 
"How did things get to be this way," never arose because there was never a claim that 
things are "this way," but only that our experiences are thus and so. Once Bhaskar 
opens up the way for metaphysical reflection by arguing for the real existence of 
mechanisms or tendencies, it seems necessary to point out that Bhaskar's transcendental
arguments ought not to stop there, but be applied to his own position. That is to say, we 
must not only ask the question, "If science is intelligible, what must be true about the 
world," but go on to ask, "If the world is this way, how did it come to have these 
characteristics?" Torrance might respond that the only position that can support such a 
view is Christianity.43
Bhaskar's approach can thus serve as a helpful, indeed necessary, extension of 
Torrance's. Torrance has a tendency to declare that post-Einsteinian science has left 
problematic philosophical baggage behind and has moved in a more robustly realist 
direction.44 He may very well be correct in this, but there is a certain weakness. Why 
43 Indeed, Torrance made a habit of claiming that it was no accident that modern science arose in 
Christian Europe rather than in other cultures with highly developed mathematics, as he believes that
distinctly Christian notions such as the contingence yet reality and reliability of the world were 
necessary for such a discipline to arise, though it might spread anywhere once developed. See T&C, 
218-219; CFM, viii-ix; R&ST, 198-199; D&CO, 91-92; TReconstr, 15.
44 For example, Torrance will speak of Einstein as having “destroyed” a dualistic way of thinking or a 
particular approach to science. See PCT, 42, 63.
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should the opinions of authorities within the scientific community be more convincing 
than philosophical arguments? It is well known that Einstein's authority as a 
philosopher of science, for example, was not always followed in his later life as he was 
seen as naïvely holding on to determinism in the face of what were interpreted as 
phenomena that defied deterministic description.45 Bhaskar's approach would be a 
helpful addition to Torrance's thought because it depends less on what secular or 
atheistic scientists and philosophers are inclined to doubt, the non-empirical convictions
of theologians and scientists, and more on what such people are more likely to take 
seriously: the experimental practice of science.
The difference of approach between Torrance and Bhaskar reveals a weakness in
Torrance's presentation of ultimate beliefs. It might be argued that Torrance approaches 
philosophy of science and ultimate beliefs “from above” while Bhaskar considers them 
“from below.” From one perspective, this may seem like nothing more than a harmless 
difference of approach. However, given that Torrance wants to take his cue for how we 
know created reality from his convictions as to how we come to know God in and 
through Christ, it would seem that there is an inconsistency.
Torrance rejects the dualism inherent in ebionite and docetic Christologies and 
insists that we cannot oppose a Christology from above with one from below but that 
we must approach Christ “from below and from above at the same time, for it is in the 
light of what we learn from below that we appreciate what we derives from above, and 
in the light of what derive from above that we really understand what we learn from 
below. In a faithful and rigorously theological approach, therefore, we apprehend both 
together.”46
In the light of this difference of approach, if the parallel between theological and
natural science is as strong as Torrance clearly thinks it is, then a preference for 
approaching creation “from above” while not also providing a robust account of our 
knowledge of creation “from below” is not merely a difference in emphasis, it is a 
45 Max Born, "Einstein's Statistical Theories." In Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, edited by 
Schilpp, Paul Arthur. Vol. 7, 163-177. (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1970), 166. Torrance cites Pauli as 
evidence that Einstein was not a determinist but a realist. See D&CO, 13-14; T&C, 250.
46 CDG, 114. The concern of approaching Christ “from above” or “from below” is related to Torrance's
criticism of ebionite and docetic Christologies. See TF, 112-115.
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genuine oversight which, if not filled in, would endanger Torrance's larger claims that 
theology and natural science are engaged in essentially the same kind of movement of 
thought.
It might be said that Bhaskar and Torrance are approaching the same or similar 
concerns from different directions. The fact that each of these men was writing to a 
different audience that had different values goes a long way in explaining their 
differences in presentation. However, it seems that Torrance's affirmation of ultimate 
beliefs which play such an utterly crucial role in the larger tapestry of his philosophy of 
science, might be clarified and strengthened by taking advantage of a dialogue with 
Bhaskar. Torrance's position not only has space for Bhaskar's position, it actually 
requires it, or something like it, in order for Torrance to be internally consistent with his
larger Christological and methodological concerns.
Is Torrance a Fideist?
The strong place given in Torrance's thought to the controlling influence of 
ultimate beliefs in theological reflection might make one suspicious that, especially as a
theologian, Torrance might be a fideist. “'Fideism' is the name given to that school of 
thought which [asserts] that faith is in some sense independent of, if not outright 
adversarial toward, reason."47 Within the Western tradition since the Enlightenment, 
where reason has played such a primary role, it is easy to see how Torrance might be 
open to the charge of fideism, especially from those who believe that faith and reason 
are, of necessity, in opposition to one another.
Before we explore whether Torrance's position is a fideistic one, it is appropriate
to consider what is at stake in the charge of fideism. After all, it is hardly surprising that
theologians might be convinced, by the very nature of their discipline, that faith ought 
to have a prominent place in their thinking. In a different time and place, to reject 
47 Richard Amesbury, "Fideism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Accessed on 28 January, 2014 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/fideism.
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reason in favor of faith might be seen as a positive thing. However, in post-
Enlightenment Western culture, it is seen as a serious threat to intellectual honesty. It is 
an accusation that the evidence of one's senses and mind are to be marginalized because
of a commitment to things deemed to be inconsistent with such evidence.
Andrew Purves suggests that "There is a kind of scientific theological fideism 
operating [in Torrance's theology] that is the result of the nature of God's revealing and 
saving act in Jesus Christ."48 This is seen as being the result of "the relation of theology 
to the other branches of knowledge and Torrance's refusal to engage an independent 
epistemological justification."49 Neither Purves nor Torrance seem particularly bothered 
by this element of fideism,50 but it must be taken seriously and, if possible, demonstrate 
that it is not an epistemically harmful fideism. As will be made clear, it would seem that
Torrance is able to escape any damaging accusation of fideism.
In his well-known essay "Reason and Belief in God," Alvin Plantinga suggests 
an objection that might be raised against a theist who claimed that their belief in God is 
"properly basic" and thus above evidentialist critique.
If belief in God is properly basic, why cannot just any belief be properly 
basic? Could we not say the same for any bizarre aberration we can think
of: What about voodoo or astrology? What about the belief that the Great
Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Could I properly take that as 
basic?...If we say that belief in God is properly basic, will we not be 
committed to holding that just anything, or nearly anything, can properly
be taken as basic, thus throwing wide the gates to irrationalism and 
superstition?51
It should be noted that Plantinga is not in any meaningful dialogue with Torrance at this
point. We simply take his expression of the objection as it has become somewhat classic
48 Andrew Purves, "The Christology of Thomas F. Torrance." In The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: 
Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance, edited by Colyer, Elmer M., 51-80: (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2001), 72.
49 Andrew Purves, "The Christology of Thomas F. Torrance," 72.
50 Andrew Purves, "The Christology of Thomas F. Torrance," 72-73. “TFTR,” 309-310.
51 Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God." In The Analytic Theist, edited by Sennett, James F., 
102-161. (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 1998), 149.
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and it is easy to see how such an objection might be raised against Torrance's ultimate 
beliefs, charging that such beliefs are a sign of fideism.
Torrance's position seems to imply both a negative and a positive response to 
any charge of fideism. Negatively, it is important to say that Torrance would argue that 
theology is not in a unique epistemological position; it could be argued that even the 
natural sciences, such as physics, are open to this charge, for they operate with ultimate 
beliefs that are accepted uncritically, such as belief in the reality and reliability of the 
external world. It might be said that the only difference between distinctly theistic 
ultimate beliefs and those demanded by the natural sciences is that there are 
comparatively few people who reject the latter in Western culture today, though it 
should always be remembered that there have been many throughout history who have 
done so.52 
If the charge of fideism is sustainable against Torrance's theology, then it would 
seem also to be sustainable against physics. However, it is unlikely that this is 
something that someone who is unhappy with fideism is likely to do. One of the 
implications of the "Great Pumpkin Objection" is that, if belief in God is to be 
distinguished from "bizarre aberrations" such as voodoo and astrology it must provide a
justification for such a belief based on something other than the belief itself. However, 
this is revealed to be either an inappropriate demand or something that would as soon 
eliminate physics as a field of reasonable study as theology.
To ask for theology to give an account for its field on grounds that do not arise 
on the basis of that field itself is no more reasonable than to ask for physics to give an 
account of its field on independent philosophical grounds. There are no such 
independent grounds; physics is justified by the nature of its object of study and nothing
else. If physicists are not expected to be deterred by the arguments of solipsists, it 
would stand that neither ought theologians to be sidetracked because someone else 
denies the possibility of their field. 
The positive response to the charge of fideism arises from Torrance's basic 
epistemological convictions. If theological belief is to receive justification from 
52 Such as the entire Ancient Greek philosophical tradition which treated empirical data to be unreal or 
of secondary importance, when compared with rationalist concerns.
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somewhere other than the object of study, where is the theologian to find it? Again, the 
inappropriateness of such a requirement is made clear by a comparison with physics. If 
an interlocutor will not be convinced that the physical, external world exists by a naked 
appeal to reality itself, from whence would the physicist gather their arguments? True 
epistemological objectivity is not detachment but radical attachment to the object of 
study.53 There is no meta-discipline or scientia universalis that can assume a privileged 
epistemological position over either theological or natural science.
How might Torrance defend the position that the Christian belief in God is more 
valid of serious study than voodoo or astrology? It should be noted at the beginning that
Torrance never embarks on any such defense. However, there does not seem to be any 
reason, a priori, why Torrance's position would necessarily require the exclusion of 
such topics from scientific investigation.54 If practitioners of voodoo and astrology were
to contend that their disciplines are rooted in reality itself and, as such, are capable of 
rigorous scientific investigation, it would seem that Torrance's position would demand 
that they be taken seriously and, if one were to argue against such positions, such an 
attempt must be made from within the framework of thought shared by those 
practitioners.55 
53 TS, 35-36. More on scientific objectivity in chapter 3.
54 Though David Munchin, Is Theology a Science?: The Nature of the Scientific Enterprise in the 
Scientific Theology of Thomas Forsyth Torrance and the Anarchic Epistemology of Paul 
Feyerabend. Studies in Systematic Theology., edited by Bevans, S. V. D., Miikka Ruokanen. Vol. 7. 
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, NV, 2011), 133, raises this as a concern that could be 
raised against Torrance's kataphysic epistemological position by a philosopher like Paul K. 
Feyerabend, it is far from clear that Torrance's position must rule such topics out a priori.
55 Michael Polanyi, in Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1958), 286-294, recounts how thoroughly a framework of thought, including that 
of modern science can resist all attacks. It seems as though speaking of voodoo and astrology might 
be intended to function more as propaganda, a way to dismiss an undesirable position, than as an 
actual argument, as is suggested by Paul K. Feyerabend, Three Dialogues on Knowledge. 
(Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1991), 60-68, 74-75. If one suggests that a view one holds is similar 
to one they find repulsive, it might be possible to get them to reject the former without offering a 
concrete argument for why they should.
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If it should happen that such practitioners are unable to provide a convincing 
account of the object of their study, then the problem, which could not be eliminated a 
priori is eliminated a posteriori. Suppose, though, that such a convincing account could
be made, what would be the result? Depending on one's convictions, it may result in 
"throwing wide the gates to irrationalism and superstition," or it may result in a deeper 
appreciation of the complexities of reality. It is not clear, beyond the influence of 
prejudice, that Torrance's conception of a theological science is damaged by the 
possibility that voodoo or astrology might also be capable of scientific investigation on 
their own terms.
Is Torrance a Foundationalist?
Torrance's notion of ultimate beliefs brought him under fire from Ronald 
Thiemann, who suggested that Torrance is just one more example of a modern 
theologian whose approach is infected with epistemological foundationalism, a view 
that Thiemann calls "the fatal flaw which haunts the modern doctrine of revelation."56
In a footnote which appears in the process of critiquing Torrance, Thiemann 
gives five of what he calls "key aspects of a foundational epistemology."
1) A set of non-inferential, self-evident beliefs which serve as the given 
or foundation of all knowledge. 2) A distinction between foundational 
beliefs and other inferential propositions. 3) A claim that foundational 
beliefs are justified immediately by a form of direct experience. 4) An 
appeal to the mental act of intuition. 5) An assertion of the 
correspondence between the self-evident beliefs and the language 
independent world.57 
56 Ronald Thiemann, Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise. (Notre Dame: Notre 
Dame University Press, 1985), 7. Because "foundationalism" can easily become an amorphous 
"swear word," we shall be concerned only to address Thiemann's charge of foundationalism and the 
specific issues it involves.
57 Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, 165.
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There are several points of contention regarding whether this description of 
foundationalism applies to Torrance. For example, there is a very real question about 
what Thiemann means by beliefs that are supposed to be self-evident and whether their 
self-evidence is the result of their character as statements or whether they are 
considered self-evident inasmuch as they arise from a self-evident reality. Given the 
tone of Thiemann's wider critique, it would seem that he has a problem with the former. 
However, as will become more clear in chapter four, this is far from applicable to 
Torrance, who always prioritizes being over statement.
The real difficulties that face Thiemann's charge of foundationalism seem to lay 
in a misreading of a key passage from one of Torrance's major works.
The direct experience of God of which Torrance speaks is not the 
precognitive but rather signifies God's direct imposition of true 
propositions in the mind of the believer. Torrance believes that the 
imposition of truth which occurs in revelation is unique to theology, but 
in fact it is characteristic of all foundational epistemologies.58
The conceptual background of Thiemann's concern with the "imposition of truth" is 
made more clear in a quotation he cites from Richard Rorty, which speaks of an object 
imposing the truth upon propositions.59
This nuance of meaning picked up from Rorty is extremely important because it 
alters the entire critique and reveals its inappropriateness to Torrance's thinking. It is 
one thing to affirm that the objects of our knowledge impose the truth of their being 
upon us; it is another thing altogether to assert that such objects impose true 
58 Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, 40, my emphasis.
59 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1980), 157 in Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, 40. It should be noted that Rorty, 159, claims that
"The idea of 'foundations of knowledge' is a product of the choice of perceptual metaphors." His 
entire book is aimed at dismantling the notion of thinking as looking through "the eye of the mind." 
Torrance rejects the epistemological primacy of vision with some frequency. Given this, it would 
seem that Rorty would not consider Torrance a foundationalist, as he rejects the conditions upon 
which foundationalism relies. For Torrance's rejection of the primacy of vision in knowledge see 
CT&SC, 102-103; DM, 176-177; TReconstr, 14, 88, 169-170; TS, 22-23; HJC, 27; BS&CL, 1.
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propositions about themselves upon us. Torrance, it seems clear, would affirm the 
former but would certainly reject the latter.60
Thiemann's tendency to focus on statements as the primary locus of truth and 
knowledge prevents him from understanding Torrance adequately. Speaking of 
Torrance's position, especially his polemic against "the common distinction between 
personal and propositional revelation," Thiemann writes, "God reveals himself in his 
Word as mediated through the words of scripture. All personal revelation is 
propositional. There can be no non-propositional revelation of God."61
The evidence cited for drawing this conclusion is the first part of Torrance's 
chapter in Theological Science on "The Truth of God." However, Thiemann seems to 
have misunderstood Torrance's critique of the distinction between personal and 
propositional revelation. Torrance writes of Christ, “He is the Truth communicating 
Himself in and through truths, who does not communicate Himself apart from truths, 
and who does not communicate truths apart from Himself.”62 This does not mean, as 
Thiemann seems to believe it does, that there is no non-propositional revelation of God,
but rather that propositional truth cannot be separated from personal truth without 
distortion. It is true that Torrance believes that we have no access to the personal truth 
of the incarnate Word of God that bypasses the written text of scripture, but it is also 
true that he believes that we do not understand the written text of scripture if we do not 
understand it in its relation to the personal reality of Christ. Thiemann's critique could 
be corrected of this misreading of Torrance if he were to say, "there can be no merely 
non-propositional revelation of God." However, once this is done, his critique loses its 
force.
Thiemann presents his critique in a formal way. 
Torrance is faced with the following inconsistent triad.
1. Theology is a rational discipline exemplifying the characteristics 
of a true science.
60 The crucial distinction between the "truth of statement" and the "truth of being" will be a major topic
of discussion in chapter 4.
61 Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, 40.
62 TS, 147.
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2. The reciprocal relation between the investigating subject and the 
object of inquiry is a general characteristic of rational scientific activity.
3. Theology's unique object is the truth which imposes itself on the 
subject independent of the subject's reciprocal influence.
The assertion of any two of these propositions demands the denial of the 
third. Since Torrance's argument requires all three assertions, his position
appears doomed to inconsistency.63
The flaw in Thiemann's argument, as we have seen, is that when he speaks of truth 
imposing itself on the knowing subject, he believes this takes the form of imposing true
propositions on them, whereas when Torrance speaks of truth imposing itself on the 
knowing subject, it is in the form of ultimate and penultimate beliefs, things which 
cannot be rationally rejected at the time but which must always be put to the test. This 
reviseability inherent in Torrance's notion of the truth of statement is what ensures that 
the third proposition is not in contradiction with the other two.
That this is precisely Thiemann's problem is evident in how he follows up his 
argument. "Torrance's insistence that revelation is always linguistic in character seals 
the inconsistency of his position."64 If Thiemann had not made the mistake of assuming 
that Torrance's rejection of a purely non-propositional understanding of revelation and 
truth necessarily implied an acceptance of a purely propositional understanding, he 
might not have made the mistake of thinking that Torrance is a foundationalist.
Thiemann is not the only one to claim that Torrance is a foundationalist. John 
Douglas Morrison finds it to be more or less self-evident.
Torrance never explicitly declares himself to be a foundationalist. 
Torrance's explanation of the centrality of certain “ultimate beliefs,” 
“assumptions,” “fundamental ideas,” and even “foundations” to proper 
thought which are not themselves verifiable have made clear that 
Torrance is a foundationalist.65
63 Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, 39.
64 Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, 40-41.
65 John Douglas Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas Forsyth 
Torrance. (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 66.
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Morrison's claim can be dispelled quickly at this stage in the discussion. It has 
already been made clear that ultimate beliefs, at least in the wider sense, which is how 
Torrance most often uses the term, are always subject to test and revision and thus not 
taken as self-evident propositions taken without proof after the manner of Euclid's 
postulates. To the degree that Torrance's uncritical acceptance of the object of study, 
within the context of the discipline which studies it can be considered a kind of 
foundationalism will be taken up below.66
Morrison is quite correct that Torrance never refers to himself as a 
foundationalist. Subsequent to the publishing of Morrison's book, Torrance himself 
went on record about his alleged foundationalism, especially that claimed by 
Thiemann.67
Nothing could be further from the truth or even more bizarre than 
Ronald Thiemann's rhetoric in which he claims that I use the term 
“intuition” “to signify the indubitability and incorrigibility of this 
causally imposed knowledge,” and when he accuses me of what he calls 
“foundationalism!!” (sic) That would be equivalent to saying that Clerk 
Maxwell and Einstein were 'foundationalists' operating with logico-
causally derived conceptions in their understanding and development of 
continuous dynamic fields, which is what they explicitly rejected.68
66 Tapio Luoma, Incarnation and Physics: Natural Science in the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 73, suggests that Torrance is "open to the criticism 
generally addressed to classical foundationalism, namely that one can never know for certain that the
knowledge assumed is in line with reality. This makes Torrance quite indifferent toward the question,
how can we know that the knowledge we have really accords with reality? His reliance upon the self‐
evident compelling power of independent reality cannot avoid certain features of a circular 
argument: we know that our knowledge accords with reality if we let its compelling power affect our
understanding, and we know that the compelling force acts upon us when we adapt our knowledge to
reality." That Torrance provides a much more robust and critical epistemological procedure will 
become clear in subsequent chapters, especially chapter 5.
67 Torrance's response to Thiemann was specifically within the context of responding to an essay by 
Colyer that argued against Thiemann's claims.
68 “TFTR,” 331. Original emphasis. The claims of Thiemann referenced in this quote have their origin 
in Colyer's essay.
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Though Torrance's refusal to accept that his theology was foundationalist would 
not necessarily make it so if a criticism such as Thiemann's were valid, there are others 
who have found such a claim to be a mistake. Elmer Colyer calls Thiemann's charge of 
foundationalism to be a "misunderstanding" of Torrance's theology.69 Paul Molnar also 
finds the charge to be misguided.70
Though it seems entirely inappropriate to speak of Torrance as a foundationalist 
in anything like the traditional understanding of the term, the fact that Torrance affirms 
that the objects of our knowledge are not open to doubt raises the question whether 
there might be a kind of foundationalism, though extensively reinterpreted, which 
Torrance actually affirms.
Elmer Colyer, who significantly opposes Thiemann, suggests that Torrance 
might be considered to be a "foundationalist" if we mean that knowledge is built on the 
"foundation" of the tacit dimension of knowledge which, as such a foundation would be
impacted by the entire cultural-lingustic framework of the knower, would escape the 
kind of a priorism of classical foundationalism.71 However, this is clearly not the kind 
of foundationalism that Thiemann was charging Torrance with, nor is it quite adequate 
to Torrance's own position. In spite of my tremendous respect for my former teacher 
and mentor, I think we must go somewhat further.
The core of the flaw in Thiemann's critique was not in his claim that the objects 
of knowledge impose their truth upon us, but in his insistence that this took the form of 
self-evident propositions. What Torrance takes as the foundations of knowledge in a 
particular field is not a series of propositions but the reality itself that is under 
investigation. Within the context of Christian theology, we might distinguish this from 
classical foundationalism by calling his approach "Christo-foundationalism." Within the
69 Elmer M. Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology.
(Illinois: Intervarsity Press, 2001), 17n.
70 Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity. (Burlington, VT : Ashgate Pub. Ltd.,
2009), 326-327.
71 Colyer, How to Read, 243-244 and "A Scientific Theological Method," in Colyer, Promise of 
Trinitarian Theology, 228-229.
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realm of science more generally, we might say that Torrance is an "onto-
foundationalist."72
Above, Torrance was quoted saying that it made as much sense to call James 
Clerk Maxwell or Albert Einstein a foundationalist as to call him one. The irony is that, 
if we can say that Torrance is an onto-foundationalist, it would seem that Clerk 
Maxwell and Einstein indeed could be described in a similar way.73 However Torrance 
was quite correct that onto-foundationalism does not operate with logico-causally 
derived concepts but rejects such an approach altogether.
Though with the coining of the term onto-foundationalism, it seems possible to 
acknowledge what some might suspect is a foundationalist tendency in Torrance's 
thinking, it must be asked whether this justifies those who would accuse Torrance of 
foundationalism or whether it would be helpful, in general, to speak of foundationalism 
this way. To this, the answer seems to be a resounding "no." Developing a new way to 
think of foundationalism does not justify those who are putting forward an accusation 
of an entirely different kind of foundationalism. Additionally, to speak of Torrance as an
onto-foundationalist might lead to some helpful changes in thinking but is likely to lead 
to more confusion than it is worth.
Are theoretical concerns unavoidable in empirical science?
As a result of all the issues discussed throughout this chapter, it seems clear that 
Torrance believes theoretical concerns are unavoidable in every field of knowledge, 
including theology and the empirical sciences. These theoretical concerns do not 
72 I am indebted for this kind of expression to Kevin S. Diller who, in his PhD thesis speaks of Karl 
Barth not as an anti-foundationalist, but as a "theo-foundationalist." "The Theology of Revelation 
and the Epistemology of Christian Belief: The Compatibility and Complementarity of the 
Theological Epistemologies of Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga" (PhD diss. University of St. 
Andrews, 2008), 45. Torrance's "onto-foundationalism" may be understood as a form of Barth's 
nachdenken, where human thought is a response to that which encounters us from beyond ourselves.
73 For a glimpse that Einstein considered his own thought in what could be called foundationalistic 
terms, see "Inaugural Address to the Prussian Academy of Sciences (1914)." In The World as I See it,
127-130. (New York: Covici Publishing Company, 1934), 127-128.
70
necessarily invalidate the knowledge that we gain when our practice is informed by 
them, and it cannot be said that all theoretical elements in our knowledge are the result 
of arbitrarily choosing the framework to which reality must conform.
Instead, it is the dynamism of reality itself that shapes our ultimate beliefs, 
whether we can always articulate them or not. Torrance's position does not require a 
foundation of self-evidently true propositions upon which to build certain knowledge. 
The final court which can decide the truthfulness of a proposition or conviction is not 
reason but reality. It is reality that confers truth or falsity upon our statements and it is 
reality alone that can generate properly ultimate beliefs and it is upon reality alone that 
our penultimate beliefs are finally shattered. This is the sheer objectivity of scientific 
knowledge and it is this topic that forms the focus of the next chapter.
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3. Objectivity
Torrance's theology operates with an understanding of objectivity which he 
believes to be in significant agreement with that held by the natural sciences in the 
middle of the twentieth century. There is very little in Torrance's writings that articulates
what has classically gone by the name of "objectivity," except where he critiques it for 
being "objectivistic" rather than truly objective.1 Concerns for space do not allow for a 
detailed discussion of the concept of objectivity from the Enlightenment to the advent 
of Relativity and Quantum theory.2 Suffice it to say that "objectivity" in the nineteenth 
century involved more or less the elimination of the knowing subject from the object of 
study to ensure the accuracy and reliability of measurement and description. It carried 
with it the conviction that the appropriate scientific attitude is one of detachment.3
This objectivistic notion of objectivity has been challenged in a fundamental 
way by the very field that gave rise to it: physics.4 The early twentieth century saw a 
major advance in physics that made such a notion of objectivity problematic. Relativity 
theory brought about the final abandonment of Newton's notion of absolute 
mathematical space and time, which he had constructed, in spite of his protestations that
he "invented no hypotheses,"5 by pointing out that we do not make observations in 
isolation from a particular coordinate system. It is equally valid, equally "scientific," to 
1 T&C, 153. For other condemnations of objectivism, see G&R, 188-189; R&ST, 14-15, 133, 189; 
TReconstr, 232; TS, 38-39, 93, 296n.
2 If space were to permit, it would seem appropriate to discuss how science operated with a concept of
"truth-to-nature" and moved toward a concept of "objectivity," which has proven untenable in more 
recent years. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison. Objectivity. (New York: Zone Books, 2007).
3 D&CO, 95-96.
4 G&R, 12-13.
5 T&C, 16-18. Torrance cites this as coming from Newton, Principia 575, [943 in the edition in the 
bibliography, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. Translated by Cohen, I.
Bernard and Anne Whitman. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 
1999) where it reads, "I do not feign hypotheses"] and Opticks: Or a Treatise of the Reflections, 
Refractions, Inflections & Colours of Light. Fourth ed. (London: G. Bell & Sons, LTD., 1931), 369.
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describe the motion of a train, for example, relative to an embankment as the motion of 
an embankment relative to a train.6
What this means is that it is not possible to describe any phenomenon from a 
neutral coordinate system. There is no overarching meta-coordinate-system that 
removes the significance that every scientific statement is made from a particular point 
of view. What is astonishing, and why relativity theory does not collapse into relativism,
is that we are always able to translate phenomena from one coordinate system to 
another, as all observations are invariant under the Lorentz transformation.7 The point 
for our purposes is that, while one need not have any particular coordinate system for 
relativity physics, we cannot escape the fact that we must always have one. The 
observer is forever bound up with the observation for a particular coordinate system, or 
point of view, must be assumed in every scientific description.
Torrance felt that this shift was of tremendous importance. However, not 
everyone has agreed with him. David Munchin writes:
We should not get too carried away with Torrance. Whilst relativity 
theory does require a more detailed specification of the observer, it is 
sometimes forgotten that the classical reduction of the observer to a 
mathematical point was only ever a mathematical idealisation. For whilst
we might model (for instance) the pull of the earth's gravitational field 
on us, as a point at earth's centre of gravity attracting another point mass 
at our center of gravity, this was only ever a mathematical technique, 
which ignores empirically negligible effects - of ourselves on the earth as
zero - ontologically the theory acknowledges that we are not point 
masses, it is just that empirically the cost of idealisation is negligible.8
6 The train/embankment example was a favorite of Einstein. See Part I of Relativity, the Special and 
General Theory. Translated by Lawson, Robert W. (London: Methuen & Co. LTD, 1920).
7 See Einstein, Relativity. "Thus the unique and central role of the speed of light and its uniform 
constancy enable modern science to interpret and explain the phenomena of nature with a profounder
and more unrestricted notion of objectivity than was possible for classical physics." CT&SC, 80.
8 David Munchin, Is Theology a Science?: The Nature of the Scientific Enterprise in the Scientific 
Theology of Thomas Forsyth Torrance and the Anarchic Epistemology of Paul Feyerabend. Studies 
in Systematic Theology., edited by Bevans, S. V. D., Miikka Ruokanen. Vol. 7. (Leiden, The 
73
He continues his critique, asserting that "relations have risen up the ontological league 
table over against objects, but relations were never entirely absent in classical natural 
science...So, one needs to ask more precisely why relativity theory is any more 
conducive to theology than classical physics?"9
While Munchin is correct that Newton's equations imply that we must 
acknowledge the existence of the knowing subject, it would be hard to defend a claim 
that this concern had any significant impact on the field, as is implied by the fact that 
Laplace's suggestion that the knowledge of the locations and momentums of particles is 
all that is necessary for a comprehensive knowledge of all phenomena in the past and 
future could be raised without fundamental controversy.10 Therefore, even if one can 
make the argument that classical physics still, theoretically, included a place for the 
knowing subject, it cannot be maintained that it took that knower seriously. Thus, the 
answer to Munchin's question as to why theology would prefer relativity physics over 
classical physics is obvious. Whatever may have been claimed, classical physics 
proceeded as if the knowing subject could be ignored while relativity physics does not 
allow such an approach. There are worlds of difference between the two.
Does Torrance believe we can deal only with the object of knowledge?
The difference between an approach that takes the knowing subject into account 
as opposed to one that, in practice if not in theory, does not, is the difference between 
what Torrance calls "objectivity" and what he terms "objectivism."11
Objectivism is one of the possible outcomes of approaching knowledge with a 
dualism between the subject and the object.12 As Torrance sees it, there are two forms of
Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, NV, 2011), 57-58.
9 Munchin, Is Theology a Science, 58, 59.
10 Pierre Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities. Translated by Truscott, Frederick 
Wilson and Frederick Lincoln Emory. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1902), 4.
11 For Torrance's insistence on the distinction between “objective” and “objectivistic,” see R&ST, 13-
14; TReconstr, 10, 232; TS, 38-39, 296n.
12 R&ST, T&C, 73.133. The other possible outcome is "personalism."
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"objectivity" which are actually forms of objectivism as they arise out of dualistic ways 
of thinking. The first of these is "observational objectivity."
Observationalist objectivity is that of naïve empiricism, according to 
which our thought is held to be controlled by observations or 
observational facts which have a condition independent of the basic 
rational factors that arise in our scientific constructions, and which 
operates with a concept of the universe as inherently independent of 
intelligible form or intrinsically amorphous.13
The problem that faces observationalist objectivity is that it posits a dualism between 
observational and theoretical elements in our knowledge, prioritizing the former and 
rejecting the latter. This would be a satisfactory account of objectivity if human beings 
were capable of having purely observational knowledge, independent of theoretical 
considerations. However, this is precisely what Torrance believes is not possible.14 As it 
is, observational objectivity continues to operate with theoretical elements since they 
cannot be avoided. Its nominal rejection of such elements makes it seem as though it 
has succeeded in avoiding them when, in fact, it has woven particular theoretical 
elements, such as a conviction that metaphysical considerations are simply not 
relevant,15 into its very approach.
The second of the false objectivities is methodological.
Methodological objectivity arose in modern science first out of the 
phenomenalist dualism posited by Galileo and Newton in the 
foundations of science. As we have seen, the real external world was 
identified with a common, public world that transcended all private 
perspectives, knowledge of which was reached through a synthesis 
constructed out of the many variable sense-experiences of private 
observers. This distinction between real and apparent, however, could 
only be upheld by a distinction between absolute and relative, in which 
absolute space and time, regarded as constituting a homogeneous inertial
13 T&C, 73.
14 See chapter 2 for the inescapability of theoretical components for knowledge.
15 T&C, 153.
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system, were erected as the rigid support and scaffolding for all scientific
concepts and operations. In these circumstances, objectivity became 
equated with the causal absoluteness of space and time.16
Methodological objectivity has the benefit of being rather robust. Indeed when people, 
especially non-scientists, speak of objectivity, they are likely referring to something like
methodological objectivity, a conviction that "the objective" is to be identified with that 
which is not dependent on any particular observer. The difficulty that arises is that, in 
order for such a view to be maintained, it must construct a framework in which to fit 
these publicly-available observations. This framework, in its turn, becomes what 
confers objectivity on observations even though it is not, by definition, observed by 
anyone.
In the end, both of these forms of objectivism fail precisely where they seem to 
be the strongest. Setting out to eliminate the influence of the subject on the object of 
knowledge, they end up imposing a subjectivity that tends to prevent the embrace of 
true objectivity. Observational objectivity does this by smuggling in theoretical 
commitments, such as the separation of observational and theoretical elements in 
knowledge; methodological objectivity does this by clamping an artificially generated 
framework down upon reality.
Though Torrance clearly sees himself as developing a notion of objectivity that 
stretches back hundreds of years, one of his more interesting dialogue partners on this 
topic is Michael Polanyi. There are two elements of this dialogue that are relevant for 
our understanding of Torrance's position. The first element is the recovery of what 
Torrance calls the "personal" or "social coefficient of knowledge."
Polanyi's rehabilitation of the personal coefficient in scientific 
knowledge does not imply a rejection of objectivity but of a mutilated 
concept of objectivity which he speaks of as objectivism, i.e. the severely
restricted concept of “objectivity” thrown up by the positivist outlook 
which limits knowledge to the results of explicit inferences and therefore
16 T&C, 74.
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leaves no room for basic beliefs or acts of the “understanding” in its 
determination to achieve a proper scientific "detachment."17
The majority of references to objectivity in Torrance's writing are not 
accompanied by an explanation that objectivity is not to be read as "objectivism" or that
scientific objectivity is always personal in character. However, in his essay, "The Social 
Coefficient of Knowledge,"18 Torrance expresses his agreement with the Polanyian 
stress on the importance of personal knowledge but expresses his conviction that it is 
the person who is the "bearer of objectivity."19
In all authentic knowing we distinguish what we know from our 
knowing of it and at the same time we distinguish ourselves from 
whatever we know. We recognise our own free independent existence 
and we are aware of ourselves as rational subjects in the activity of 
knowing. But obversely we recognise what we know as having reality 
"on its own," independent of our knowing of it. In distinguishing 
ourselves from what we know we are aware of ourselves as irreducibly 
real subjects, who have reality in ourselves independent of other realities
with which we stand in relation. But by the very same token we are 
aware of the other as having reality in itself independent of our knowing 
of it. It is this personal mode of being as subject which is precisely the 
mode of being in which we are aware of the objective world around us. 
Personal subject-mode of being is thus the bearer of objectivity.20
Torrance is quoted at length because this passage gathers up several important 
points about the person as the bearer of objectivity. He begins with a brief analysis of 
what happens when we know something and asserts that we distinguish ourselves from 
what we know. This is never argued for but simply asserted, occasionally with the 
additional suggestion that the inability to make this distinction is a sign of mental 
illness.21 This seems to be the important base of Torrance's argument, the point he takes 
17 T&C, 152-153.
18 R&ST, 98-130.
19 R&ST, 134.
20 R&ST, 109.
21 For such comparisons see G&G, 114; DM, 380; G&R, 8, 115-116; CT&SC, 62; TReconstr, 17.
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for granted. If one were to approach the knowing relationship with a different set of 
penultimate beliefs, one would likely reach a different conclusion.
However, if that distinction can be taken as valid, Torrance's argument seems 
sound. If I distinguish something from myself I am affirming its ontological (though 
perhaps not causal or epistemological) independence from me as well as my ontological
independence from it. If this independence holds good it follows that, just as I object to 
being manipulated by objects external to myself, so also the object of my knowledge 
objects to such manipulation by me.
The notion of the personal as that which is distinct from other things and persons
is crucial to Torrance's thinking. If one reads "person" in Torrance and does not realize 
that he uses it in a very technical way which he believes to be rooted in the 
development of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity,22 one may quickly misunderstand 
what he means. Torrance is convinced that one cannot be a "person" in utter isolation. 
One's personhood is defined by one's relationships, primarily with God, secondarily 
with other persons, and in a distinctly tertiary sense, with non-personal beings.23
The relevant implications of the subject-object distinction and the understanding
that it is the person, the one who is self-consciously differentiated from that which they 
know, that is the bearer of objectivity, is that it shifts our concept of objectivity from the
subjective pole of the knowing relation to the objective pole. That is to say, objectivistic
ways of thinking attempt to eliminate the subject from the subject-object relation. As 
such, the question that is implied by the objectivistic answer is, "How is it that we can 
be objective." Rather, Torrance would have us ask how it is that we, being the subjects 
we are, can allow the object to be objective to us. In point of fact the object is already, 
by its very nature, objective to us. The goal is to respect that objectivity by letting it be 
what it is and not what we would have it be. Objectivity is thus achieved by continually 
allowing the object of our knowledge to call what we think we know into question so 
that we may purge artificial elements from our knowing and achieve knowledge, as far 
as we may, in terms of reality itself.24
22 CFM, 37-41. Cf. R&ST, 171-172.
23 R&ST, 110-111.
24 For such accounts of objectivity, see G&R, 92; T&C, 75; TS, xv-xvi, 36, 295-296; R&ST, 14.
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This leads us to the second important element that Torrance picks up from 
Polanyi regarding objectivity, and that is the way Polanyi ties objectivity with his 
metaphysics.
Objectivity, as Polanyi understands it, has to do not only with the bearing
of our knowing upon reality but also, and preeminently, with its bearing 
upon the indefinite depth of rationality inherent in reality, in virtue of 
which reality has an inexhaustible capacity to reveal itself in unexpected 
ways in the future. It is indeed precisely in terms of that characteristic 
that Polanyi defines reality, that is, in terms of its independence and 
power to manifest itself in unthought of ways, and in corresponding 
terms that he defines objective truth in science, that is, in terms of the 
apprehension of real patterns inherent in nature, independent of our 
knowing of them, the implications of which extend indefinitely beyond 
the experience which they were originally meant to control.25
This appropriation by Torrance of the Polanyian understanding of "reality" as 
"something that attracts our attention by clues which harass and beguile our minds into 
getting ever closer to it, and which, since it owes this attractive power to its independent
existence, can always manifest itself in still unexpected ways,"26 will prove to be one of 
the most important pieces for understanding Torrance's realism.
Though Torrance has some significant problems with what has gone by the 
name of objectivity in the past, it is important to note that this is not to say that such a 
view had nothing to recommend it. Indeed, as we shall see, it is characteristic of 
Torrance's realism that problematic concepts can be overturned without abandoning 
their true elements. That is to say, Torrance provides a robust realism that is not 
damaged, for example, by the development of incommensurate conceptual frameworks.
Classical elements, "such as impartiality and universal agreement" must be 
retained; objectivity implies that "individual feelings and opinion" may not be imposed 
upon the object of knowledge.27 What we think is objective knowledge must be put to 
25 T&C, 154. See also TReconstr, 54.
26 Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 119-120.
27 T&C, 75.
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the test to see if we have actually come to grasp reality out of its own depth or whether 
we have artificially imposed our own preconceptions upon it. 
Necessary as all this is, however, it does not constitute sufficient 
condition for objectivity, for objectivity, as we now understand it in the 
light of relativity theory, must be grounded in invariant structures 
inherent in the space-time universe irrespective of any and every 
observer. In the nature of the case, objectivity is something that cannot 
finally be captured by our theoretic constructions no matter how 
faithfully they may bear upon those invariances through their referential 
and ontological relations.28
Objective thinking, for Torrance, is not detached thinking, thinking that is 
disinterested in the reality under consideration. Rather, objective thinking is 
characterized by radical attachment to the object, to have one's knowledge formed by 
that object rather than by subjective constructs.29 This sheds light on why Torrance 
never apologized for his passionate commitment to the gospel. According to his own 
convictions, if he had attempted to understand and articulate the fundamental 
convictions of Christian faith as nothing more than a detached observer, he could not be
objective. If Torrance approached theology in this way, without being deeply committed
to the truth of the gospel and attempting to allow it to call his most cherished beliefs 
into question, then he would have no knowledge of the gospel beyond how it appeared 
to him from the outside. Since it is not possible to come to know something 
independent of a particular framework of thought, he would then have no alternative but
to interpret it in light of a conceptual framework derived from elsewhere. Thus, the 
theologian who is "detached" from the God they study is, for Torrance, far from being 
objective or authoritative, but the most subjective of all. It is precisely this kind of 
commitment to the object of study that Torrance saw in the great scientists of the early 
twentieth century.
28 T&C, 75-76.
29 For objectivity as attachment rather than detachment, see CT&SC, 35; G&R, 6, 8-9; KB, 202: R&ET, 
98; R&ST, 112; TReconstr, 123; TS, 35; CFM, 66, 138-139.
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A final point about Torrance's understanding of objectivity to which we shall 
return in the next chapter in a discussion on truth is that objective knowledge, for 
Torrance, is not to be confused with timeless, unchanging expressions of that 
knowledge. Torrance agrees with Polanyi that reality is that which is able to reveal itself
in unexpected ways, even the most objective knowledge can never be treated as final, 
for there may always be more to learn. In fact, it is never more certain that knowledge is
not objective than when it is treated as irreformable or unchanging. “The relativity of 
our knowledge to external reality and its objectivity are but the obverse of each other."30
Does Torrance believe we can deal only with the subject-object relation?
A concern that might be raised in response to Torrance's insistence that we can 
never abstract the knowing subject from the knowing relation and that there is no way 
to transcend the subject-object relation is how we are to keep the subjective element in 
our knowledge in check. If Torrance's position is not to tumble into full-blown 
postmodern relativism, he will need to provide ways that the subject pole of human 
knowledge can be kept from becoming dominant, thus allowing the object to truly 
govern our knowledge of it.
Torrance does this by noting that, while we can never escape the subject-object 
relation, it is not the only relation that exists in our knowledge. Within the context of 
theological knowledge, Torrance points out that we do not have to do only with 
God/human relations but with God/world/human or God/human/world relations.31 This 
30 TS, 296. Cf. Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science. 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2008), 249. Also see 
R&ET, 12. “That is to say, the reality of the universe retains its own authority over all our inquiry 
and understanding, and remains the final judge of the truth or falsity of our concepts and statements 
about it. This is the kind of realism in which objectivity and relativity, properly understood, belong 
inseparably together.”
31 Torrance's own terminology is God/world/man or God/man/world relations. Though Torrance 
intended the word "man" to be taken in its classical, inclusive meaning, DM, 3; CDG, xi-xii, this has 
been a point of critique. Elmer M. Colyer, "Review of: The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being 
Three Persons, by Thomas F. Torrance." (Scottish Journal of Theology 50, (1997): 389-391), 389. In 
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acknowledgment means that we can extend the subject-object relation in two distinct 
ways: by involving other persons and by involving non-personal beings, both of which 
serve to check our subjectivity within the knowing relation.
As has been noted already, though Torrance's intellectual positions often arise 
from distinctly Christian considerations, they have implications that reach beyond the 
confines of Christian theology into the philosophy of science more generally. While 
there is nothing distinctly Christian about acknowledging that we ought to take our 
relations with other persons or non-personal beings into account to keep our own 
subjectivities in check while attempting to learn something new, it is clear that Torrance
does not believe that the Christian is free to reject this insight.32
Torrance's insistence that we must take God/world/human relations into account 
is fueled by the Christian doctrines of creation and Incarnation. It is important to note 
that it is these two doctrines when taken together that require that the Christian take 
these relations seriously. The doctrine of creation and related convictions, shared by 
Jews and Muslims, can suggest that other people and things within that creation may 
have epistemological value;33 however, it is when that concept of creation is amplified 
by the distinctly Christian notion that God has become incarnate in our spatio-temporal 
world that solidifies its importance.34 For Christian faith, knowledge of God is gained 
primarily within the creation, through Christ and the human witness to him, rather than 
by purely intellectual or abstract means.35 If we must acknowledge that we only know 
God as a community and in a world that includes us but cannot be reduced to us, how 
order to remove a needless offense without altering meaning, we have elected to use a gender 
inclusive term.
32 TReconstr, 236.
33 Torrance acknowledges that certain aspects of what has now come to be the scientific worldview 
were shared by other monotheistic faiths, through Christianity developed them further. See D&CO, 
2-5; G&G, 52-60; CT&SC, 60-61.
34 D&CO, 33.
35 Torrance's conviction is that, once God chooses to reveal himself in one way, it makes other ways of 
attempting to know God inappropriate. See G&R, 145; MC, 12; R&ET, 24. This conviction seems to 
be related to a point drawn from Fermat "that light takes the shortest path between two points." See 
ST&I, 66; G&G, 108-109; R&ET, 88; T&C, 269; TS, 341-342; CDG, 22.
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much more must we recognize that our knowledge of creation is not a matter of private 
reflection but something shared with other humans and the rest of creation?36
One further consideration is that God objects to our attempts to fit him into a 
pre-existing conceptual framework in a way that created realities cannot. It is the fact 
that God does not just resist these attempts, but actively confronts us that makes 
Christianity, perhaps, the science most rigorously dedicated to objectivity.37
This is an objectivity that is the antithesis of all objectivism, for 
objectivism treats the object merely as an object and prescinds the 
relation of the knowing subject to the object in such a way that the 
relation of the subject to the object becomes purely theoretical or logical,
i.e. an abstraction. But God gives Himself to be known as personal 
Subject, as the one Lordly Subject who approaches us and assumes us 
into personal relation with Him as subjects over against His own divine 
majestic Subjectivity...In other words, we cannot truly know God 
without being reconciled and renewed in Jesus Christ. Thus the 
objectivity of our theological knowledge is immutably soteriological in 
nature.38
The Christian doctrine of justification by grace alone is thus the strongest affirmation of
the importance of objectivity and the greatest challenge to any attempt to justify a 
theology that is inappropriately formed by subjective elements.39
How do we keep our subjectivity in check?
The fact that God/human relations are always just one part of God/human/world 
or God/world/human relations means that any individual who encounters God is not 
36 G&R, 201-202.
37 TS, 56. Torrance claims that Christian theology is not less scientific but more so because of its 
radical commitment to objectivity.
38 TS, 38-39, 41.
39 For the connection Torrance sees between justification by grace and objectivity, see G&R, 68; 
R&ET, 18; T&C, 211; KB, 88.
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alone in this encounter. There are others who have also encountered God with whom 
she or he can be in dialogue. Occasionally, Torrance will make reference to Polanyi's 
notion of a "community of experts," who are necessary for the existence of any science, 
not least theological science.40 The notion of a community of experts is a frequent one in
Polanyi's writing.41 The fact that such a community must be possible, even if a 
particular scientific endeavor has not yet generated such a community is crucial. If a 
community of experts is not possible, it would call into question the actual intersection 
of the reality we seek to know and our knowing of it. Scientific knowledge in any field 
cannot ever be a private acquisition; that is to say, when we say that we have come to 
know something, we are not speaking of a knowledge that has arisen in a highly 
idiosyncratic way that is impossible to be appropriated by others, but rather one that is 
available to all.42
Munchin suggests that Torrance denies religious experience any "cash-value" 
because of the stress of the Reformed tradition on the primacy of scripture.43 In fact, 
Torrance absolutely makes a place for our subjective religious experience though it is 
true that, for Torrance, this can never stand on its own but must be brought into 
dialogue with both the religious experience of others as well as scripture. To say that the
Reformed tradition thinks that the scripture is where the buck stops is not the same as to
say that a particular theologian in the Reformed tradition does not have a place for non-
scriptural considerations. Something can be primary without becoming monolithic.
Torrance maintains that the subjective pole of the subject-object relation is kept 
in check, to a degree, by subject-subject-object relations or intersubjectivity.44 In 
40 For the importance of community in theological knowledge, see JL&PL, 41-42; TS, 163; G&R, 201-
202.
41 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1958), 53, 163-164, 216-219, 375-376.
42 The question as to whether any reality is truly open to all is the question as to the role of verification 
in scientific activity, which will be addressed below.
43 Munchin, Is Theology a Science? 84.
44 Torrance does not always speak with such inelegant terminology. However, it is helpful to use it here
as it makes the relationship between this concept and the subject-object relation, which Torrance 
does not believe we can escape, clearer in spite of being somewhat clunky language. For the need of 
the community for the rationality of all knowledge, see TS, 210.
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subject-subject-object relations, we are not dealing merely with the fact that, whenever 
someone knows something, it is always they who know it, but with the fact that they are
not the only ones who know it. Our experience in any of the sciences, whether natural 
or theological, is never merely our own experience, but is also the experience of others 
with whom we can enter into dialogue.45 
The very fact that God reveals himself to us, and gives himself to us, 
within the space-time structures of our world, where we also 
communicate with one another, implies that we do not have to with God 
except as he relates himself to the world, and we do not have to do with 
the world except as the realm where we have to do with God as well as 
with one another and where therefore it is invested with a sanction 
beyond the beauty and harmony of its inherent rational order.46
It is, of course, possible that I may be mistaken in my understanding of what I 
have experienced, but what I think I know can be brought into a kind of dialectic with 
what another person thinks they know.47 By expanding the knowing relationship beyond
a single subject, a process which might resemble a kind of epistemological triangulation
can take place. Torrance believes that this kind of triangulation arises when more than 
one mind meet and refer to an object they both have epistemic access to in order to test 
their knowledge.
Propositions take place within the relation of objectivity between two 
subjects where the objectivity of one encounters the objectivity of 
another and where the ultimate decisions are not taken in the isolation of 
45 R&ST, 112.
46 R&ST, 189.
47 The purpose of this "dialectic" is not to merge the experiences of different people into a kind of 
Hegelian synthesis, but to discern similarities and overlap of experience. It should be clear that the 
conviction that a person may not be certain with regard to what they have experienced and that they 
can seek discussion with others to clarify their interpretation of their own experience presupposes an 
understanding of doctrine that is more complex than the "experiential expressivism" of much modern
theology as described by George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a 
Postliberal Age. (London: SPCK, 1984), 16, 31-32. See also Alister E. McGrath's response, The 
Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundation of Doctrinal Criticism. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 
20-26.
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one mind but in dependence on another or other minds. Of course no 
such encounter takes place in vacuo, but only in relation to a reality 
objective to both subjects and in a medium from which they draw their 
signs for communication with one another. Propositions have their place,
therefore, in a triadic relationship in which some 'object' is pointed out or
put forward by one person for the attention of another who is meant to 
apprehend it under the direction of the proposing statement and through 
a judgement on his part in agreement with that of the proposer.48
It is because of this inherently objective characteristic that makes propositions, where 
one person "proposes" something for the independent judgment of another person, 
superior to "judgments," where decisions and interpretations take place within a single 
mind.49 If it is inherently impossible to direct another person to an object, it must be 
asked whether such an object actually exists. This is not to say that all such direction is 
of the same kind, such as directing someone to an experimentally repeatable 
phenomenon, but that there must be some way to appeal beyond the specific spatio-
temporal experience of a single person. In the natural sciences, this takes place in 
universities, laboratories and conferences. In theology this takes place primarily in the 
church, though it avails itself of academic expressions of community as well. 
How does Torrance conceive the confirmation or assessment of scientific claims?
One of the most important things intersubjectivity provides is a way to verify 
epistemological claims.50 For Torrance, verification is the way by which we confirm, as 
far as possible, the legitimacy of our knowledge. According to his view, this can only 
happen along the lines of the "triadic relationship" noted above, where two minds meet 
and are mutually referred to an object external to each of them.
48 TS, 162-163. See also 350-351.
49 TS, 161-163.
50 It must be noted that, for Torrance, verification does not function as it did for the positivists.
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We can only ‘convince’ others of the truth of our existence-statements if 
we can get them to see or hear the reality they refer to as we see or hear 
it. It can never be forced upon them. They must be brought to share our 
intuition of the object given. That does not mean that by describing or 
explaining to others our intuition we can induce them to have a similar 
experience, for no act of knowledge is explainable from the side of the 
knowing subject (i.e., psychologically) but only from the side of the 
object known, for true knowledge arises in proportion as the subject 
allows his knowing to be determined by the nature of the object before 
him.51
If we are to verify an epistemological claim, we cannot do this by reflecting on it
in an abstract way but must actually get someone to experience reality, to a degree, as 
we do. In a simple case, such as the statement, "The sky looks blue today," verification 
may involve nothing more than the other person looking at the sky and confirming that, 
as they see it, the sky is indeed blue. However, if the claim is more complicated, it may 
require more effort from the verifier. The difficulty that Torrance seems to be 
attempting to draw attention to is that two different persons may not be equally 
prepared to discern a reality. If someone, such as myself, has poor eyesight, it will not 
be sufficient to have her look at the same thing as someone with perfect eyesight. 
Rather, one's vision must be operating appropriately, in this case with corrective lenses, 
in order to be in a position to verify the claims made by another person. According to 
theologians as significant to Torrance as Athanasius, it might be that in order for one to 
get the "lenses" one needs to gain certain knowledge she might need to go to a 
particular place or adopt a particular kind of lifestyle, or else she is not in a position to 
verify or falsify a particular claim.52
It is important to note that, while Torrance's understanding of verification 
requires differences in procedure depending on whether we are dealing with claims to 
51 TS, 165.
52 Athanasius. On the Incarnation. Translated by Behr, John. Yonkers, (New York: St. Vladimir's 
Seminary Press, 2011). §57, 173.
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know God or claims to know created things,53 it is effectively the same, mutatis 
mutandis, in every field. In both fields, claims are ultimately reliant on reality itself for 
their truth or falsity.
Science is ultimately cast upon the grace of reality for the justification or
verification of its theories and results. That is to say, justification by faith
alone applies no less in the realm of scientific knowledge than it does in 
the realm of theological knowledge, for in both we rely entirely upon the
dynamic processes of order inherent in that which we seek to know, the 
contingent universe or God the Creator of the universe. We express that 
reliance by the affirmation of our belief.54
No science, whether natural or theological, has any authority higher than the object of 
study to which they may appeal. No theoretical framework or meta-discipline can 
arbitrate between differences of opinion with final authority when reality itself does not 
do so.
Within the context of theological knowledge, Torrance believes that, "for 
verification we can only cast ourselves ultimately upon the justifying Grace of God, 
since in the last resort verification of our knowledge of God must come to us from 
without from God Himself."55 However, this reliance on grace is not something that is 
only the case in theology. Torrance is quite convinced that the same must be said about 
the verification of claims in the natural sciences, though in this case it is the "grace of 
reality" that justifies our statements.56
What is the relationship between discovery and verification?
 Torrance's understanding of verification might be more significant because of 
what it does not include than what it does. Verifying an epistemological claim, for 
53 On the need for knowledge to be justified by the nature of what we know, see TS, 193; R&ET, 148.
54 T&C, 211.
55 TS, 197. See also 201.
56 This expression can be found in T&C, 211 and "TR,” 183.
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Torrance, involves going through more or less the same process as the one who 
discovered it went through.
There is of course a proper distinction between how a scientist actually 
comes to find out something and how he subsequently writes it up and 
presents it, termed by Reichenbach the “context of discovery” and the 
“context of justification,” but it is another matter through rational 
reconstruction to clamp down prescriptively a hypothetical-deductive 
theory of scientific discovery and verification upon unformalisable 
heuristic operations.57
That is to say the scientist, when presenting her work for verification, does not 
communicate precisely the process they went through.58 This is not least because it is 
impossible to reduce the experience of discovery to statements. The messy process of 
discovery can be tidied up somewhat for clarity of presentation, but this distinction does
not allow one to conclude that, while scientific discovery does not need to follow any 
particular rules, when the time comes to verify those claims, they must be able to be 
explained in terms of what the community of scientists already knows. Rather, it is 
precisely the fact that new knowledge cannot explained in terms of old knowledge that 
makes it a discovery rather than a mere outworking of the implications of what we 
already knew.59
Torrance makes a distinction between gaining new knowledge and working out 
the implications of what we already know, though it must be granted that sometimes 
this outworking can feel like a new discovery.60 New knowledge according to this 
understanding cannot, by definition, be explained in terms of what we already know, 
57 T&C, 101n.
58 TS, 197-198.
59 Travis M. Stevick, "Openness and Formal Logic in the Natural and Theological Sciences According 
to T. F. Torrance." (Participatio 2 (Supp. Vol.), (2013): 37-66), 56, 62. This distinction shows that, 
like Feyerabend, Torrance prefers "revolutionary science" over "normal science." David Munchin, 
"‘Is Theology a Science?' Paul Feyerabend's Anarchic Epistemology as Challenge Test to T. F. 
Torrance's Scientific Theology." (Scottish Journal of Theology 64, 2011: 439-455), 449.
60 TS, 250. Logic can “do some difficult thinking for us by unfolding the implications of our scientific 
work beyond what we could determine with our empirical statements alone.”
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otherwise it would not be new knowledge. One of the significant implications of this 
distinction is that, for Torrance, there can be no sharp dualism between the context of 
discovery and the context of justification. There are no a priori rules by which new 
would-be discoveries are justified. No such rules would be appropriate for, if they are 
claimed to exist, it would seem to imply either that new knowledge will necessarily be 
similar to knowledge we have already gained or that we are clamping down an artificial
framework of thinking upon all knowledge. It would seem that Torrance would not 
approve of either option.
The fact that there is no fundamental difference between the context of 
discovery and that of verification or justification is due to the lack of a "logical bridge" 
between our concepts and experience.61
There is indeed a deep and wonderful correlation between concepts and 
experience, and science operates with that correlation everywhere, but 
since there is no logical bridge the scientist does not work with rules for 
inductive procedures, and cannot finally verify his claims to have 
discovered the structures of reality by logical means. This does not imply
that there are not immensely important logico-deductive processes that 
have to be undertaken in the construction of scientific theories and in 
testing their consistency, but the actual way in which they are applied to 
empirical existence, which is such a crucial test, is not basically different
from the way in which they are discovered by the scientist in the first 
place.62
This denial of a logical bridge between our concepts and experience is an important part
of Torrance's realism, for it implies that we never have merely empirical science but our
engagement with reality is always empirico-theoretical. We shall return to this and its 
implications in chapter five.
61 It would seem that Torrance got the term "logical bridge" from Einstein. If not the term, Torrance 
certainly considers Einstein to be one of the greatest enemies of the idea expressed by it. See 
D&CO, 59, and its note on 150-151. See also T&C, 120.
62 R&ST, 76.
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This theoretical objection is not the only one Torrance has regarding the positing
of a sharp difference between the context of discovery and the context of justification. 
Expressing the same problem but with different terms, Torrance writes the following.
The actual work of discovery is carried out by the scientiae speciales 
which all presuppose and overlap with one another in scientia generalis, 
but the scientia generalis is bound to what is known like the scientiae 
speciales. Philosophy, however, is not bound in that way for its activity 
is not limited by a particular object or a set of objects and therefore has a
considerable range of freedom within the possibilities and necessities of 
thought. It is concerned with what Whitehead called “complete 
generality” or “necessity in universality.” It is much more like abstract 
mathematics which is not bound by the limitations of the concrete or of 
space and time, but because it is like abstract mathematics and because it
is concerned, like scientia generalis, with the overlap between the 
scientiae speciales, philosophy is constantly being tempted to identify 
itself with scientia generalis, and through schematization to abstract 
mathematics to conceive of itself as a scientia universalis. In so doing, 
however, philosophy confounds itself as a way of thinking with a way of
discovery, and so lays down principles for verification which do not 
coincide with the actual ways of discovery in the special sciences, and 
would, if taken seriously, cut away the ground from beneath the special 
sciences and make them meaningless.63
A sharp separation between the context of discovery and the context of justification 
leads, according to Torrance, to nothing short of a marginalization of all the special 
sciences in favor of some mythical and omni-competent philosophy of science.
A well-known, and highly controversial philosopher who would seem to be of a 
similar opinion regarding the relation between the context of discovery and the context 
63 TS, 114-115. Cf. Feyerabend's argument in Against Method. 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 1993).
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of justification is Paul Feyerabend.64 Within the context of a dialogue, Feyerabend 
criticizes what goes by the name "context of justification."
OK - but then you must also admit that what you call the context of 
justification - the situation when you have unambiguous and highly 
corroborated instances and a clear generalization and ask how one is 
related to the other - is an ideal case that almost never occurs in 
practice...What we have in practice is always a theory, which 
occasionally is formulated in very ambiguous terms (think of Bohr's 
older quantum theory!), evidence that points in all sorts of directions and
a judgment which says what is reliable and what not and accepts the 
theory on that basis.65
Elsewhere, Feyerabend asserts that "the idea of a science that proceeds by logically 
rigorous argumentation is nothing but a dream," applies to the context of justification 
every bit as much as it does to the context of discovery.66
What role do non-personal objects play in gaining knowledge?
Subject-subject-object relations, or intersubjectivity, can go far in keeping our 
individual subjectivity in check. However, it would be a mistake to conclude from this 
64 For much more on the ways Torrance and Feyerabend are similar or dissimilar, see Munchin, Is 
Theology a Science?
65 Paul K. Feyerabend, Three Dialogues on Knowledge. (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1991), 86-87. 
The fact that this point is taken from a dialogue and thus cannot be uncritically assumed to be a fixed
position of Feyerabend is a feature common to all of Feyerabend's writings, which are frequently 
characterized by an ironical tone or an expression of "devil's advocacy." This is a point where 
Munchin, Is Theology a Science, 188, seems to have misunderstood Feyerabend, as he implies that 
Feyerabend was going through a Critical Rationalist phase when he wrote Against Method, whereas 
Feyerabend has been clear that it was written as it was because it was originally an essay for Imre 
Lakatos and he wrote from the point of view of a rationalist because Lakatos was a rationalist. 
Against Method, vii.
66 Paul K. Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason. (London: Verso, 1987), 10.
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that something that achieves intersubjective affirmation is "true" in anything like a 
traditional sense of the term. The most one can hope to assert with intersubjective 
evidence is what could be called "truth by consensus." The major weakness of such a 
position is that consensus can and often does change over time. It was this that made 
Lakatos refer to "truth by [changing] consensus" one of what he believed to be 
unacceptable replacements for a notion of truth as "proven knowledge."67
It is clear that individualistic subjectivity is a problem for authentic knowledge, 
but asserting intersubjectivity as an epistemological virtue raises the question as to 
whether there is such a thing as corporate subjectivity and, if so, whether it is a problem
like individual subjectivity.
It is clear from Torrance's own writings that he saw a dangerous corporate 
subjectivity at work in the Roman Catholic Church.
In this way the Roman Church appears to have evolved a new notion of 
truth! The only reality it acknowledges is that which it finds in the 
developing forms of its tradition and continuously makes real for itself 
through doctrinal formulation, so that the tradition of a thing is its reality,
and truth is that which conforms to this tradition as it is formed and 
shaped in the consciousness of the Roman Church. Thus the truth of a 
doctrine is what has become of it in the development of the active 
tradition, so that in this way the element of objectivity in the tradition is 
subordinated to a massive subjectivity in the mind of the Church. Hence 
it can be argued that for the Roman Church 'objectivity' actually and 
practically denotes conformity to its own mind. The ultimate criterion of 
truth with which it operates is appeal to its own self-consciousness 
which it assumes uncritically to be identical with the Mind of Christ. 
Truth is subjectivity, corporate subjectivity - that is what we may call the
67 Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.” In Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of 
Science, London, 1965, Volume 4, edited by Lakatos, Imre and Alan Musgrave, 91-196. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970). 92. Brackets in original.
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notion of the active reason in its corporate form, the intellectus agens 
combined with the dynamic creative subjectivity of the Church.68
Though Torrance finds corporate subjectivity to be a danger for the Roman Catholic 
Church, this does not mean that Protestantism is not guilty of subjectivism; it is simply 
that Protestant subjectivity tends to be individualistic rather than corporate.69 Indeed, it 
might be suggested that Protestantism can also suffer from corporate subjectivity when 
it gets expressed as the "establishment religion."
The question as to whether we can ever have anything more than truth by 
consensus is raised in the natural sciences by the work of Thomas S. Kuhn, who 
suggested that scientific knowledge is not merely the accumulation of facts but the 
successive change in what he termed "paradigms."70 This notion, that scientific 
knowledge is not theory-neutral but always relative to a particular paradigm or 
scientific perspective shared by the community of scientists or some significant portion 
of that community has been criticized as making scientific change essentially no 
different than religious change.71 What this means is that, though the problem of 
corporate subjectivity is a problem for theological science, of which every theologian is 
aware because of the different viable traditions at work in the field of theology, it is 
equally a problem for the natural sciences.
For Torrance, the primary problem with corporate subjectivity within theological
science is its tendency to appropriate the object of knowledge, the thing that stands over
and against the knower, whether individual or corporate, and transform it into 
something under the control of that knower.72 As such, it is imperative for science, 
whether natural or theological, to find a way to keep corporate subjectivity under 
control.
Above, it was stated that Torrance provides two ways to extend the subject-
object relation in order to keep subjectivity in check. The first of these was to take 
68 TS, 79. Also, TReconstr, 68.
69 TS, 80; TReconstr, 68-69.
70 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996).
71 Lakatos, "Falsification," 93.
72 TS, 351-352.
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subject-subject-object relations into account. The second is to take subject-object-object
relations into account.
Torrance believes that the root of subjectivity in theology and in certain forms of
the philosophy of science is a tendency to give epistemological priority to the analogy 
of sight.
What is really primitive, however, is precisely this pre-scientific way of 
thinking in pictures and images on the model of visual perception, that 
is, in terms only of a subject-object relation in which we cannot escape 
from ourselves - in the last resort this reduces all theology into some 
form of anthropology. In genuinely scientific thinking, however, while 
symbolic representation retains an essential place, we are concerned to 
penetrate into the objective coherences and structured interrelations of 
things in themselves - that is, into object-object relations in which our 
subject-object relations are transcended and controlled from beyond 
themselves by reference to the ontological structure of the realities being
investigated. This transition from primitive to scientific thinking is one 
in which we move from mythos to logos, from image to inner logic, 
from subjectivity to objectivity.73
This stress on the need to develop epistemological models beyond those based 
on the analogy of sight is due to Torrance's characteristically realist conviction that it is 
possible to discern relations that are not observable after the model of vision.74 It is 
Torrance's conviction that natural science felt compelled to move beyond 
73 T&C, 252. Torrance believes that the addition of what could be called auditive modes of knowing is 
a contribution of the Hebrew tradition to modern science. See TReconstr, 14-15, 170; JL&PL, 34n; 
CFM, 37-41. It should also be noted that, though Torrance speaks here, as elsewhere, in terms of 
"object-object" relations, he has not forgotten that the knowing subject is always involved.
74 Bhaskar would seem to agree. He distinguishes between the domains of the Empirical, the Actual 
and the Real. The first is necessarily observable, the second is accidentally so and the third is 
fundamentally unobserverable, since it is the condition on which the other two are possible at all. 
However, this unobservability does not make it any less real. Indeed, Bhaskar acknowledges that the 
greater danger in his system is to assume that observations are less real than the structures and events
that gave rise to them. Realist Theory of Science, 58-59.
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observationalist modes of knowing in order to "penetrate behind sense-experience to the
invisible object-object relations and dynamic field-structures which give continuity and 
cohesion to states of affairs in nature independent of our observations and 
manipulations."75
The basic epistemological function of these subject-object-object relations is to 
allow the interactions between the object of our knowledge and other objects, especially
when these relations play a crucial role as to what a thing is, to function as a form of 
knowledge with greater objectivity against which to compare the knowledge we believe
we have gained through subject-object and subject-subject-object relations.
Torrance does not give many examples of what this looks like in either natural 
or theological science, but it would seem to be fairly easy to supply a few. Within the 
context of Christian theology, there are two kinds of "object-object" relations that leap 
to mind. The first has to do with the encounter of the first disciples with Jesus and the 
miracles he performed. In addition to the other miracles, the gospel accounts bear 
witness to what are often called "nature miracles," mastery over the wind and waves, to 
give one example. The relation between Jesus and the forces of nature is, from the point
of view of the disciples, an "object-object relation," a relation in which they have no 
part other than the fact that they happened to witness it. Relations like this might be 
seen as counting against any individual or corporate conviction that, in Jesus we have to
do with nothing more than a wise teacher and political revolutionary.
A further and, for Torrance, doubtless more important example of object-object 
relations are those we find among the Persons of the Trinity. For Torrance, these 
relations are the paradigmatic examples of what he calls "onto-relations."76 The relations
between the Persons are part of who they are; no single Person of the Trinity is what 
they are in isolation from the other two. This means that any insights gained by 
individuals or communities into the Person and character of Jesus must be brought into 
dialogue with and informed by the relations between Jesus, the Father, and the Spirit. 
These are relations that are both constitutive of the Divine Being as well as independent
75 CT&SC, 48-49.
76 The term “onto-relations” can be found in R&ET, 42-51; MC, 47; T&C, 230; ST&R, 185; CDG, 102-
103; CT&SC, 26-27, 51; D&CO, 109-110; JL&PL, 43-44; G&G, 174.
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of all creation. It would seem that the relation between the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit as born witness to in the New Testament is of pivotal importance if one were to 
argue that the divinity of Christ is not merely a subjective affirmation, whether 
individual or corporate.
Within the natural sciences, perhaps the clearest example of object-object 
relations in Torrance's writings is the development of field theory. An electro-magnetic 
field is not directly observable, but its effects are. It was the difficulty of explaining the 
effects of things such as magnets in terms of Newtonian mechanics that pushed James 
Clerk Maxwell to develop his concept of dynamic fields.77 The taking of object-object 
relations into account has become a major element of modern science. Perhaps this is 
because of the impersonal nature of many of the objects of scientific investigation. 
However, Torrance believes that such relations are no less important for theological 
than for natural science.
What are we hoping to come to know in our scientific activity?
In an earlier quotation about object-object relations, Torrance said that the 
transition from mythos to logos and from subjectivity to objectivity is parallel with that 
from image to inner logic. Inner logic is another way that Torrance expresses the nature 
of reality that we seek to know. To know something truly is to know it according to its 
nature, to know it in accordance with its inner logic or to understand it in its inherent 
intelligibility.78 Because of this, it is important to turn our attention to what Torrance 
means when he speaks of "truth," the more so because it turns out that he uses this term 
in a significantly idiosyncratic way.
77 Torrance speaks of this difficulty and solution in CT&SC, 50-51 and PCT, 5-6.
78 Torrance uses these terms interchangeably.
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4. What does it mean to speak kata physin? 
The question of truth
Why is language a problem?
Torrance's fundamental epistemological conviction is that we know something 
truly when we know it according to its nature.1 We have already seen that this 
conviction has far reaching implications. It means that we must derive our ultimate 
beliefs about reality from reality itself or else we shall be guilty of importing a set of 
beliefs derived from elsewhere. It also means that it is not appropriate to take up an 
epistemological position of detachment. Rather, objectivity is less an embracing of a 
kind of subject-object dualism than it is a submission of the subject-pole of knowledge 
to the object of knowledge.
However, if we are ever to give expression to our knowledge, we must do so 
through the use of statements. This poses a very real problem, for unless we are dealing 
with our knowledge of statements, the statements we use to express knowledge about 
reality are of a very different nature than reality itself. Knowledge is of very little use 
unless it can be communicated. If Torrance's central epistemological conviction is to be 
of any use at all, it must be related to a theory of language. This raises questions 
regarding the relation of statements to being or, in other words, questions about the 
nature of truth and truthfulness. It is necessary to explore whether Torrance's kataphysic
knowledge implies such a theory and whether it is viable. 
How does Torrance understand the relation between statement and being? By 
way of anticipation, the relation is basically semantic.2 That is to say, Torrance is 
1 Elmer M. Colyer, The Nature of Doctrine in the T. F. Torrance's Theology. (Eugene, OR: Wipf and 
Stock, 2001), 15.
2 Travis M. Stevick, "Truth and Language in the Theology of T. F. Torrance." (Participatio 2 (Supp. 
Vol.), 2013) 73-74.
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adamant that truth is not something that is primarily characteristic of our statements but 
rather is a property of the reality to which those statements direct us. Speaking 
precisely, it is being that is "true," while statements can be "truthful" if they are “rooted 
in reality.”3 While Torrance's position can be neatly summarized in this manner, it is a 
highly nuanced position which cannot be properly understood except against some 
important background issues. It is to these issues, and relevant historical developments 
that we now turn.
How can we speak of that which is so different from language?
One of the great mysteries of language is that we are able to use it to describe 
things that are so radically different in nature from language. One modern philosopher 
who mused on the question of what this looks like is Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Describe the aroma of coffee! - Why can't it be done? Do we lack the 
words? And for what are words lacking? - But where do we get the idea 
that such a description must, after all, be possible? Have you ever felt the
lack of such a description? Have you tried to describe the aroma and 
failed?4
There is a sense in which we feel that we ought to be able to describe a phenomenon 
such as a powerful smell and yet we seem utterly inadequate to the task. Even if we 
were to invent new words for the occasion, would that not require a clear understanding
of what element of the smell of coffee we needed to describe but have as yet been 
unable to do so? But why do we need an unambiguous description of the smell of 
coffee? Can we not refer to it adequately to one familiar with such a smell for them to 
recall their own experiences and can we not refer to it sufficiently well so that one who 
is unfamiliar with the smell can decide whether it is the kind of experience they would 
3 This expression, which functions as a technical term in Torrance's writing and in this thesis, will be 
unpacked below.
4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. (New York: 
MacMillan Publishing, 1968), §610.
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like to have? Somehow, our inability to capture experience in our statements does not 
prevent communication from taking place.5
Can we dispense with language altogether?
Given that we are unable to reduce the complexities of reality into our 
conceptual statements, one might be tempted to dispense with language altogether. Why
can we not operate with a conviction that there is only a non-evidential or non-
conceptual relation to God where we need not be tied down to any of the problems 
raised by dealing with language?6 Torrance's chief difficulty with such a position is that 
it eliminates any real grounding of our concepts in the being of God and so leaves us 
with nothing according to which we may judge theological terms other than "our own 
inward experience and spirituality."7 Torrance believes that problems such a view 
intends to solve can be solved equally well, while avoiding the problems of a such a 
view, when "the truth of being is given its rightful priority and prerogative over all truth
of statement."8 Given that Torrance believes that the relation between statement and 
being must be grappled with, we must examine how Torrance actually grapples with it.
When Torrance wants to raise the question as to how words or statements are 
related to reality, he most often does so within the context of a discussion on Plato's 
dialogue, Cratylus.9
In order to understand the insights that Torrance takes from the Cratylus, it is 
important to introduce the basic structure of the dialogue, for Torrance reads it 
somewhat selectively. In this dialogue, the Platonic Socrates (hereafter merely 
5 Torrance does not refer to Wittgenstein's example at any point. However, it serves as an example of 
reflections that are not altogether unlike what Torrance's position is attempting to articulate.
6 Torrance uses the theology of Schillebeeckx as a case study of the perils of a non-conceptual and 
non-evidential relation to God in "TR," 176-183.
7 "TR," 181.
8 "TR" 180.
9 For the clearest connection between this topic and Plato's work, see R&ET, 65-66. See also, JL&PL, 
26; T&C, 319-320; TReconstr, 89; "TR," 170-171.
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"Socrates") is asked to arbitrate between two men: Cratylus who believes that words 
have a "natural" relation to reality and Hermogenes who thinks words are only related 
to reality by way of custom. In particular, Hermogenes is of the mind that the name of 
something is that which people agree to call it. For him, this ability to assign names 
does not just apply to groups of people, such as various nations and languages, but to 
individuals as well.10 
Torrance believes that the key question at stake in the dialogue is, "Do the terms 
we use have their significance in virtue of some natural relation between them as verbal
signs and the realities they signify, or simply in virtue of an extrinsic conventional 
relation?"11 We shall look briefly at how the dialogue deals with the question and then 
note what insights Torrance appropriates from it.
Socrates sees certain pieces of truth in each of these positions but ultimately 
rejects them both. True to his emphasis on experts, he confronts Hermogenes by arguing
that not everyone is capable of giving names to things, but only "legislators," the 
experts of names.12 Even though different legislators will use different syllables, they 
are each attempting to give articulation to what he calls the "true name." This practice is
considered parallel to the fact that, even if something is made in different places and 
with different materials, it can be equally good.13 Torrance's appropriation of this insight
is clear. "The difference between words in different languages is of course due to 
convention yet basically, according to Plato, there is a natural, rather than a 
conventional relation between speech and the things signified."14
Though Socrates objected to the relativism of Hermogenes, this is not to imply 
that he found nothing to critique in Cratylus' would-be realist theory of knowledge. 
Indeed, it would seem that, for Cratylus, a "true name" is so much like that-which-it-
names that one can learn as much about that-which-it-names by examining the name as 
one could by examining that-which-it-names directly. For Socrates, this is an absurd 
10 Plato, "Cratylus." In The Works of Plato. Translated by Taylor, Thomas and Floyer Sydenham. Vol. 5,
455-526. (Chippenham, Wiltshire: Antony Rowe, 1996 (first in 1804)) 462.
11 R&ET, 65.
12 Plato, "Cratylus," 465-470.
13 Plato, "Cratylus," 468.
14 TReconstr, 89.
101
position to hold, for then there is no difference between an image and reality and we 
would readily confuse the two. An image is still an image, even if it is not an exact copy
of reality. Indeed, as Torrance points out, an image can only be what it is intended to be 
if it falls short of reality to some degree.15
The conclusion that Torrance takes from this dialogue is that, at their best, our 
theories, terms, and such have a real rather than a purely conventional relation to reality.
However, this is not to be construed as if "real" in this context meant "exact copy." 
Torrance maintains that there can be a real semantic relation between a statement and a 
reality that far outstrips it in meaning. Indeed, all referential statements have this 
character. This "inadequacy" of our terms to reality is not to be interpreted as a 
shortcoming but an indispensable part of their truth.
It must be noted that it would be inappropriate to say that Torrance 
"appropriates" the Cratylus in any sense that implies that he has faithfully and 
sufficiently articulated the content of the entire dialogue and is in substantive agreement
with Plato's conclusion. Rather, it would be more responsible to interpret his citation 
and discussion of the dialogue as being evidence of his being inspired by Plato's 
treatment of the question. The consistency with which Torrance refers to the Cratylus or
language used in it either explicitly or implicitly seems to imply that he genuinely 
thinks he is appropriating Plato at this point,16 but there are important differences 
between Torrance and Plato. Torrance rejects the Platonic metaphysics which lie behind 
Socrates' position and, while it would seem that Torrance would not be utterly opposed 
to a Platonic stress on experts inasmuch as Torrance thinks it is important to get our 
philosophy of science from practicing research scientists,17 he is also aware of the fact 
that there can be a gap between how one thinks they are operating and how they are, in 
fact, operating.18
15 R&ET, 50-51. See also TS, 167.
16 Explicit references were noted above. It is referenced implicitly in DM, 263; R&ET, 110-111; T&C, 
305-306; TF, 36.
17 "The Ground and Grammar of Theology, Lecture 2 Q&A." Grace Communion International, 
accessed March 18, 2014, http://gcitv.net/download/MiscVid/TorranceGrammar-Tape2-QA.mp3, 
19:07.
18 T&C, 244-245. Cf. Feyerabend, Three Dialogues on Knowledge. (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 
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Torrance is something of a philosophical opportunist.19 He has a tendency, which
we shall see again with his treatment of Anselm of Canterbury, to interpret a thinker 
somewhat freely, yet maintaining that the ideas came from those thinkers originally. 
This kind of opportunism can be read in an essentially harmless way. It might seem 
reasonable to suggest that the relation between Torrance and his philosophical 
influences is something like this: Torrance reads someone like Plato or Anselm. While 
reading, he has an insight which significantly aids him in articulating what he wants to 
express. Torrance then takes over the forms of thought and speech from the other 
thinker into his own thinking, even directing attention back to that thinker to elucidate 
his own point. The result would then be seen as a genuine intellectual appropriation 
which yields a very important, if selective, reading of the original thinkers, which plays 
a significant role within the framework of Torrance's own thought but which might be 
considered inadequate from the point of view of a historian of philosophy.
However, it must be noted that this opportunism, if not exposed and addressed, 
has several unfortunate consequences. First and most obvious, it risks playing fast and 
loose with history. By citing his own views as if they came to him from the minds of 
others, Torrance portrays thinkers in history as affirming views that they may not, in 
fact, have affirmed. Additionally, Torrance's publications cover a significant range of 
topics and this opportunism is woven throughout them all. It is entirely possible that 
those who appreciate Torrance will assume that he provides an entirely accurate reading
of historical texts with which they have no firsthand experience. This may result in 
those following after Torrance building on the Torrancean Plato, for example, rather 
than the actual Plato. Thus, given that Torrance's selective readings are implicit rather 
than named explicitly and acknowledged openly, will tend to sow confusion.
Further, Torrance's selective reading and tendency to portray historical thinkers 
as supplying him with ideas to put to his own purposes implies that his ideas have a 
philosophical pedigree that they do not possess. Within the context of this thesis, 
1991), 9.
19 Cf. Einstein's claim that, to the point of view of a systematic epistemologist, the practicing scientist 
must appear "a type of unscrupulous opportunist." "Remarks to the Essays Appearing in this 
Collective Volume." In Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, edited by Schilpp, Paul Arthur, 663-
688. (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1970), 684.
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Torrance's appropriation of Plato and Anselm are taken up. It is important to note that, 
whatever inspiration Torrance may have gained from such thinkers and however 
obvious their meanings may be portrayed, his ideas are his own and are not to be traced 
back to antiquity or the eleventh century, respectively.
What have been the dominant views?
Painting with a broad brush, it could be said that there have two dominant views 
regarding the relation of statement to being: a correspondence theory of truth and a 
coherence theory of truth. It should be emphasized that this is a simplification as there 
are other views, such as the identity theory of truth or a pragmatic theory of truth. 
However, it would seem that the basic convictions expressed in these two primary 
views are particularly forceful and perennial, as they seem to crop up over and over 
again throughout history under different names.20
20 Here are some of the ways that these convictions are mentioned in Torrance's work (If the terms arise
in the context of historical discussion, the people cited as using these terms are in parentheses): 
Existence-statements and coherence-statements, TS, 164-172; Logic of Empirical Form and Logic of 
Systematic Form, TS, 222-223; Discovery and Logic (See my "Openness and Formal Logic in the 
Natural and Theological Sciences According to T. F. Torrance." Participatio 2 (Supp. Vol.), (2013)); 
Direct Intention and Oblique/Secondary Intention (Ockham, Peter of Spain), TS, 223; G&R, 36-37; 
Interrogatio and Quaestio (Valla, Calvin), G&R, 34; JL&PL, 37; T&C, 267-268; HJC, 111-112; 
Relations between matters of fact and Relations between ideas (Hume), TS, 164-165; Activa 
Inquisito/Inventio and Logic (Bacon), TS, 70; Invention and Induction (Bacon, Agricola and Valla) 
HJC, 28-29; Ars Inventiendi and ars diiudicandi (Medievals) R&ST, 29f; Intuitive Knowlege and 
Abstractive Knowledge (Duns Scotus, Occam), TReconstr, 79; HJC, 4-5, 13f; Signification and 
supposition (Occam), HJC, 15f; Semantic Meaning and Syntactic Meaning (Carnap) TS, 223n1; 
Sachlogik and Sprachlogik (German thinkers) TS, 226. It is also evident in thinkers not explicitly 
noted by Torrance. This dual emphasis is evident in Thomas Kuhn's distinction between 
revolutionary science and normal science, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996); Roy Bhaskar's "phases of discovery" and "phases of 
application," A Realist Theory of Science. 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2008), 192; George Lindbeck's 
distinction between "ontological" truth of statement and "intrasystematic" truth of statement, The 
Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. (London: SPCK, 1984), 64; Albert 
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Extremely briefly, a correspondence theory of truth, in one way or another, 
emphasizes that our statements refer to that which is beyond themselves in an external 
reality while a coherence theory of truth, in one way or another, affirms conceptual 
consistency as the primary virtue for our statements. Torrance would consider both of 
these views to result from a kind of subject-object dualism, where a strong 
correspondence theory emphasizes the objective pole of language to the neglect of the 
subjective pole and a strong coherence theory emphasizes the subjective pole of 
language to the neglect of the objective pole.21
Is there a direct connection between statement and being?
The first major option for understanding the relation of statements to being we 
shall discuss is the idea that there is some kind of direct connection between statement 
and being. To say that there is a direct connection is not to imply that the relation 
between statement and being is collapsed merely to statements, for the relation may be 
understood as semantic in nature, but that there is a sense in which our statements, as 
well as the terms within them, correspond with reality. This is to say that if the 
statement, "the cat sat on the mat," is to be true, there must exist a cat and a mat and the 
cat must be sitting on the mat. The lack of any of these particulars would render the 
statement false. This view has come to be known as the correspondence theory of truth.
The roots for a correspondence theory of truth are often traced back to Aristotle 
in book four of his Metaphysics.
We begin by defining truth and falsehood. Falsehood consists in saying 
of that which is that it is not, or of that which is not that it is. Truth 
consists in saying of that which is that it is, or of that which is not that it 
Einstein's distinction between "External Confirmation" and "Inner Perfection," "Autobiographical 
Notes," in Schilpp, Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, 23; and John D. Norton's distinction 
between empirical experiments and thought experiments, "Why Thought Experiments do Not 
Transcend Empiricism." In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, edited by Hitchcock, 
Christopher. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 44-66.
21 See similar observations by Torrance, DM, 426; R&ET, 67; G&G, 32-35. 
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is not. Therefore he who says of anything that it is (or that it is not) says 
what is either true or false.22
Aristotle's definition has cast a significant shadow over all subsequent reflection 
on the topic of truth but there is one aspect of it that is particularly relevant for our 
discussion. Both "truth" and "falsehood" are defined as consisting in saying things. For 
Aristotle and many who have followed in his footsteps, truth is something that 
characterizes our statements. The importance of this tradition will become clear below 
when we consider Torrance's rather different concept of truth. Torrance's conception of 
“truth” plays a key role in the unpacking of his epistemology, though it will be seen that
his presentation of these ideas is not unexceptionable.
What are the strengths of a correspondence theory of truth?
Correspondence has been the dominant theory of truth throughout Western 
history. Because of this, one would expect that there are some clear strengths of such a 
theory of truth. Indeed this is so. A correspondence theory of truth provides a robust 
traditional notion of "Truth" in the sense that our statements are not to be considered 
merely in themselves or merely in an intrasystematic way but as having metaphysical 
implications. Statements are not true or false in themselves but are true or false based 
on what is the case, independent of them. In Aristotle's terminology, one cannot simply 
say whatever one wishes but is bound by truth to say of what is that it is and of what is 
not that it is not. 
Within a dualistic framework of thought, a correspondence theory of truth could 
be seen as emphasizing the object-pole of knowledge to the neglect of the subject-pole. 
What the knower thinks about matters is more or less unimportant. It is what is or is not
the case that is ultimate. This has implications for the testability of statements. 
Historically, different positions have been maintained as to how we can test our 
statements and check their truth value. Logical positivism operated with a "verification 
principle," where either it is only statements which can be empirically verified that are 
22 Aristotle, Aristotle's Metaphysics. Everyman's Library. Translated by Warrington, John. (London: J. 
M. Dent & Sons LTD, 1956), book IV, chapter 7, section 1.
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to be admitted as true or, in some cases, only such statements which were to be allowed 
as meaningful in the first place.23
Another way to test our statements which is logically weaker than verification 
but which has been thought to be more tenable is a "falsification principle," most 
famously championed by Karl Popper, where statements could not be proved to be true 
but could be demonstrated to be false and, thus, must be abandoned. In this case, 
statements that were in principle unfalsifiable could be admitted as meaningful but not 
as scientific.24
The underlying presupposition for each of these theories as to the testability of 
our statements is that there is a real relation between our statements and reality and that,
if experience should show that our statements were not perfectly true, we must abandon
them and search for more appropriate replacements. This rejection, either due to a 
failure to be verified or a success in being falsified, operates with a rather strong notion 
of correspondence. Fruitful theoretical statements which prove to be not adequate to 
reality are deemed "false.”
What are the weaknesses of a correspondence theory of truth?
In spite of all the strengths of a correspondence theory of truth, there are some 
significant weaknesses that cannot be ignored. Our discussion on such topics will be 
informed primarily by developments within secular philosophy of science, not least 
because the natural sciences lend themselves more unambiguously to a strong 
correspondence theory of truth than other fields, such as the humanities. An argument 
against correspondence in the self-consciously symbolic and metaphorical disciplines of
the humanities might not be perceived as having implications for the philosophy of 
science. However, if fields so self-consciously literal and rigorous as the natural 
sciences are unable to maintain a correspondence theory of truth it may be seen as 
having implications, a fortiori, in other fields.
23 See, for example, Alfred Jules Ayer. Language, Truth and Logic. (London: Victor Gollancz LTD, 
1964), 32.
24 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Fourth (Revised) ed.
(Frome and London: Butler & Tanner Limited, 1976), 38-39.
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One of the more significant developments in the philosophy of science in the 
twentieth century is the introduction of the notion of paradigms and paradigm shifts.25 
In particular it is argued that statements about reality are only intelligible within a given
paradigm. There are three main problems that arise for a correspondence theory of truth 
if something like this model of paradigm shifts is accepted.
The first is that a successful scientific paradigm, such as Newtonian physics, can
be superseded by a new, equally successful paradigm, such as Relativity physics. In this
case we can have two conceptual systems that account for a huge portion of empirical 
data but do so in ways that are "incommensurable" with one another inasmuch as it is 
not possible to translate statements from one paradigm into entirely equivalent 
statements in the other paradigm. In our example, the very notions of space and time 
have changed and, with them, the notion of objectivity. Statements that are 
linguistically identical bear different meanings because they are being made against the 
background of different metaphysical assumptions.
While the success of the new paradigm and our preference for it over the 
replaced paradigm are easy to explain,26 for the new paradigm provides a more 
comprehensive and accurate account of the empirical data than the replaced paradigm, 
it raises the question as to how we regard replaced paradigms. A correspondence theory 
of truth had inclined us to believe that the entities posited by Newtonian physics, which 
was an undoubtedly successful system by any meaningful measure, existed in reality. 
With the advent of Relativity physics some crucial elements, such as absolute 
mathematical time and space, were rejected, implying that any reference to such 
elements, whether explicit or implicit, is rendered "not true" which requires the label 
"false." As these rejected elements were referenced implicitly by every statement in 
Newtonian physics it renders, on a strong correspondence theory of truth, that the entire
system, and everything in it, is false. This is a disturbing idea to any who wish to 
maintain that Newton, though not entirely correct, was certainly on to something related
25 For the landmark text which introduced these terms and has largely shaped subsequent discussion on
the topic, see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
26 That is to say, it is easy to explain once the shift has already taken place and the new paradigm has 
gained authority. There has been some question as to what actually constitutes "progress" in science. 
See Larry Laudan, Progress and its Problems. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977).
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to truth. The options are either to make changes to the correspondence theory of truth or
to condemn replaced paradigms to be labeled as merely "false."
This line of reasoning has a further consequence. As one looks throughout 
history, it seems that scientific knowledge has undergone a series of paradigm shifts. 
According to a strong, that is unmodified, correspondence theory of truth, this means 
that all such replaced paradigms are false. The question then arises, "On what grounds 
can we believe that our current theories will fare better than those of the past?" This 
concern was raised by Hilary Putnam27 and has been called the pessimistic meta-
induction or the disastrous meta-induction.28 In response to this concern, it would seem 
that there are only two possible courses of action: either grant the objection and assume 
that our current theories will not, in time, fare any better than their predecessors or 
assert that there is something about this theory that makes it immune to such 
replacement. The former response requires an abandonment or modification of a 
correspondence theory of truth while the latter maintains it but at the cost of what could 
be seen as chrono-centric thinking.
A third consequence which is difficult for a correspondence theory of truth 
raised by the theory of paradigm shifts is that of meaning variance. Over time, concepts 
change but sometimes the same term is used across paradigm shifts, taking on different 
meanings each time. A particularly clear example of this is the term "atom." The term 
has been around for thousands of years, being used by Democritus and the other 
atomists within pre-Socratic philosophy.29 If we move into the early twentieth century, 
we find J. J. Thomson who develops what was called the "plum pudding" model of the 
atom, where an atom was conceived as being a more or less solid mass with electrons 
"floating" in it.30 Not long after this Ernst Rutherford developed a new model of the 
27 Hilary Putnam, "What is Realism," In Scientific Realism, edited by Leplin, Jarrett, 140-153. 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), 146.
28 McMullin, "A Case for Scientific Realism." In Scientific Realism, 22.
29 Frederick Copleston. A History of Philosophy. Revised ed. Vol. 1. (Westminster, MD: The Newman 
Press, 1963), 73.
30 J. J. Thomson, "On the Structure of the Atom: an Investigation of the Stability and Periods of 
Oscillation of a Number of Corpuscles Arranged at Equal Intervals Around the Circumference of a 
Circle; with Application of the Results to the Theory of Atomic Structure." Philosophical Magazine 
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atom which has come be known as the "planetary model," where the atom is conceived 
as being a nucleus surrounded by electrons which orbit it.31 Rutherford's model has, in 
turn, been replaced, but it is well-known enough to use as an illustrative example.
When one either uses or happens upon the term "atom," which meaning is one to
give to it, that of Democritus, Thomson, Rutherford, or something else altogether? 
Clearly, the three models are not referring to precisely the same conceptual reality. The 
atoms of Thomson and Rutherford would not qualify as an atom on Democritus' 
definition for the modern atom can be further divided, something which is not allowed 
in ancient atomic theory. If we say that the term "atom" corresponds with reality or 
refers to reality, we must come to some conclusion on this issue, for it seems clear that 
they cannot all refer in such a way demanded by a strong correspondence theory of 
truth.
How have people tried to cope with these weaknesses in secular philosophy of 
science?
Though these weaknesses of a correspondence theory of truth within the 
philosophy of science are quite strong, it has not been given up without a fight. There 
have been several attempts to reinterpret what is meant by "correspondence" in an 
attempt to maintain the advantages of such a theory of truth without it crumbling in the 
face of its difficulties.
One attempt to preserve a robust notion of truth in the face of changing theories 
and paradigms is the notion of verisimilitude as found in Popper,32 one of the more 
7, no. 39 (March 1904), 237. It should be noted that Thomson did not use this term in his paper. 
Thomsons's precise language is that "atoms of the elements consist of a number of negatively 
electrified corpuscles enclosed in a sphere of uniform positive electrification."
31 Ernst Rutherford, "The Scattering of α and β Particles by Matter and the Structure of the Atom." 
Philosophical Magazine 6, no. 21 (May 1911), 686. "The atom consists of a central charge supposed 
concentrated at a point...and surrounded by a compensating charge of N electrons."
32 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 391-398.
110
staunch opponents to Kuhn's paradigm model of science.33 The purpose of Popper's 
concept of verisimilitude is to “combine...the ideas of truth and content into one” and 
provide a means to measure a theory's “greater (or less) likeness in similarity to truth.”34
Such a concept aims to give a quantitative measure by which we can compare which of 
two or more theories better approximates the truth.35
Such a view could be interpreted as trying to salvage a traditional notion of truth
in the face of some of the difficulties faced by a strong correspondence theory of truth. 
Before considering whether a view of approximate truth achieves this end, it should be 
noted that to grant that approximate truth is an epistemological virtue for our statements
and theories is already a departure from a strong correspondence theory of truth. It is to 
say that even though, according to Aristotle's definition, a statement is false, there is 
still epistemological value.36
However, it seems that this approach is unable to achieve its goals. First, the 
notion is rather vague. There is a great need for clarity as to what it means for 
something to be sufficiently "approximately true" in order to justify the label.37 It would
seem that, if the term is not to crumble into ambiguity, it requires something like what is
found in mathematical analysis, a conceptual distance ε within which a theory must fall 
from a "true" theory in order to be a sufficient approximation to truth. However, given 
that such practice in mathematics requires that the value of ε be arbitrarily small, it 
33 See Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds. Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of 
the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970).
34 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 232-233.
35 Though the term “approximate truth” is not identical to “verisimilitude,” it is a related concept and is
presented as such by Popper. “I believe that we simply cannot do without something like this idea of 
a better or worse approximation to truth.” Conjectures and Refutations, 232.
36 Popper was aware of the kind of negative reaction that might arise with such an admission. “But can 
we really speak about a better correspondence? Are there such things as degrees of truth? Is it not 
dangerously misleading to talk as if Tarskian truth were located somewhere in a kind of metrical or 
at least topological space so that we can sensibly say of two theories – say an earlier theory t1 and a 
later theory t2, that t2 has superceded t1, or progressed beyond t1, by approaching more closely to the 
truth than t1?” Conjectures and Refutations, 232.
37 This point is noted by Ernan McMullin, in Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism, 35-36.
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would not seem to be helpful within the philosophy of science for, in such a case, to say
that a theory t is within ε of the truth is functionally equivalent to say that t is true. It 
would seem that a notion of "approximate truth" fails precisely because it is either too 
vague for actual use or it functions merely as a cypher for "truth."38
Secondly, it seems as though the notion of approximate truth would have some 
real difficulty if applied as broadly as it would need to be applied in order to provide a 
convincing account of theoretical shifts over time. For example, it is fairly easy to apply
the notion to explain why the theory or paradigm that immediately precedes the 
currently held theory or paradigm was held. The previous paradigm or theory can be 
interpreted as approximating the current one in some significant capacity, whether 
conceptually or empirically.39 However, as the history of a field is extended, this 
becomes problematic. In what way, for example, can approximate truth be brought to 
bear on the situation where there are two or more previous theories or paradigms, each 
incommensurate with each other as well as with the current theory? In what meaningful 
sense can a plurality of mutually incommensurate theories be considered approximately
true? It might seem that one could appeal to the idea that theories are approximately 
true in the sense that they yield empirical predictions which approximate those of a 
subsequent theory, but this appears to imply a non-realism of scientific theories that 
seems incompatible with the metaphysical claims approximate truth was introduced to 
preserve.
Another potentially appealing way of dealing with the inability to achieve true 
correspondence between our theories and reality is to make a conceptual substitution. 
Rather than seeking to show that our theories are "true," we might suggest that the goal 
38 Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. Philosophical Issues in Science, edited
by Newton-Smith, W. H. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 103, does the latter when he suggests that "a 
theory is approximately true if it describes a world which is similar to the actual world in its most 
central or relevant features." In order for this definition to be useful, we must possess prior 
knowledge of this "actual" world in a way that bypasses our scientific theories, which is precisely 
what we do not have.
39 Such is the case in the shift from classical to relativity physics. The former can be seen as 
approximating the latter in terms of how they calculate empirical predictions. Classical physics is 
manifestly not an approximation of relativity physics at the conceptual level.
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is to achieve theories that are "highly probable." There are a few problems with this 
tactic. First, it shares with the concept of approximate truth a crippling ambiguity. What 
does it mean to be "highly" probable and how can a sufficiently high probability be 
demarcated from one that is not sufficiently high?
Additionally, and here Popper sees things clearly,40 an appeal to high probability 
as the aim of science, "is a characteristic development of verificationism: if you find 
that you cannot verify a theory, or make it certain by induction, you may turn to 
probability as a kind of 'ersatz' for certainty, in the hope that induction may yield at 
least that much."41 Indeed, according to Popper, the category, "highly probable," is not a 
helpful one. For example, it is quite clear that any disjunction of the form P V ~P has a 
probability of 1, yet tells us nothing at all.42
Yet a further attempt to achieve the testability of theories by evidence is to push 
the question of testability back to another level where we may have more luck.43 Imre 
Lakatos articulated a position that he called "sophisticated falsificationism."44 According
to such a view, we do not judge individual theories or statements based on their 
empirical content but on series' of such theories. For Lakatos, we are not interested in 
whether statements or theories are "true," but with whether research programs as a 
whole represent "progressive" or "degenerating problemshifts."45
It is not at all clear that Lakatos has achieved his ends. If this is so and his 
position is not sustainable, it would seem to be particularly significant in the dialogue 
between theology and the philosophy of science. It seems that theologians and 
theistically minded philosophers are particularly attracted to Lakatosian research 
40 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 57-59.
41 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 58.
42 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 218-220.
43 Note that here we are no longer concerned explicitly with a strong correspondence theory of truth, a 
testimony to the weaknesses of such a theory
44 Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." In Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of 
Science, London, 1965, Volume 4, edited by Lakatos, Imre and Alan Musgrave, 91-196. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970).
45 Lakatos, "Falsification" 31-47.
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programs.46 Perhaps this has to do with the fact that Lakatos' philosophy does not 
require the kind of strict verificationism or falsificationism which might feel stifling to 
theistic considerations while maintaining a strong affirmation of progress, rationality, 
and intellectual virtue in science. This combination would seem to allow the theist to 
avoid some of the more hostile elements of historical philosophy of science while still 
maintaining the unique value of scientific investigation.
However, Lakatosian philosophy of science seems unable to maintain all of its 
aims in a helpful way. By pushing the critical questions back to the level of research 
programs rather than individual theories, Lakatos severs himself from any meaningful 
sense of correspondence and fails to avoid the very real questions associated with such 
a shift, such as the question as to what we mean when we say that a theory is "true." 
While shifting the conversation from whether or not a particular position is true to 
whether or not a particular person is being intellectually virtuous is an acceptable 
substitution in some areas of philosophy, and one that surely contributes to a more 
pleasant environment for discussion, it is difficult to imagine that a scientist is quite 
happy to settle for being intellectual virtuous if they are hoping to provide a "true" (in 
some sense) account of what actually is the case. However, even if intellectual virtue is 
seen as an acceptable substitute for truth, in whatever sense that term is appropriate, 
does this not require an abandonment of anything like a correspondence theory of truth 
and thus open the doors to all the problems that arise when such a theory is rejected?
What would be necessary to support a Lakatosian move to the rationality of 
research programs as a viable interpretation of scientific progress? Lakatos himself 
gives us a criterion.
Can there be any objective (as opposed to socio-psychological) reason 
to reject a programme, that is, to eliminate its hard core and its 
programme for constructing protective belts? Our answer, in outline, is 
that such an objective reason is provided by a rival research programme 
46 Nancey Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1990); J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology. (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1997); Tim O'Connor in a presentation at the systematic theology research 
seminar at the University of St. Andrews on 26 February 2014.
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which explains the previous success of its rival and supersedes it by a 
further display of heuristic power.47
This seems appropriate. However, Lakatos immediately makes it apparent that 
his criterion is less clear than it might seem. 
However, the criterion of “heuristic power” strongly depends on how we 
construe “factual novelty.” Until now we have assumed that it is immediately 
ascertainable whether a new theory predicts a novel fact or not. But the novelty 
of a factual proposition can frequently be seen only after a long period has 
elapsed.48
The practical upshot of this is that what Lakatos calls "instant rationality" or "instant 
learning" is an impossible goal. Rationality, learning and, by extension, intellectual 
honesty, can only be judged a posteriori.49 Indeed, things become even muddier when 
Lakatos suggests that "As long as a budding research programme can be rationally 
reconstructed as a progressive problemshift, it should be sheltered for a while from a 
powerful established rival."50
First, it must be asked whether there are any boundaries as to how much 
"rational reconstruction" is allowed before it is considered irrational to maintain a 
research program. Were the elaborate modifications to the Ptolemaic cosmological 
system irrational? Where is the line between rational reconstruction and irrational 
reconstruction to be drawn and, if this cannot be done, has Lakatos moved beyond the 
"truth by [changing] consensus" he developed his philosophy to oppose?51
Additionally, it must be asked how long we are to wait in conformity with 
Lakatos' charge to shelter a budding research program "for a while." Is this "while" to 
measured in days, weeks, months, years, or centuries? If one answers in one way, it 
makes this position effectively no different than a more "naïve" falsificationism. If one 
answers in another way, it makes it seem as though falsification plays no role at all, 
regardless of how "sophisticated" it may seem. If the time we ought to wait is to vary 
47 Lakatos, "Falsification" 155.
48 Lakatos, "Falsification" 155.
49 Lakatos, "Falsification" 174. See also, 154-173.
50 Lakatos, "Falsification," 157.
51 Lakatos, "Falsification," 92.
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depending on the context, it must be asked whether it can retain any objectivity in the 
sense Lakatos is trying to defend.
Is there a hiatus between statement and being?
It is clear that there are some serious difficulties confronting a strong 
correspondence theory of truth. Even Lakatos' defense of a traditional notion of truth 
while granting much of Kuhn's position fails to preserve the more important strengths 
of such a view.
In such a situation, it must be asked whether the correspondence theory of truth 
is salvageable at all. Is it possible to take an entirely different approach, sacrificing the 
strengths of correspondence but gaining other positive elements? If so, what might it 
look like? It might take the form of rejecting the metaphysical reference of our 
statements and theories altogether. In such a case, "truth" might refer to the coherence 
of our statements with one another rather than any reference to what is the case, 
independent of those statements. This so-called "coherence theory of truth" is the 
primary alternative to a correspondence theory of truth.
Arguably, the most important thinker in contemporary reflection on this topic is 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein published only a single work during his lifetime, 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in which he advanced a view that can be described as a
"picture theory of meaning."52 This view has strong resonances with a correspondence 
theory of truth. In his posthumously published work, Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein self-consciously rejected his earlier position, developing a notion of a 
"language game." For Wittgenstein, a language game includes not only how we use 
language but also our forms of life in an integrated whole.53 Put very briefly, the 
importance of Wittgenstein's later work is that it would seem to root the meaning of 
words and statements in how they are used in actual life and thus marginalizes the role 
52 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein's Tractatus [Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]. Translated by 
Kolak, Daniel. (Mountain View, California: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1998). See especially 
statement 2.1 and its commentary.
53 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §7.
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of a "language-game-independent" reality in determining the meaning of our 
statements. In particular, Wittgenstein has been an influence on many Christian 
theologians seeking an alternative to something like a correspondence theory of truth.54
There are some tremendous strengths of coherence, the most obvious of which is
that it is untouched by the kinds of problems faced by a correspondence theory of truth. 
A coherence theory of truth is not bothered by a shift from one paradigm to an 
incommensurate one. It simply asks how each paradigm operates within its own system.
The problem noted above regarding meaning variance is also a non-issue for a 
coherence theory of truth. It does not matter whether Democritus, Thomson, and 
Rutherford were speaking of the same entities by their term "atom." The coherence 
theorist does not ask whether there is a "reality" behind the different uses that binds 
those uses together. The most that a coherence theory of truth can ask is how the term 
functions within each framework of thought.
A practical implication of a coherence theory of truth within the context of 
religious dialogue is that it shifts the focus of discussion from attempting to answer the 
question, "Who is right," and asks instead, "How can we understand one another." 
While there is, and can be, no resolving of differences in such a dialogue, for there is no
appeal to any reality beyond the conceptual frameworks of those involved, much 
progress can be made in terms of humanitarianism for the "other" is not seen as an 
opponent to be defeated but as a human to be understood.
If the question is asked as to where a strong coherence theory of truth finds 
expression in the philosophy of science, it is not clear whether such a position exists 
anywhere, in spite of the charges of some philosophers who dislike the turn toward 
coherence in the philosophy of science.55 The reason for this seems to be the persistent 
pressure to take empirical content seriously, which appears to be stronger within the 
54 Lindbeck, 24. Tim Labron, Wittgenstein and Theology. (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 85-90, names 
Lindbeck and Frei as examples of "post-liberal" theologians who have moved toward the position of 
the later Wittgenstein.
55 Such as Lakatos' claim that Kuhn's philosophy leads to "truth by [changing] consensus" and implies 
that "scientific change is a kind of religious change." Lakatos, "Falsification," 92-93. See also 
Christopher Norris, Against Relativism: Philosophy of Science, Deconstruction, and Critical Theory. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 82-83.
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philosophy of science than in other branches of philosophy. Even in some of the 
strongest proponents for scientific anti-realism, such as we find in Bas C. Van 
Fraassen's "Constructive Empiricism," where the notion of truth is all but abandoned, 
there is still a primary place given to "empirical adequacy."56
However, there are moments when it seems as though a particular philosopher 
will say something that makes it plausible that they affirm a coherence theory of truth. 
Consider Kuhn when he writes, "If I am right, then 'truth' may, like 'proof,' be a term 
with only intra-theoretic applications."57 In spite of such statements, it seems that most 
philosophers of science are not interested in a pure coherence theory of truth inasmuch 
as they are profoundly interested in empirical data which is seen as being at least 
partially non-determined by one's conceptual framework.
What are the weaknesses of coherence?
When one looks at a coherence theory of truth when one is troubled by the 
problems facing a correspondence theory of truth, it can seem to be just what is needed. 
However, there are some very serious problems that can be found with a coherence 
theory of truth. Unsurprisingly, just as the strengths of coherence were the mirror image
of the weaknesses of correspondence, the weaknesses of coherence are the mirror image
to the strengths of correspondence.
It is difficult to see how "truth" could be used in anything like a traditional sense
if we are operating merely with a coherence theory of truth. In such a case, the most 
that could ever be hoped for in science, philosophy, or theology is conceptual 
consistency. Any yearning to understand reality according to its own nature is doomed 
to frustration since such a goal would imply that there is a way to bring our statements 
to bear on an external reality without being trapped in our own framework of thought. 
As such, it would also seem that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to devise a way to 
test our statements since it would not be possible, ex hypothesei, to do anything more 
56 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 12.
57 Kuhn, "Reflections on My Critics." In Lakatos and Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge, 266.
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than choose between two entire systems and only when dealing with very specific 
phenomena.58
The upshot of these considerations is that even someone with comparatively 
moderate metaphysical convictions will likely find a strong coherence theory of truth to
be stifling and unsatisfactory.
Is it possible that coherence/correspondence is yet another radical dualism that 
must be rejected?
It might very well be asked, given Torrance's generally anti-dualistic 
convictions, whether the division between correspondence and coherence is just one 
more example of a radical dualism that must be eliminated from our thinking. Given the
suggestion above that correspondence and coherence can be seen as the outworking of a
subject-object dualism within our conception of how statements are related to being, 
this is a perfectly reasonable question. John Douglas Morrison agrees with such a 
suggestion. "Disjunctivist or dualist notions have trapped and distorted thinking into 
one or the other (correspondence or coherence) and must be corrected."59 The difficulty 
arises when one asks how one should overcome this dualism.
In his monograph on Torrance, Morrison attempts to articulate Torrance's 
position within the correspondence/coherence debate by arguing that, for Torrance, the 
goal is that our statements and theories would correspond to the inner coherence of the 
object of study.60 His treatment makes it clear that he understands that Torrance does not
truly fit into either the correspondence or coherence camps and that there must be some 
way to combine the key insights of the two. There are two difficulties with his view, 
58 This would seem to be the consequence of the Duhem-Quine thesis.
59 Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas Forsyth Torrance. (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1997), 124.
60 Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God, 123-132. "But with this goes Torrance's 
understanding of Truth as 'correspondence' and 'coherence,' or more particularly correspondence 
truth whereby the proper object is known as it is in its own inherent, internal coherence." 124.
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both of which are the result of not continuing through with the investigation as far as he
might have.
The first issue is that Morrison insists on placing Torrance within the 
correspondence/coherence debate in the sense of articulating his position as a kind of 
synthesis between the two views.61 This kind of exposition, intentionally or 
unintentionally, connotes that the entire framework of thought with both its dualistic 
tendencies as well as its emphasis on truth of statement over truth of being is sound. As 
we shall see, Torrance's position demands the abandonment of this entire way of 
thinking. However, the fact that he never made this explicit and, in his own way, 
continued to use the language of correspondence and coherence from time to time, 
makes Morrison's conclusion not only a plausible interpretation of Torrance but also 
suggests that it is an expression with which Torrance himself may well have agreed. 
However, the emphasis on the truth of being over the truth of statement, to which we 
shall turn presently, implies a different position on this topic, whether Torrance was 
explicitly aware of it or not. 
The other problem of speaking of Torrance's position as being a correspondence 
to an inner coherence is one of scope. It is surely the case that Torrance's position 
ultimately aims at such a theoretical vision. If and when we have grasped an utterly 
"true" theoretical account of God or of creaturely reality, it will surely satisfy both 
correspondence and coherence and it will find its coherence not primarily in an 
independently generated notion of logic but in the coherence of the reality, whether 
divine or mundane, itself. 
61 Both Morrison and Munchin, Is Theology a Science?: The Nature of the Scientific Enterprise in the 
Scientific Theology of Thomas Forsyth Torrance and the Anarchic Epistemology of Paul 
Feyerabend. Studies in Systematic Theology., edited by Bevans, S. V. D., Miikka Ruokanen. Vol. 7. 
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, NV, 2011), 205-206, seem to make the mistake of 
concluding that Torrance's position simply means a kind of synthesis or dialectic between coherence 
and correspondence theories of truth. This is unfortunate because Torrance's position, arising out of 
his conviction that the truth of being is utterly primary over the truth of statement, actually 
challenges the framework of coherence and correspondence altogether. As we shall see, there is a 
world of difference between appropriating the insights that gave rise to two warring positions into a 
new, third perspective, and attempting to blend the two positions into a combined one.
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The difficulty is that this way of expressing the conviction is not really a step 
further than a stereotypical correspondence theory of truth. That is to say, it does not 
deal with the issues that correspondence theories have faced regarding the problems of 
reference, meaning variance, incommensurability and the like. Morrison's interpretation
of Torrance tends to mask the depth of the latter's insight. Nobody, including Torrance, 
would claim that we have already achieved a completed science in either theology or 
physics, as examples. Given that we anticipate at least one more paradigm shift and so 
must treat our concepts tentatively, how do we make sense of the usefulness of non-
final theoretical accounts, since we more than likely affirm one right now? This is 
where Torrance's conception of theories being related to truth by way of correlation and 
"truthfulness" as theories or statements being “rooted in reality,” discussed below, is 
helpful in understanding Torrance's realism. 
Torrance's commitment to ontological realism forbids him to affirm a strong 
coherence theory of truth, but he is too aware of the shortcomings of a correspondence 
theory of truth for him to affirm that, either.62 If one rejects as inadequate a notion of 
truth that is really no more than validity but is not prepared to affirm a one-to-one 
correspondence between our words or statements and reality, in what way can we speak 
of theories as having anything to do with truth? 
The attempt to simply combine correspondence and coherence theories of truth 
into a new synthesis does not provide a satisfactory solution. At its best, it can only 
describe the relation of our statements to being once we have already reached a "final" 
or "ultimate" theoretical description of reality. At that point, our theories correspond to 
the inner coherence of reality. However, it provides no help out of our difficulties 
because the problem faced in philosophy of science and, mutatis mutandis, theology, is 
how we are to maintain some sense of realism for our statements and theories, even 
when they are not yet able to correspond to the inner coherence of reality. It is at this 
point where we must raise the question as to whether we might consider the issue from 
a different angle.
62 In particular, Torrance sees a correspondence theory of truth as requiring a "logical bridge" between 
word and being, which he rejects. R&ST, 49-50.
121
What if, contrary to the Aristotelian tradition, truth is not primarily something to
be found in statements but in being? That is to say, what if the truth of our statements 
was approached as if it were truth in a secondary or even tertiary rather than primary 
sense? What if truth is deeper, richer, and more profound than our statements could ever
hope to convey? Though Torrance does not always draw particular attention to this fact,
it would seem that this is precisely what he does with his notion of truth.
How does Torrance present his ideas that lead to a new position?
There are two important issues to note when considering how Torrance 
understands "truth" and how it differs from the Aristotelian tradition. First and perhaps 
most basic, though less analyzed in Torrance's own writing, is the Christian conviction 
that Jesus Christ is the Truth.63
Now if we think of Jesus Christ in this way as the Truth in his own 
Person, our statements about him, biblical and theological statements, 
cannot be true in the same sense as Jesus Christ is true, for they do not 
have their truth in themselves but in their reference to him away from 
themselves, and they are true insofar as that reference is truthful and 
appropriate. By referring to him away from themselves, they both 
subordinate themselves to him and discriminate themselves from him. A 
semantic relation of this kind holds good, as we have seen, in any realist 
relation between statements and realities to which they refer. But if Jesus
Christ is the ultimate Truth of God, as we believe him to be, then our 
statements about him, insofar as they are true, must refer to him 
accordingly, subjecting themselves to him and discriminating themselves
from him in their utter difference from him as creaturely and 
contingent.64
63 R&ET, 137-156; TS, 146-157. See John 14:6.
64 R&ET, 124.
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If we wish to affirm the Christian conviction that Jesus Christ is Truth in his person, we 
cannot use "truth" in an undifferentiated way to refer both to Christ and our statements 
about Christ without doing damage both to the term as well as to our understanding that
Christ is Truth in a way that transcends our statements of the truth.
A much more carefully unpacked manifestation of this insight takes the form of 
a discussion on Anselm of Canterbury's work, De Veritate.65 Torrance points out that 
Anselm makes a distinction between two different "truths of statement."66 In one sense, 
we say a statement is true when it makes grammatical sense, such as "the rug is brown."
It is important to note that Anselm clearly acknowledges this to not be the way we 
usually speak of "truth."67 In another sense, we say a statement is true because it refers 
to something beyond itself, such as "the rug is brown" while indicating a rug that is 
indeed brown. In order to help keep things clear, I have elsewhere referred to these as 
being, respectively, the "syntactic truth of statement" and the "semantic truth of 
statement."68 When a statement has both syntactic truth and semantic truth, we say that 
it has "truth of signification." Another way of saying that a statement has "truth of 
signification" is to say that the statement is "truthful." 
It is incredibly important to note that Anselm does not only affirm truth in our 
statements. Later in his work, Anselm argues that there is a truth in created things that 
they receive from what he calls "the highest truth."69 This is a kind of truth that 
65 De Veritate is also known by its English name, "On Truth," as it appears in the Bibliography. The 
major discussions can be found on R&ET, 126-137; R&ST, 143-147; "The Place of Word and Truth 
in Theological Inquiry According to St. Anselm." In Studia Medievalia Et Mariologica, P. Carolo 
Balic OFM Septvagesium Explendi Annum Dicta, edited by Zavalloni, P., 131-160. (Rome: 
Antonianum, 1971), 142-147; "Ethical Implications of Anselm's De Veritate." Theologische 
Zeitschrift 24, no. 5 (1968), 309-313.
66 Anselm "On Truth." In Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works. Translated by McInerny, Ralph, 
edited by Davies, Brian and G. R. Evans, 151-174. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Section
2, 153.
67 Anselm, "On Truth," Section 2, 154.
68 Stevick, "Truth and Language in the Theology of T. F. Torrance." The syntactic truth of statement is 
reflected in the coherence element in Torrance's philosophy of language; the semantic truth of 
statement is reflected in the correspondence element in Torrance's thought.
69 Anselm, "On Truth," Section 7. Anselm's expression in Latin is summam veritatum.
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something has by virtue of being what it is and not something else. Here we do not have
truth in the same sense that we have it when we speak of a statement being true. Rather, 
it is what Torrance calls "truth of being." It is an ontological, rather than a linguistic 
notion of truth. 
It must be noted that Torrance's use of the word "truth" to refer to the "truth of 
being" is idiosyncratic. Some may feel that truth properly refers to a particular kind of 
relationship between statement and being and that it is inappropriate to use it to describe
"being" or "reality" as such. It seems that Torrance picked up such terminology from 
Anselm and retained it as a way to conceptually relate the truthfulness of statement with
the authoritativeness of created reality in the natural sciences and the absolute truth of 
God. Torrance's ontological notion of truth can be elucidated in contrast to the way 
Thomas Aquinas uses the term, as articulated by William Wood.70
Aquinas develops his notion of “God is truth” by reference to his general theory 
of truth. Wood provides a formal reconstruction of three arguments in Aquinas to 
establish that God is Truth in a literal way. These arguments draw on his convictions 
that the understanding of truth as adequation of an intellect with the object it knows, 
that the fact that God is Truth is a logical consequence of divine perfection, and that, as 
the ultimate cause of all truth, God possesses truth to the maximal degree and is, 
therefore, the highest truth.71
It must be noted that Torrance develops his notion in a noticeably different way. 
Torrance, in his own development (that is, not the places where he sees himself as 
developing Anselm's views) begins with the relation of biblical and theological 
statements to Christ. He specifically says that, if Christ is the Truth, then our statements 
cannot be true in the same sense. He does, in this case, use the idea that Christ is Truth 
literally. We must ask what Torrance is trying to articulate in this way. What work is 
being done by his affirmation that Christ is Truth? After all, it could easily be claimed 
that Jesus intends “I am the truth” to be taken as metaphorically or as symbolically as “I
am the vine” or even the other claims in John 14:6, “I am the way...and the life.” 
70 William Wood. “Thomas Aquinas on the Claim that God is Truth.” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 51, no. 1 (2013): 21-47.
71 Wood, “Thomas Aquinas,” 28-35.
124
Indeed, it must be asked what “truth” adds to the concept of “being.” Wood claims that 
it does not add anything, at least in Aquinas.72 Do Torrance's convictions require a literal
interpretation of Christ, and therefore God, being the Truth in a literal way?
It seems that the driving force behind Torrance's treatment of this issue is the 
fact that he wants to maintain that being is more basic than our statements about being. 
He could use any number of examples to try to make that point, but as a Christian 
theologian, he turns primarily to Christ. For Torrance, the fact that our words and 
statements about Christ are always marginalized when compared to Christ himself 
justifies a similar stratified relationship, mutatis mutandis, between created realities and
our statements about them.
This is, as regards the points covered in this thesis, the only aspect of this 
stratification that truly matters. At the very least, we must say that Torrance's insistence 
on using the language of “truth of being” is confusing. While in his general conclusion, 
he stands in a long line of classical Christian theologians who held similar views,73 his 
seeming stubbornness to retain a particular expression (noteworthy because he so 
frequently uses a variety of expressions for any given concern) limits his ability to 
communicate his concerns to those outside of a distinctly Christian theological context. 
This, in turn, works against his general interest of bringing the gospel to bear on our 
engagement with created reality.
Additionally, Torrance's practical insistence of speaking of the priority of being 
or reality over our statements of it in terms of the priority of the truth of being over the 
truth of statement is inconsistent with his other concerns that we allow our terms and 
statements to be marginalized by that to which they refer. The irony in this is that the 
marginalization of our statements in light of reality is the necessary outcome of the 
stratification of truth such terms were employed to safeguard. Does not the more or less 
uniform use of such terms imply that Torrance is unwilling to let these terms, Biblical 
though they may be, be challenged by that which he seeks to articulate, which would in 
turn question the priority of reality over what we can say about it?
72 Wood, “Thomas Aquinas,” 25.
73 See Wood, “Thomas Aquinas,” 21.
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Given these critical reflections, it should be noted that Torrance consistently 
uses the term “truth” in this differentiated way and so, for the sake of clarity in 
unpacking Torrance's own usage of the term, his idiosyncratic usage will be retained in 
the remainder of this thesis. If this usage continues to trouble the reader after these 
clarifying and critical remarks, it should be noted that nothing of substance is lost if one
were to substitute “reality” where one reads “truth of being.”
The distinction between the truths of statement and the truth of being means that
there is a kind of stratification of truth, not to be confused with the stratification of 
being and that of knowledge, discussed elsewhere in this thesis,74 where the truth of 
statement, truth of being, and "Supreme Truth of God (Torrance's rendering of Anselm's
"highest truth") are connected to one another, but in a holistic and dynamic way rather 
than in a one-to-one correspondence. This means that we can say that our statement 
"The rug is brown," to continue with our mundane example, is true if and only if it 
directs us to a rug that is indeed brown. If the statement directs us to something that is 
either not brown or is not a rug, we would say that the statement is false. That is to say, 
the truth of statement is dependent on the truth of being. In its turn, both Anselm and 
Torrance affirm that the truth of being is dependent on the supreme truth of God for its 
very existence. 
It is conceivable that a sincerely made statement might direct our attention to 
something that is so unlike what the statement would lead us to expect that we call it 
false. However, if the reference has indeed taken place, that is, if the statement has in 
fact directed our attention to something outside of itself, there is still a sense in which 
the truth of being can be served.75 As we have seen from his engagement with Plato's 
Cratylus, Torrance speaks frequently of the need to realize that our statements are 
inadequate to really fully describe or refer to reality.76 There is no logical bridge 
between our statements and reality. However, when we realize that our statements are 
not only inadequate but are misleading or otherwise distracting, we must revise our 
74 Chapters 1 and 5, respectively.
75 R&ET, 18.
76 Such references can be found in DM, 265-266; R&ET, 66; T&C, 276, 305-306, 320; TS, 166, 329; 
"TR," 171; G&G, 144, 214; CDG, 76-77.
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statements to more adequately, though never entirely adequately, bear witness to the 
truth of being. This means that reference may be partial and broken and yet still be 
genuine, for it is only in light of the fact that genuine reference has taken place, in 
whatever way, that we are in a position to pass judgment on our statements. It also 
means that there is a sense in which even our broken and partial witness to how things 
are is "justified" by the "grace" of reality.77
To use Anselmian terms, it would seem that the realism/anti-realism debate in 
secular philosophy of science during Torrance's career was obsessed with truth of 
statement, where what really matters is whether our statements are true in the sense that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between their terms and reality. If one were to try 
to force Torrance into this dialogue, he would no doubt appear to many as an anti-realist
in spite of all his claims to affirm and uphold scientific realism. This would seem to be 
rooted in the fact that Torrance has very little interest in our statements as such. He is 
only concerned with our statements as the means by which we speak about and refer to 
reality beyond them.78 As such, Torrance's realism is not an affirmation about particular 
theoretical frameworks but an affirmation that our theories, in one way or another, are 
making contact with a reality that lies beyond them.79 We might say that, while the 
mainstream of the debate over scientific realism has seemed to be concerned with the 
truth of statement, Torrance's realism is concerned with the truth of being. It seems that 
this kind of emphasis on the truth of being to the marginalization of the truth of 
statement that we find in Torrance is given succinct expression by philosopher Roy 
77 T&C, 211. It should be remembered that to be "justified" can also carry the meaning of 
"condemned." As such, we should not be surprised if reality "justifies" our statements by "declaring" 
that they must be scrapped and revised. TReconstr, 153. See also "TR," 183, which is perhaps an 
even more bold statement.
78 Torrance cited Athanasius with approval, "Terms do not detract from his nature; rather does his 
nature draw those terms to itself and transform them. For terms are not prior to beings, but being our 
first and terms come second." TF, 129. See also DM, 248.
79 Torrance reminds his readers that we must not get stuck in looking at our statements but look 
through them to the reality that lies beyond them. See CDG, 44; R&ST, 140; TS, 34.
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Bhaskar. "Epistemological relativism, in this sense, is the handmaiden of ontological 
realism and must be accepted."80
At the risk of being repetitive, it must be stressed that it is vitally important that 
we keep Torrance's distinction between the truth of being and the truth of statement in 
mind as we unpack his thought. It bears some resemblance to what goes by the name of 
"realism," and shares its name, but it also has some striking similarities with what 
would traditionally be considered "anti-realist" arguments. However, it must be made 
clear that Torrance is not trying to create some kind of synthesis between the two views 
but is forging a different path that he believed to be more faithful to how science, 
whether natural or theological, has actually progressed through the centuries. 
In light of this analysis, we must ask the question, how far does Torrance's 
approach accurately reflect what Anselm was seeking to argue? It would certainly seem 
that Anselm would have affirmed a correspondence theory of truth and, since something
like a correspondence theory of truth seems to have been the position of nearly every 
other medieval and classical thinker, it is quite likely that, if we could anachronistically 
bring Anselm into the contemporary debate, he would affirm correspondence as well. 
However, Torrance's philosophical opportunism enabled him to take a small piece of 
Anselm's thought and appropriate it within the context of his own thinking without 
necessarily concerning himself to fit it in with Anselm's other conclusions.Torrance has 
attempted to fit this Anselmian distinction between the truth of being and the truth of 
statement that seems demanded by a commitment to kataphysic knowledge without 
being committed to a strict correspondence theory of truth. Indeed, if Torrance is correct
that it is in light of the truth of being that we judge the adequacy or inadequacy of our 
statements, it would seem that a correspondence theory is not only not necessary, but 
not possible, inasmuch as such a theory maintains that truth is primarily something that 
statements have.
An understanding of Torrance's reading of Anselm's text is extremely important 
for understanding Torrance's philosophy of science. It makes the crucial distinction 
between the truth of statement and the truth of being. It might be objected that Anselm 
has done nothing more than give expression to a kind of Christianized correspondence 
80 Bhaskar, Realist Theory, 249.
128
theory of truth. It might be argued that the assertion that statements must correspond to 
reality or "what is the case," implies precisely what Anselm was making explicit and 
what Torrance appropriates from him. However Anselm's presentation, perhaps in spite 
of himself, does indeed seem to go further than a mere correspondence theory of truth.
There is a sense in which Anselm's two truths of statement are the concerns of 
coherence and correspondence, respectively. It is important for statements to make 
grammatical sense, though this is not usually what we mean when we say a statement is
"true." This parallels precisely the concerns of a coherence theory of truth to the extent 
that it insists that our statements form a coherent system, but falls somewhat short of 
what we usually mean when we say that a theory is "true." Additionally, it is important 
for statements to refer to something beyond themselves. However, Anselm's analysis 
suggests that for our statements to be true, they must be related to the truth of being. 
This focuses the notion of truth primarily on being and only secondarily on statements. 
It is a subtle distinction and one that will be made clearer in its application.
Who, in secular philosophy of science at the time, was making similar points?
So far our consideration of Torrance's position has focused on the way his 
discintly Christian theological convictions have shaped his understanding of truth. 
However, it must also be noted that there were other thinkers who were making similar 
points, even if they were not quite identical.
Alfred Tarski's name is closely associated with a particular expression of a 
theory of truth.81 The most classic statement of his position is as follows. The statement 
"snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. At first glance, it would seem that 
Tarski has done nothing more than articulate a correspondence theory of truth. 
However, Karl Popper points out that he has done something a bit more profound than 
that.
The decisive point is Tarski's discovery that, in order to speak of 
correspondence to the facts, as do (1) [The statement, or the assertion, 
81 Alfred Tarski, "Truth and Proof." Scientific American 220, no. 6 (1969), 63-77.
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“snow is white” corresponds to the facts if, and only if, snow is, indeed, 
white.] and (2) [The statement, or the assertion, “grass is red” 
corresponds to the facts if, and only if, grass is, indeed, red.], we must 
use a metalanguage in which we can speak about two things: statements;
and the facts to which they refer.82
That is to say, Tarski has realized that the goals of a correspondence theory of truth only
make sense if we have a way to speak and think on more than one level simultaneously.
How close is Tarski's notion of truth to Torrance's reading of Anselm? It is 
certainly not far inasmuch as it affirms that we cannot do justice to the notion of truth 
by speaking on only one level. However, Tarski is rather far from Torrance inasmuch as 
he still maintains that truth is something that primarily characterizes statements as 
opposed to being.83
Another philosopher who wrestled with a more accurate expression of what we 
mean by "truth" is Michael Polanyi. Polanyi modifies Tarki's position by saying, "'I 
shall say that "snow is white" is true if and only if I believe that snow is white.' Or 
perhaps more reasonably: 'If I believe snow is white I shall say that "snow is white" is 
true.'"84 Here, we have not only a recognition that we must think and speak at two levels
simultaneously but an acknowledgement that simply to state that snow is white can be 
contested. After all, it is precisely our ability to make unambiguous statements about 
reality that is under question in these various theories of truth.
How does Torrance approach the relation of statement to being?
It would appear that Torrance holds to a different understanding of the relation 
of statement to being than those expressed by correspondence and coherence theories of
82 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 224.
83 "In this article, however, we are interested only in what might be called the logical notion of truth. 
More specifically, we concern ourselves exclusively with the meaning of the term 'true' when this 
term is used to refer to sentences." Tarski, "Truth and Proof," 63.
84 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958), 255.
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truth. He seems to navigate a third way that satisfies the goals of both correspondence 
and coherence theories of truth but does so in a way that is not merely a synthesis of the
two views. We shall be referring to Torrance's view as a "correlation" theory of truth, 
due to the important role played by what he calls "empirical correlates."
It should be noted at the outset that Torrance does not develop this correlation 
theory of truth at length at any place in his writings. What follows is what Lakatos 
called a "rational reconstruction" of Torrance's position, a making explicit what is left 
largely implicit in the Torrance corpus.
Torrance was no friend of a merely coherence theory of truth. He was deeply 
suspicious of anything that seemed to sever the bond between language and being. In 
particular, he was worried that the later Wittgenstein led his followers down a 
dangerous path that failed to pay sufficient attention to the reality that lay behind 
various language games.85 It will be argued later that this suspicion prevented Torrance 
from understanding the later Wittgenstein as a kind of realist that bore a remarkable 
similarity to Torrance's own form of realism. For now, suffice it to say that, if one were 
to force Torrance to choose between a correspondence and a coherence theory of truth, 
he would certainly choose the former.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude from this that Torrance was in any 
way a supporter of what I have been calling a "strong" correspondence theory of truth. 
Indeed, it might be said that the only part of a correspondence theory of truth that 
Torrance feels compelled to maintain is that there must be some kind of real connection
between our statements and reality. So long as that connection is maintained, it seems 
difficult to conclude that Torrance will be particularly picky about which terms are 
used.86 This conviction, that there must be a real relation between our statements and 
reality, could be called the "correspondence element" in Torrance's thought.
The other major conviction that shapes Torrance's understanding of how our 
theories are related to reality is that there must be a strong distinction between the truth 
of being and the truth (or truthfulness) of statement.87 It is for this reason that we spent 
85 T&C, 318-319.
86 Torrance cites with approval the counsel of the Nicene theologians. See footnote 78.
87 See T&C, 304 and its elaboration in T&C, 317-320.
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so much time drawing out Torrance's analysis of Anselm's De Veritate above for 
Torrance reliably turns to it to articulate the distinction he wants to affirm. This 
conviction, that we must not identify the truth of being with the truth of statement, that 
we must not imagine there is a one-to-one-correspondence or a "logical bridge" 
between the two, is the root of the "coherence element" in Torrance's thought.88
It was claimed above that it is not possible to combine correspondence and 
coherence theories of truth into a new synthesis outside of the very special case where 
we are dealing with a "final" theory which can correspond to the inner coherence of 
reality. How then does Torrance weave the correspondence and coherence elements of 
his thought into a larger perspective? Given that these elements require coherence and 
consistency across a theoretical framework, yet this framework must bear upon reality, 
though not in a one-to-one way, Torrance's position requires an apparatus that facilitates
this relation between the theoretical framework and empirical reality.
It will be helpful to consider Torrance's most sustained reflection on this 
problem in his own words.
On the other hand, because existence-statements are made in groups, 
they have to be connected together through other statements, not all of 
which will show an objective reference, directly at any rate...Formal and 
material implication cannot be separated sharply in any scientific 
activity, so that all statements for which ontological status is claimed 
must be investigated to see whether they have immediate objective 
reference or, if not, whether they fit in with other statements that do, and 
whether the pattern of reference in which they share in that way is as a 
whole ontologically relevant. However, since the various statements that 
are connected together in a pattern of reference all tend to lend evidential
support for each other, it is necessary to penetrate down to the really 
basic existence-statements and the conceptual forms they embody 
88 "By the nature of their transcendent and contingent reference they indicate that the realities to which 
they point range far beyond their demonstrative capacity, so that it belongs to their peculiar 
‘adequacy' to fall short of them. The conceptual structures of scientific theory can never have a one-
to-one correspondence with the ontic structures of reality, far less be identified with them.” TS, 239.
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through which we let our minds fall under the logic in the realities to 
which they refer, in order that we may come to a decision as to their 
truth or falsity under the compulsion of the realities themselves. What 
sustains and fortifies us at this point is the discovery of a rationality in 
the nature of things that goes far beyond our understanding and that 
transcends the clues on which we have relied in attaining vision of it. Of 
course from a purely logical point of view, as Karl Popper has pointed 
out, we do not have to stop at any particular basic statement rather than 
another, but if we do not stop somewhere and accept some basic 
statement, the testing of a theory falls through…There are no formal-
logical operations which can undertake this for us – in the last resort we 
are thrown back upon the judgment of our own reason.89
Torrance is claiming is that, contrary to a strong correspondence theory of truth, 
there may be many statements that do not directly refer to reality. Indeed, this is 
required by Torrance's conviction that our theoretical frameworks are not related to 
reality in a one-to-one way. However, contrary to a strong coherence theory of truth, 
there must be some statements that do refer to reality. Torrance refers to the points 
where theoretical statements are connected to empirical reality by such reference as 
"empirical correlates."90 It is important to highlight here that Torrance is relatively 
unconcerned with where these empirical correlates are to be found within a theory; it is 
important only that they exist somewhere.
For Torrance, the need for empirical correlates in our scientific theories, whether
in natural or theological science, is based upon the reality of Christ. Though our 
doctrines, like our scientific theories are, in a sense, free creations of the human mind, 
to use Einstein's language,91 we are not free to say anything we choose to say about 
God.
89 TS, 236-237.
90 Torrance uses the phrase frequently. For the most important discussions, see ST&I, 89-90 and TS, 
236-237.
91 Einstein, "Physics and Reality." In Out of My Later Years, 59-97. (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1950), 64; T&C, 78-79. Note that Einstein's usage of the phrase "free creations" is very different than
that of Popper. Conjectures and Refutations, 192.
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Not all statements about God are theological statements and not all 
theological statements are true statements. They are truly theological and
they are true in so far as they conform to the way in which the Truth of 
God has come to us, and are assimilated to the life of God as it has been 
translated into our life and history, in the human nature and activity of 
Jesus.92
If even our statements about God must have some point of contact in the spatio-
temporal empirical world, how much more must our scientific theories about that 
empirical world have empirical correlates?
In spite of the fact that Torrance's correlation theory of truth, though it should be
noted again that he never uses the expression, has both a correspondence element and a 
coherence element, both "correspondence" and "coherence" are transformed in their 
being taken up.93 The correspondence element in Torrance's thought is not the 
correspondence of individual terms to reality but the bearing of entire theoretical 
systems upon reality. The coherence element in Torrance's thought is not the coherence 
of terms relating to terms, but of terms cohering together in the object they are 
attempting to represent. That is, our system is coherent, not because of some logical 
necessity, but because their object is coherent.94
What is the "real" in Torrance's realism?
It was suggested above that, though Torrance insisted that he was a realist, there 
are some elements of his thought that seem more at home with the positions advocated 
by anti-realist philosophers of science. The fact that Torrance does not seem to quite fit 
in with either realist or anti-realist schools of thought within the philosophy of science 
92 TS, 160. See also TS, 242.
93 This is frequently the case for Torrance. For how "logic" is transformed in Torrance's thought, see 
my essay, "Openness and Formal Logic in the Natural and Theological Sciences According to T. F. 
Torrance." Participatio 2 (Supp. Vol.), (2013), 37-66.
94 For more on the inherent coherence of a given reality, see my "Openness and Formal Logic."
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makes it important to ask what Torrance meant by "realism." In other words, we must 
ask, "What is the 'real' in Torrance's realism?"
It seems clear that Torrance has no interest in insisting that our scientific 
theories, whether natural or theological, must always be interpreted as being real in 
themselves. Rather, what is "real" is that to which our theories direct us. This is perhaps 
given clearest expression in Torrance's insistence that, in real thinking, we do not 
primarily think statements, but rather we think reality through statements.95 When 
Torrance speaks of a realist theory of knowledge, he is not implying that it is our 
knowledge that is real but that what we seek to know is real.
In a realist theory of knowledge, however, we have to do with the 
apprehension of some object in its inner structure which is the source of 
our conceptions of it, and thus regard the conceptuality which arises in 
this way as having a bipolar character. It is grounded in the objective 
intelligibility of reality, but it incorporates also a subjective counterpart, 
since it is we the knowing subjects who conceive and express our 
knowledge of it. In this case what is subjectively given is revisable in the
light of the objectively given for it is grounded in it and controlled by 
it.96
For Torrance, "the real" is effectively equivalent with the truth of being, to 
which the truth of statement is to be subjected.97 Torrance's "realism" is ultimately an 
ontological rather than an epistemological claim, though it has epistemological 
consequences.
95 For this, see CDG, 44; ST&R, 8.
96 "TR," 179.
97 Torrance makes precisely this point in a lecture. "Ground and Grammar of Theology, Lecture 3." 
Grace Communion International, accessed March 18, 2014, 
http://gcitv.net/download/MiscVid/TorranceGrammar-Tape3.mp3., 22:00. Torrance claims that it is 
true to say that scientists are not interested in "truth" if we understand the term as referring to the 
"timeless and necessary truths" of the philosophical tradition.
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Does the inadequacy of a theory imply its falsehood?
It seems clear that Torrance's insistence that the relation between our statements 
and reality need not and indeed, in most cases, can not be one-to-one allows him to 
avoid most of the traditional problems faced by correspondence.98 Additionally, his 
insistence that theories must have empirical correlates saves him from the kind of 
dualism between statement and being that a strong coherence theory of truth would 
imply. However, these very empirical correlates which do so much positive work for 
Torrance's views seem to let a particularly relevant problem with correspondence in 
through the back door.
It was claimed above that theories need empirical correlates, or statements that 
"genuinely refer to reality." The moment one affirms that the gap between statement and
being is crossed, that any statements genuinely refer to reality, the problem of "meaning
variance" crops up again. If we wish to say, in any meaningful sense, that Thomson's 
term "atom" genuinely referred to reality, are we not faced with the very real problem of
the fact that the generally accepted model of what an atom is has changed dramatically 
since Thomson's time? It would seem that one is forced to say that, since we know that 
Thomson's model of the atom was not literally true in the sense that it is not possible to 
formulate a correspondence between his conceptual model and what "is the case," his 
atomic theory was not literally true and, since we have already dismissed the possibility
of finding shelter in notions such as "approximate truth," must we not reject such a 
replaced theory as "false," full-stop?
This would certainly seem to be the case if Torrance were operating with a 
notion of truth that either prioritized the truth of statement or acknowledged only the 
truth of statement as a candidate for "truth."
A well known, but not uncontroversial, definition of scientific realism is given 
by anti-realist Bas Van Fraassen. "Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true
story of what the world is like: and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief 
98 We shall return to precisely how Torrance's position navigates the problems of realism and anti-
realism in chapter 5.
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that this is true. This is the correct statement of scientific realism."99 As might be 
expected, the definition of a position by one who does not adhere to it is certain to be 
resisted, at least in part. One scientific realist who objects to part of Van Fraassen's 
statement is Ernan McMullin.
I do not think that acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief 
that it is true. Science aims at fruitful metaphor and at ever more detailed
structure. To suppose that a theory is literally true would imply, among 
other things, that no further anomaly could, in principle, arise from any 
quarter in regard to it.100
It is important to note that McMullin's reaction is not against what Van Fraassen 
claims is the aim of science but rather with the conclusions he draws from it. McMullin,
it would seem, sees nothing objectionable in the claim that "science aims to give us...a 
literally true story of what the world is like." The problem with Van Fraassen's account, 
according to McMullin, is the assumption that the realist believes that the theories they 
are committed to are representative of a science that has already achieved its goals.
By contrast, it would seem that Torrance would have a problem with Van 
Fraassen's entire statement. For Torrance, who very deliberately and self-consciously 
prioritizes the truth of being over the truth of statement, the aim of science is not to 
provide a "literally true story of what the world is like." Rather, it is to bring us into 
contact with reality, or the truth of being, so that we might grasp it as far as we are able. 
Torrance cites Einstein with approval. "Physics is an attempt conceptually to grasp 
reality as it is thought independently of its being observed."101 Though Einstein's 
statement could be interpreted as saying effectively the same thing as Van Fraassen, one
can "attempt to grasp reality as it really is" with one's concepts without necessarily 
claiming that one's concepts are "literally true." It might be argued that the best way to 
facilitate what Torrance is after is a theory that does indeed tell a literally true story of 
what the world is like. However, this kind of theory is a byproduct of science achieving 
its aims, not its aim in itself and as such. To define the goal of science the way Van 
99 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 8.
100 Ernan McMullin, "A Case for Scientific Realism," 35.
101 Einstein, "Autobiographical Notes," 81. Quoted in R&ST, 134.
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Fraassen does, in terms of literal truth, is to confuse the truth of statement with the truth
of being.
For Torrance, the goal of the scientist and theologian to seek after truth is not to 
be understood as if the truth they are seeking is nothing more than a set of true 
statements. Rather, it is the truth of being and the supreme truth of God, respectively.
There is one place in Torrance's writings where he proposes a "parable" to give 
expression to the fact that our ideas can fall short of an absolutely "true" representation 
of reality while nevertheless being not entirely false or irrational.
Consider the case of the primitive person who had a large watch put into 
his hand with the words “that is a watch.” He looked at it, saw the 
minute hand moving and heard the watch ticking, and then dropped it 
with the word “animal.” He interpreted it quite properly and intelligibly 
within the structure of his previous knowledge. He offered an intelligent 
sign to stand for and express what he perceived. His perception was shot 
through and through with an implicit pattern of meaning, and therefore 
he acted significantly. He happened to be wrong, for he was lacking in 
information, but he was rational, for he related the facts of movement 
and noise in the object as particulars in a perceived whole which formed 
a significant pattern in the only way that was apparently possible for 
him. To that corresponded, therefore, the relation of ideas expressed in 
the word “animal” by which he sought to express in speech the pattern 
he used in interpretation. The next step in understanding would have 
involved a considerable change in the structure of his previous 
knowledge, for only through such a change could there take place a true 
perception of what was new to him, the discovery of its meaning, and the
acquiring of a new sign in speech to stand for the new fact and express 
its meaning. An ostensive definition is meaningless apart from a 
coherent and indeed developing pattern of meaning.102
The convictions implicit in this anecdote and explanation are highly pertinent 
for our understanding of how science can progress through paradigms, being largely 
102 TS, 171.
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incommensurate with one another, and yet still understand why our science, at every 
stage, is useful and not to be abandoned merely as "false."
It was noted above that one of the lessons that Torrance took up from his reading
of Plato's Cratylus was that it is important that our words and statements fall short of 
reality in order to be true. If we did not believe that this were the case and we treated 
our statements as entirely adequate substitutes for reality, we would conflate the truth of
being with the truth of statement which would, in turn, falsify both statement and being 
as it would eliminate the statement-being relation.
If the goal of our statements never involves them being true in a sense that 
conflates the truth of statement with the truth of being, what does it mean when we say 
that a statement or theory is "true" or "truthful?" Torrance does not consider this 
question at length. Perhaps it seemed entirely obvious to him. However, in order to 
understand what is implied in Torrance's thought, we shall need to assign a name to 
these kinds of circumstances. Torrance, on one early occasion, provides such a name.
The paradeigmata point ostensively to divine realities beyond us, and 
necessarily fall far short of them. They are not for that reason false or 
invalid, provided that they are economically rooted in God's own acts of 
self-communication and condescension and are governed by them.103
The paradeigmata to which Torrance refers in this passage are theological 
statements. "Theological statements are paradeigmatic in that they employ images or 
representations (paradeigmata) taken from the visible or tangible world to point out 
divine realities that cannot be simply reduced to words."104 Thus it is clear that even 
early on, Torrance was concerned with distinguishing the truth of statement and the 
truth of being. Theological statements and, by extension, scientific statements more 
generally, need not be considered "false" or "invalid," provided they are 
"(economically) rooted" in reality.105 This expression "rooted in reality," which depends 
103 TReconstr, 51.
104 TReconstr, 29-30.
105  While the adjective “economically” makes sense within the context of theology, because we are 
concerned with our theological statements being rooted, not in an abstract concept of “reality” but in 
the revelation of God in the economy, it is less clear that such an adjective is needed within the 
context of natural science. As such, we shall adapt Torrance's expression, used in context of 
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upon the stratification of truth, admirably expresses the dynamic and flexible notion of 
the truthfulness of theories which enables Torrance to avoid the problem of reference 
with his empirical correlates and account for how theories which have proved 
inadequate to reality are not to be treated as "false" merely because of that. It must be 
noted that, while this phrase comes from Torrance, he does not use it often and it is 
never fully unpacked or developed. As such, we shall be largely putting the words 
"economically rooted in reality" into Torrance's mouth, but not the content expressed by
that phrase.
The idea that theories do not exhaust the reality to which they refer raises points 
of resonance between Torrance and Michael Polanyi. A remarkably parallel way of 
expressing what Torrance is arguing can be found in Polanyi's writing.
One may say, indeed, quite generally, that a theory which we acclaim as 
rational in itself is thereby accredited with prophetic powers. We accept 
it in the hope of making contact with reality; so that, being really true, 
our theory may yet show forth its truth through future centuries in ways 
undreamed of by its authors.106
What Polanyi speaks of as our theories "making contact with reality" is effectively 
equivalent to Torrance's description of our theories being rooted in reality, a similarity 
which will be made more clear in chapter five. At the moment, it is important to clarify 
what Polanyi means by "reality," as it is another point of considerable resonance 
between the two thinkers.
Polanyi has an understanding of what sets reality apart from the constructions of
our minds that is rather congenial to Torrance's way of thinking.
This is, in fact, my definition of external reality: reality is something that
attracts our attention by clues which harass and beguile our minds into 
getting ever closer to it, and which, since it owes this attractive power to 
theological reflection, to simply “rooted in reality” when dealing with our statements of created 
being.
106 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 5.
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its independent existence, can always manifest itself in still unexpected 
ways.107
If this understanding of reality is appropriate - and it is clear that Torrance believes that 
this is so108 - it means that reality is far deeper, richer, and more profound than our 
theoretical constructions could hope to capture. Even if science or theology were to 
achieve a "literally true" account of what is the case, it would still fall short of the truth 
of being, just as the smell of coffee can never be reduced without remainder to our 
descriptions of it, as noted at the beginning of this chapter. Before we can move on to 
the implications of our theories being rooted in a Polanyian reality, we must address a 
potential objection.
To some readers, the idea of theories being “rooted in reality” no doubt sounds 
like Torrance is saying that we do not need to reject theories in theological or natural 
science so long as they are “kind of” true. This, it could be claimed, is a trivial gain, 
since anything, or nearly anything, could be construed as “kind of” true. The point of 
this expression is to stress the idea that our terms and statements about reality “grow 
out” of the reality in which they are rooted and which, in turn, marginalizes or 
relativizes them.109
In order to illustrate the kind of relationship implied by saying our terms, 
statements or theories are rooted in reality, we turn to Torrance's essay, “Theological 
Realism.”110 Torrance attempts to explain how realist science “operates the bipolar 
conceptuality to which the unity of being and form gives rise,” by examining “the place 
of invariance in relativity theory.”111 He argues that “the bipolarity of 
invariance...reflects the fact that our conceptual formulation of invariance serves the 
invariance inherent in nature, and is therefore relativized by it and is always revisable in
the light of its fuller or deeper disclosure.”112 By speaking of our terms and statements 
107 Polanyi, Knowing and Being. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 119-120.
108 Torrance cites or alludes to Polanyi's definition of reality in BS&CL, 15; T&C, 185, 254; TReconstr, 
54; TS, 236-237, 296; D&CO, 40, 80; JL&PL, 33, 49; G&G, 136-137; CDG, 98.
109  It should be noted that Torrance does not press the metaphor in this picturesque way.
110  “TR.”
111  “TR,” 183. Emphasis in original.
112  “TR,” 184. Emphasis added.
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as being rooted in reality, we are stressing that being comes first and scientific terms 
only come a posteriori, such that we never allow our terms and statements to gain 
priority over the reality they are employed to disclose.
To call terms or statements “kind of” true is once again to make our terms or 
statements primary over being. To say our terms and statements are rooted in reality 
places the primary importance upon the reality from which those terms and statements 
spring and to which they direct us.
Did Torrance himself understand the implications of his position?
It is not clear that Torrance fully understood the significance of his own position.
Though he refers to the work of Thomas Kuhn,113 he never engages with it in any depth. 
Perhaps he was of the same mind as people such as Lakatos who worried that Kuhn was
destroying beloved concepts.114 Regardless of why Torrance refrained from engaging in 
dialogue with the post-Kuhnian tradition within secular philosophy of science, which 
was well underway during his academic career, it would seem that his insights might 
clear up some of the problems which are perceived within that tradition at the time.
Once it is granted that there is a stratification of truth and that theories are not to 
be judged true or false based on whether they provide a literally true account of reality 
but by whether they are rooted in a reality that can reveal itself in new and surprising 
ways, a host of questions can be raised. How does Torrance understand the concrete 
interaction of theory with reality? In what way do our theories get developed, critiqued, 
and replaced? How can Torrance's position navigate the problems raised in the debate 
over scientific realism and anti-realism? These are all questions to be addressed in the 
next chapter. 
113 Torrance's brief engagements with and references to Kuhn's work can be found in G&R, 46; JL&PL, 
31; R&ST, 159n; T&C, 243, 260n; TS, 221n; G&G, 47-48.
114 Lakatos, "Falsification," 91-93. However, this seems unlikely, for Lakatos lumps Polanyi with Kuhn 
as problematic examples and it is well known that Torrance greatly valued Polanyi's thought.
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Locating Torrance Historically and Conceptually
Torrance's stress on the priority of being (or reality) over statement places him in
an interesting relationship to other thinkers. We shall attempt to locate Torrance 
historically and conceptually by examining ways that other philosophers have 
approximated his position on the relation of theory to being in various ways, noting 
both similarities and differences. This will allow us to locate Torrance conceptually with
a self-avowed scientific realist, a self-avowed scientific anti-realist, and an influential 
philosopher often associated with relativism. In order to achieve this, we shall examine 
elements of the thought of Roy Bhaskar, Bas C. Van Fraassen, and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein.
In what ways is Bhaskar similar to Torrance?
It would seem that Roy Bhaskar's philosophy, as articulated in his Realist 
Theory of Science, is the closest parallel to Torrance's thinking within secular 
philosophy of science. It is for this reason that he has been given a comparatively 
prominent place in this thesis as a dialogue partner. The close parallels between 
Bhaskar's understanding of transcendental arguments and Torrance's ultimate and 
penultimate beliefs was noted in chapter two. Parallels between the way Bhaskar 
affirms a stratified structure of our conceptions and the way Torrance does will be taken
up in chapter five. Here, we are concerned primarily with the clear distinction Bhaskar 
makes between reality and our statements about reality.
Bhaskar believes that a robust realism requires that we not insist that a theory be
a literally true account of reality.
We can then allow, for example, that theory Ta is preferable to theory Tb, 
even if in the terminology of Kuhn and Feyerabend it is 
“incommensurable” with it, if theory Ta can explain under its 
descriptions almost all the phenomena p1...pn that Tb can explain under 
its descriptions Bp1...Bpn plus some significant phenomena that Tb cannot 
explain. We can speak in this way in the meta-language of philosophy; 
and we must speak so if we are to retain the idea of scientific progress 
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without falling back on the idea of certain foundations of knowledge or 
theory-free experience. It is the intuition of this necessity that accounts, I
think, for the readiness with which some philosophers of science have 
embraced Tarski's theory of truth. But this theory cannot help us to 
resolve the problem posed by the apprehension of the general relativity 
of our knowledge: viz. that whenever we speak of things or of events etc.
in science we must always speak of them and know them under 
particular descriptions, descriptions which will always be to a greater or 
lesser extent theoretically determined, which are not neutral reflections 
of a given world. Epistemological relativism, in this sense, is the 
handmaiden of ontological realism and must be accepted.115
Bhaskar realizes that, even though Tarski's theory of truth helps us to think on 
more than one level at the same time, which is required for scientific realism, it does not
help us to avoid the fact that we always have a particular point of view and so cannot 
simply appeal to "the facts" as if reality were self-evident. We must grapple with the 
necessity that, if we do not want to collapse back into a correspondence theory of truth, 
we must acknowledge there is a certain relativity that will always characterize our 
statements about reality. Bhaskar, however, does not hide from this form of relativism. 
Rather, he embraces it as precisely the kind of epistemological situation we must accept
if we are to be realists at a deeper level.
Bhaskar expresses this conviction in a different, though more commonsense 
context. "For Kepler to see the rim of the earth drop away, while Tycho Brahe watches 
the sun rise, we must suppose that there is something that they both see (in different 
ways)."116 That is to say that differing descriptions of experience, if they are to be 
intelligible, must be descriptions about something, even if it is not agreed what it is. The
six blind men might very well have all radically misunderstood the elephant and given 
incommensurate accounts of it, but this does not mean that there are no such things as 
elephants.
115 Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, 248-249.
116 Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, 31.
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Bhaskar's willingness to acknowledge what could be said to be an anti-realist 
element in his thought which is implied by his realism makes him very much a kindred 
spirit to Torrance, even if there are still differences between them.
Are there parallels between the respective approaches of Van Fraassen and 
Torrance?
It is fascinating to compare Torrance with Van Fraassen. While the former 
championed the importance of realism throughout his entire career, the latter is quite 
possibly the most significant and self-consciously anti-realist philosopher of science of 
the last several decades.117 However, for all their apparent differences, there are some 
areas of resonance between the two thinkers.
Van Fraassen seems to have no interest in the category of truth in any sense. He 
claims that truth, as distinct from empirical adequacy, is not what we should be 
demanding of our theories.118 This raises the question as to exactly what it means when 
Van Fraassen says that he is an anti-realist. Does he deny that there is such a thing as a 
reality which science studies or does he merely wish to change the tone of the 
conversation so that we do not expect scientific theories to carry more weight than they 
are able to bear? If the former is the case, then there is little hope that Van Fraassen and 
Torrance will find any common ground. However, if it is the latter, it is possible that 
they are closer than might at first appear, despite significant linguistic differences.
In order to demonstrate the relative closeness of Van Fraassen with Torrance, we
need to make it clear that Van Fraassen, for all his anti-realism, believes that there is a 
reality that science studies and that this reality is able to challenge our representations 
of it. It is not clear that more is required given that Torrance would agree that we ought 
not to imagine that the truth of our statements and theories is the ultimate goal of 
science. Claiming that our theories are empirically equivalent at a particular point in 
time is not antithetical to Torrance's realism so long as reality retains the ability to call 
those theories into question and force their revision.
117 The fact that he is a philosopher of science must be specified because there are surely philosophers 
in other fields who are more radically anti-realist than Van Fraassen.
118 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 10.
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This point is easily demonstrated from Van Fraassen's own writing. Van 
Fraassen explains that Darwinian theory makes the question, "Why does this animal 
survive while others don't," irrelevant for what matters is not why the animal survives 
but that the animal survives; those that are ill-suited for survival simply do not 
survive.119 
In just the same way, I claim that the success of current scientific 
theories is no miracle. It is not even surprising to the scientific 
(Darwinist) mind. For any scientific theory is born into a life of fierce 
competition, a jungle red in tooth and claw. Only the successful theories 
survive - the ones which in fact latched on to actual regularities in 
nature.120
Van Fraassen clearly believes that there exist actual regularities in nature and that 
empirically adequate theories have managed to latch on to those in some way. Thus it 
would seem that his anti-realism pertains to our scientific theories and not the reality to 
which those theories are related.
It is also important to note that Van Fraassen believes that, even on his anti-
realist understanding of scientific theories, those who accept a theory, which in his view
only involves affirming its empirical adequacy, not its truth, behave as though they 
"believe" the theory to be true and so their behavior is largely the same as those who 
actually do assert their theories to be true in this fuller sense.
Acceptance has a pragmatic dimension: it involves a commitment to 
confront any phenomena within the conceptual framework of the theory. 
A main way in which this shows itself is that the language we talk has its
structure determined by the major theories we accept. That is why, to 
some extent, adherents of a theory must talk just as if they believed it to 
be true. It is also why breakdown of long-entrenched, accepted theory is 
said to precipitate a conceptual breakdown, and why it is natural to speak
of conceptual revolutions. For in theory change, the logical structure of 
our language in use may change. However, we are much more flexible in
119 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 39.
120 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 40.
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language use than many philosophers seem to assume: we are quite used 
to suspensions of belief or of conceptual commitment in dialogue with 
adherents of theories which we personally do not accept. This prepares 
us for such eventualities - it is noteworthy that radical as scientific 
revolutions have been, and confused as concepts and language 
sometimes became, scientists never became tongue-tied, but always 
successfully (if gradually) adapted their language to the changing tides 
of theory.121
The use of the term "model" in the preceding quotation requires a bit of 
elucidation. Van Fraassen uses meta-geometry to explain the distinction between a 
theory and a model of that theory.122 A theory is made up of statements or convictions, or
axioms in geometry, but these components do not uniquely define particular expressions
of those components. "Any structure which satisfies the axioms of a theory...is called a 
model of that theory."123
Let us consider the following statements to be the "axioms" of Van Fraassen's 
Constructive Empiricism:
(1) Acceptance of a scientific theory means only that it is believed to be 
empirically adequate.124
(2) Our theories are to be understood literally and not metaphorically.125
(3) New phenomena may come to light that require revision of our theories.126
If these statements give an acceptable description of the basic features of Constructive 
Empiricism, then we could say that Torrance's realism is an acceptable model of Van 
Fraassen's theory.
121 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 202.
122 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 41-44.
123 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 43.
124 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 12.
125 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 10.
126 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 81-82. Van Fraassen speaks of our conceptual framework 
changing and that we cannot go back to previously held theories because of new data. That this 
implies a kind of Polanyian reality will be fleshed out in more detail below in the context of 
Wittgenstein's thought.
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There is a difficulty with this interpretation, which will be made clear in chapter 
five. Torrance's realism refuses to remain entirely silent on the question of truth. 
However, this linguistic difference is not as dramatic as it might appear. Torrance's 
understanding of truth, as we have seen, is relatively unconcerned with the "truth" of 
our theories. He is far more concerned with the truth of being and with whether our 
theories are rooted in reality. In light of these considerations, the difference between 
Van Fraassen and Torrance is not so great after all. The "truth" Van Fraassen is trying to 
avoid is not the "truth" that Torrance insists must be retained. If Constructive 
Empiricism is able to grant that we may live in a "Polanyian" world, where that which 
lies beyond our theories possesses the capacity to reveal itself in ways that cannot be 
anticipated by our theoretical constructions, then we are not far from Torrancean 
realism.
Indeed, it seems that, with this kind of presentation, Van Fraassen's model needs 
little modification to accommodate a Torrancean realism. In Van Fraassen's own words,
To believe a theory is to believe that one of its models correctly 
represents the world. You can think of the models as representing the 
possible worlds allowed by the theory; one of these possible worlds is 
meant to be the real one. To believe the theory is to believe that exactly 
one of its models correctly represents the world (not just to some extent, 
but in all respects).127
Thus, it would seem that, to the degree that it is accurate to describe Torrance's realism 
as a model of Constructive Empiricism, there is an element of irony, for it would mean 
that one of the great anti-realist perspectives allows for a robustly realist interpretation.
How can Torrance be located relative to Wittgenstein?
Few thinkers loom as large in twentieth century philosophy as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. Many of Torrance's books contain a reference or allusion to the thought of
the earlier Wittgenstein. In almost every case, it takes a form similar to, "It is impossible
to picture how a picture pictures what it pictures, without reducing the reality pictured 
127 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 47.
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merely to a picture of it."128 Torrance prefers to change the idiom by saying that "No 
more can we state in statements how statements are related to being, without reducing 
the relation of statements to being entirely to statements."129 It is a crucial insight that 
has many connections with Torrance's thought. It is evidence of his rejection of a strict 
correspondence theory of truth, it is connected with his insistence on a distinction 
between "truth" and "truthfulness," and the importance of what I have elsewhere called 
a "semantic relation"130 between sign and thing signified.
Though Torrance alludes to the earlier Wittgenstein frequently, his perspective 
on scientific realism makes one want to ask what he thought about the later 
Wittgenstein, whose thought has been called a "salutary influence" toward relativism.131 
Torrance writes so little on, or even alluding to, the later Wittgenstein that it is 
somewhat difficult to give a definitive answer. However, there is one passage that 
seems illuminating.
Wittgenstein had rather similar problems [as Heidegger]. He too made 
very important contributions to modern philosophy, not least in his 
analysis of the function of language, and certainly in his later thought he 
stands apart from many of his would-be followers, but it would be 
difficult to absolve him from serious mistakes that keep on cropping up 
in the various stages and forms of the linguistic philosophy, and not least
the inveterate nominalism that is evident in the substitution of “linguistic
statements” for “physical statements,” or in the reduction of empirical 
statements to the relations of statements.132
128 T&C, 304. Paraphrases of this statement can be found in G&R, 36; R&ET, 73; R&ST, 143; T&C, 
318; TReconstr, 56. This is noted by Torrance in TS, 24, as being a reference (though perhaps 
paraphrase would be more appropriate) to Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein's Tractatus, 4.12.
129 T&C, 304. Paraphrases of this statement can be found in PCT, 44; R&ET, 73; R&ST, 143; T&C, 318; 
TReconstr, 56; TS, 143, 223, 272; ST&R, 77.
130 Travis M. Stevick, "Truth and Language.”
131 Christopher Norris, Against Relativism: Philosophy of Science, Deconstruction, and Critical Theory. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 71.
132 T&C, 319. It could be contended that the later Wittgenstein's nominalism is less the denial of 
universals and more the conviction that we can never articulate our knowledge of a universal in a 
way that unambiguously distinguishes it from other universals. This point seems to be taken 
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Though the rest of the paragraph, to which we shall return, somewhat softens this 
appraisal of Wittgenstein it seems clear that Torrance is not pleased with what seems to 
him as Wittgenstein's decidedly anti-realist turn. Indeed as it appears that no interaction 
with the later Wittgenstein of even a cursory nature occurs after this passage was 
written,133 it would seem that Torrance's suspicions of Wittgenstein's position prevented 
him from further dialogue.
It must be asked, however, whether this criticism is valid. There is no question 
as to the fact that Wittgenstein's thought has often been pressed into the service of anti-
realist and relativist arguments alike.134 There is little doubt that, if one were to take a 
strong stance against such movements, Wittgenstein would certainly be guilty by 
association. However, the later Wittgenstein's thought does not necessarily imply such 
positions.
The passage quoted above, critical of the later Wittgenstein's supposed anti-
realism, is immediately followed up with a consideration of what we might learn from 
Wittgenstein [and Heidegger] if we assume that they had more realist intentions than 
some of their followers would have us believe. If that is so, we can learn 
about the need to distinguish the truth of being from the truth of 
statement, for unless the truth of statement is grounded beyond itself in 
the truth of being it can quickly replace the truth of being altogether. It 
does not follow, because a true statement about the truth must be 
distinguished from the truth of being to which it refers, that it is not 
objectively grounded in that truth.135
That is to say, one might say that anti-realist interpreters of Wittgenstein take the point, 
which is extremely important, that the truth of statement must be distinguished from the
truth of being (Wittgenstein did not use these words; perhaps he would have said that 
the word must be distinguished from its so-called "meaning"), and interpreted it to 
seriously by Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
166, 190-191.
133 This is not only true of the date of publication of T&C (1984), but also with respect to the date of the
paper from which the chapter originated (1969).
134 This reading has been so common that one can speak of "Wittgensteinian fideism."
135 T&C, 319.
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imply that statements can be utterly separated from what they speak of. Torrance will 
grant the former, which is clearly present in the later Wittgenstein's thought, but rejects 
the latter.
But is the latter appropriate to the later Wittgenstein's own thinking? It would 
appear that this is not the case. As was stated above, it is fairly easy to interpret the later
Wittgenstein in a relativistic way, where each community's language and way of life 
determine what "truth" is for them. However, this is not the only documentation of 
Wittgenstein's later thinking that we have. If one examines his work, On Certainty,136 
one finds significant passages that imply that such a ontologically relativistic viewpoint 
is an inappropriate imposition on Wittgenstein's thought.137
There are places in On Certainty where it certainly seems as though 
Wittgenstein speaks of "truth" and "falsity" as nothing more than their roles within a 
given language game,138 which would seem to be in contrast to Torrance's insistence on 
realism. However, Torrance is every bit as capable of speaking in this way, such as 
when he speaks of a "primitive" person calling a watch an animal139 or Newtonian 
physics being valid "on its own level."140 The fact that every person always and 
everywhere speaks from within a particular set of ultimate beliefs that so condition 
what we can think that they must be critiqued in a fundamentally different way than 
inconsistencies within a given framework of thought is well-noted by Torrance and 
acknowledged by Wittgenstein.141
The claim that Wittgenstein and Torrance are necessarily at odds is only valid if 
it can be shown that this is the only way Wittgenstein speaks of truth and falsity, and 
this is not the case. Specifically, Wittgenstein speaks of language games changing, the 
136 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, edited by Anscombe, G. E. M., G. H. von Wright. (New York: 
Harper Torchbook, 1972).
137 The fact that On Certainty was published after Wittgenstein's death, and thus does not bear his final 
stamp of approval, is of no consequence as the same is true, though to a lesser extent, of 
Philosophical Investigations.
138 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §80-83, §94, §199.
139 TS, 171.
140 G&G, 103.
141 See Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §103, §152.
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bare acknowledgement of which topples the conflict between himself and Torrance, or 
nearly so at any rate.142 Consider the following passages from On Certainty (numbered 
for easier reference below):
(1) If we imagine the facts otherwise than as they are, certain language-
games lose some of their importance, while others become important. 
And in this way there is an alteration - a gradual one - in the use of the 
vocabulary of a language.143
(2) When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, 
and with the concepts the meanings of words change.144
(3) I do not say that [G. E.] Moore could not convert the king [who 
believes the world to have existed only a short time before his birth] to 
his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would 
be brought to look at the world in a different way.145
(4) If someone said to me that he doubted whether he had a body I 
should take him to be a half-wit. But I shouldn't know what it would 
mean to try to convince him that he had one. And if I had said 
something, and that had removed his doubt, I should not know how or 
why.146
(5) Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with
one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic.147
(6) Certain events would put me into a position in which I could not go 
on with the old language-game any further. In which I was torn away 
142 David Munchin, Is Theology a Science?, 119, cites that D. Z. Phillips saw that this is exactly the 
issue at stake. Whether Phillips was correct in his development from that point is a different issue 
altogether.
143 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §63.
144 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §65.
145 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §92.
146 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §257.
147 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §611.
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from the sureness of the game. Indeed, doesn't it seem obvious that the 
possibility of a language-game is conditioned by certain facts?148
Statements such as (1) and (2) speak of language games changing in various ways. For 
one who hopes to find in Wittgenstein an ally to relativism, they raise the question, 
"From whence does this change come? How does it come about that language games 
change?" If one were to respond that language games can be challenged by their 
inability to account for particular facts of the empirical world, it must be granted that 
there exists an external reality that is so far undetermined by the language and life of the
community that the latter can be challenged by it.149 Once this is granted, Torrance's 
position can be accepted in its full force, for Torrance does not for a moment imagine 
that being a "realist" implies a correspondence of each of our terms with an element of 
reality. Rather, realism is a conviction that reality is far deeper and richer than our terms
can describe and, as such, continues to stand against us and our concepts.150 The 
abandoning of a language game due to external pressures (facts) in statement (6) 
implies the same conclusion, if somewhat more explicitly.
Rather than posit something in the natural world that changes a language game, 
one might prefer to account for the change in communal terms, such as the interaction 
of one community with another. This example is as good as the previous one, for it 
means that there exists a second community that is so far undetermined by the first one 
that it can present an alternative cultural-linguistic framework which has the possibility 
of bringing about a change in the framework of the first community or vice versa.151 The
language game is not absolute, but can be modified by outside influences, again making
way for Torrance's realist convictions, even if not those of other so-called realists.
148 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §617.
149 The persistence of the value of Planck's constant, h, in opposition to the expectations of the scientific
community might serve as an example of such a fact which radically changed the language game of 
physics at the time.
150 This is similar to Polanyi's definition of reality.
151 An example of this might be the influence of a conquering culture on the language and culture of the 
conquered people or, alternatively, the influence of a conquered people on that of the conquering 
people.
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Statements (3) through (5) deal with the issue in the philosophy of science of 
incommensurability. Statement (3) speaks of two paradigms, one where the earth is 
quite a bit older than a person and one where it is barely older than the person. They are
not identical and the differences have far-reaching implications, such as for 
understanding and interpretation of history.152 However, for all their disagreement, 
people who hold to the two paradigms can speak to one another and can attempt to 
persuade each other. We cannot articulate precisely what goes on when one is persuaded
in this way, though it is interesting that Wittgenstein uses the religious term 
"conversion." However, arguments or facts can press up against a language game in 
such a way that it is eventually modified or abandoned. This could not happen if those 
who advocate for a radically relativistic perspective relying upon the absolute character 
of language games are correct.
Incommensurable theories can be seen as utter roadblocks in the way of 
communication. However, it is not always as dramatic as that. Statement (3) is an 
example of two views that are incommensurable, but not entirely so. They are not 
identical and cannot even be translated into one another, but there is still sufficient 
common ground to attempt persuasion. Statements (4) and (5) are examples of what 
might be called "total incommensurability," two ways of viewing the world and 
interpreting experience that are so radically different that they cannot even speak 
intelligibly to one another. Both circumstances are seen as having no hope for 
reconciliation. How does one become convinced that they have a body if they are not 
convinced by their own experience of having one? How can a conversation take place 
when the language games of the parties involved are so incommensurate that the only 
option they have is to interpret the other as one who has no faculty of reason or as one 
who is intentionally distorting the truth? The point to be gleaned from these statements 
is that the kind of incommensurability that would need to be the case in order to justify 
a position of anti-realism in the sense of true ontological relativism is relatively rare,153 
152 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §185.
153 Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, 258, suggests that even Feyerabend did not affirm the 
possibility of "total Kuhn-loss," which he associates with incommensurability.
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is the exception rather than the rule and such a position makes the mistake of taking the 
special case as the paradigmatic example.154
It would seem that the later Wittgenstein did not imagine that language games 
were to be interpreted in a fully relativistic way. Though language games color our 
understanding of everything we encounter, they are not immune to critique and may 
prove to be inappropriate, in which case they either become modified or abandoned. 
This was precisely what we saw in the discussion of ultimate and penultimate beliefs.155
Wittgenstein stretches his notion of a language game further than terms are 
stretched in Torrance. For example, where Torrance will speak of ultimate beliefs, of 
different sciences with different objects and research methods, and of disclosure 
models, Wittgenstein uses just the one concept of a language game.156 Torrance once 
remarked that Wittgenstein's use of terminology associated with "vision" to describe 
language was unfortunate and led to his being misunderstood.157 Torrance is no stranger 
to using a term with such interpretational baggage that it becomes difficult to 
understand.158 It seems that the fruit that might have come from a more extensive 
dialogue with Wittgenstein was never realized due to the misinterpretation of others.
As we have seen, Torrance's distinction between the truth of statement and the 
truth of being has a strong parallel in Bhaskar's realist theory of science but is also 
compatible with both Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism and Wittgenstein's 
language games. This unusual relationship with both so-called "scientific realism" and 
154 The long tradition of foundationalism is evidence that taking a special case (such as mathematics) 
and imposing it as the standard by which we judge can have disastrous consequences.
155 Again it should be remembered that it can never be proved that a belief is ultimate, only penultimate 
and this judgment can only be made a posteriori. This is not unlike the fact that we can never know 
whether a theoretically problematic phenomena will turn out to be an anomaly or a counter-instance 
(to use Kuhn's language), we can only know that it was a counter-instance after a revolution has 
taken place or that it was an anomaly after it is successfully explained within the paradigm. There is 
no way to tell, a priori, whether something is an anomaly or a not-yet-exposed counter-instance.
156 It could be argued that Torrance's concept of a "disclosure model" is every bit as flexible as 
Wittgenstein's language games, but Torrance himself does not often use it that way.
157 TS, 24.
158 Such seems to be the case with the ongoing discussion as to what, exactly, Torrance meant by 
"natural theology."
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"scientific anti-realism" leads us to consider precisely what role theories play within the
natural and theological sciences.
156
5. What is the role of theory in Kataphysic
knowledge?
It was claimed in chapter four that, for Torrance, the primary purpose of theories
in the natural and theological sciences is not to tell a "literally true story of what the 
world is like," but rather to facilitate our contact with, and participation in, reality.1
This seems to flow inescapably from Torrance's other concerns already 
explored. For Torrance, authentic knowledge is knowledge according to the nature of 
that which we seek to know. However, this knowledge is shaped by our beliefs. Some of
these beliefs are ultimate, forced upon us by the nature of reality itself, but some of 
them are penultimate beliefs which allow of alternatives, though we are often in no 
position to make a rational case as to why we should believe one rather than another. In 
cases such as this, we cannot merely appeal to the reality itself, since our knowledge is 
not objectivistic knowledge but always involves the subject-object relationship, though 
the subjectivity that would seem to be inherent in such a relationship can be kept in 
check through various means. According to Torrance we have to allow the nature of 
things to dictate a new understanding of objectivity. Rather than thinking out objectivity
in terms of the knowing subject, we must think it through in terms of the object itself. 
This means that we highlight and remain dedicated to the object's right and capacity to 
object to us and our formulations. This, in turn, has made us pay careful attention to 
how our statements are related to being and exactly what we mean when we say that our
theories "refer" to things or that theories might be "true."
The claim that "true" is a term more appropriately applied to realities than to our
statements about those realities requires an analysis of what is meant when it is claimed
that statements or theories are true. For Torrance, the truth of statement means more 
than the mere "validity" or "logical consistency" of a strict coherence theory of truth. 
Additionally, our theories and statements must also direct us to a reality that transcends 
them and their ability to describe it.
1 Again, "participation" in Torrance is never Platonic in nature.
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What kind of theories/models are demanded by Torrance's notion of truth/reality?
While this conclusion seems to be required if Torrance is to be consistent with 
his other epistemological convictions, it is not immediately clear as to how the natural 
and theological sciences are to proceed with their empirico-theoretical engagement with
their objects of study for Torrance. They do so by adopting a flexible, inherently 
reviseable manner of investigation that is conscious as far as possible of its 
presuppositions and is self-correcting of them. Torrance calls the models we develop in 
such investigation "disclosure models."2 This is a culmination of the issues discussed so 
far, but it is also an insight that carries with it a variety of important considerations.
What Torrance calls disclosure models are perhaps most clearly articulated in 
two passages that do not use the term.
In the process of question and answer in some field, we find imposed 
upon us a new and enlightening form which we judge to be an important 
intimation or essential clue to the reality we are investigating. We make 
it central and organize the other forms round it in a harmonious pattern 
of reference. Then we imaginatively and tentatively project that as a 
hypothesis and put it as a complex question to the reality we are 
investigating in such a way that the answer is clearly intuited, and so 
once again in the light of what is revealed we proceed to reconstruct it. 
We clarify and sharpen its focus as an act of interrogation, we simplify 
and unify its conceptual form, in the hope that it will become such a 
transparent medium for our apprehension that our thoughts will fall 
under the power of the logic or the interior connection in the components
of reality itself. This is the theory or “mechanism,” what we now call a 
2 The key discussions on disclosure models can be found in R&ET, 49-51; R&ST, 85-86; G&G, 124-
127. See David Munchin, Is Theology a Science?: The Nature of the Scientific Enterprise in the 
Scientific Theology of Thomas Forsyth Torrance and the Anarchic Epistemology of Paul 
Feyerabend. Studies in Systematic Theology., edited by Bevans, S. V. D., Miikka Ruokanen. Vol. 7. 
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, NV, 2011), 227-233, for a discussion on "fluid axioms" 
that are deeply related to disclosure models. Indeed they are largely just a different angle on the same
topic.
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“model,” or better still an “analogue” (especially for the more concrete 
and less mechanical sciences),3 but it remains only an instrument of 
reference in the successive advances of our cognitive interrogation, a 
kinetic model or analogue that is to be “operationally defined” (in 
Einstein’s sense), and must never be allowed to become fixed or rigid for
that would suppress its intended function in discovery.4
As we direct our questions to our chosen field we allow it to disclose 
itself to our inquiry, and as that takes place we proceed to question our 
initial questions, and then we pose our revised questions to the field and 
in the light of what further becomes disclosed we requestion our prior 
questioning, and so on. Thus scientific inquiry operates in such a way 
that it cuts back constantly into ourselves the questioners, in order to 
invert the determining factor from ourselves to what we seek to know. 
This is why rigorous scientific inquiry far from being some sort of 
impersonal progression of induction is a highly distinctive movement of 
interaction of the inquirer with the object, in which acts of personal self-
criticism and personal judgment are called for all through the process of 
distinguishing what we know from ourselves and of checking the 
illegitimate projection of ourselves, our subjective states and conditions, 
into what we seek to know.5
The simplest and clearest way to describe how disclosure models 
function in our scientific endeavors is as a lens6 through which we look at 
3 Torrance notes in a footnote that "analogue" might be the more appropriate term, though it is 
interesting that he eventually drops the term and tends to stick with "disclosure model" in his later 
works.
4 TS, 239-240.
5 R&ST, 26-27.
6 R&ET, 50. It seems that this is related to one degree or another to Calvin's comparison of the 
scriptures to spectacles, that is, something to look through (rather than at) to discern the truth. John 
Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion. Translated by Battles, Ford Lewis, edited by 
McNeill, John T. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), I.6.1. Torrance makes this comparison 
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reality.7 When we first engage with a particular facet of reality, we often do not 
grasp it in its depths with our understanding.8 It is as if we were looking through
a lens that is not yet properly calibrated; the object is there, but seems distorted 
or blurry. Because of this, our first ways of understanding a thing may turn out 
to be particularly inadequate. However, this does not mean that this first way of 
understanding is not a very helpful step toward deeper knowledge; in fact, as we
shall see, it may be indispensable. We take initial clues and organize these and 
the insights to which they give rise as a model of what we seek to know. It is 
extremely likely that, while using this model as a tool by which we understand a
facet of reality, we shall come to the realization that our model is significantly 
inadequate to reality.9 This often manifests itself in the empirical correlates 
posited by the theory or model not being actualized in the appropriate 
circumstances. One example of this is the rotation of the perihelion of Mercury, 
an empirical phenomenon that was different than was expected by the 
Newtonian worldview. When this happens, the disclosure model must be broken
down and revised.
There are some similarities here with Karl Popper's theory of falsification, 
where we advance in knowledge by freely positing theories and putting them rigorously
to the test. While Torrance's position sees the value of falsification and insists on 
theories being falsifiable to one degree or another through their empirical correlates, his
position differs sharply from Popper's inasmuch as it is more deeply realist. For 
Torrance, in spite of the fact that there is no way to construct a logical bridge between 
explicit in a lecture. "Ground and Grammar of Theology, Lecture 2 Q&A." Grace Communion 
International, accessed March 18, 2014, (http://gcitv.net/download/MiscVid/TorranceGrammar-
Tape2-QA.mp3) at 1:05:00.
7 Torrance is very aware of the tendency, as evident in chapter 4, to focus on statements rather than 
using statements as transparent media through which to discern reality and issues warnings against it.
See chapter 4, footnotes 78 and 88.
8 It must be remembered that this engagement is always within the subject-object relation.
9 The qualifier "significantly" is important here. All our models are, strictly speaking, inadequate to 
reality. The inadequacy we are speaking of here is an inadequacy where the shortcomings are more 
than trivial deviations from reality. That is to say, they are significantly inadequate.
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reality and our theoretical representations of it or render such a relation entirely explicit,
there is still a real, though unspecifiable, connection.10 Our disclosure models, to 
whatever degree they are rooted in reality, are the result of the inherent intelligibility of 
reality impressing itself upon our minds. That is to say, though the development of our 
theoretical tools is non-logical (or extra-logical, though never illogical) and is free in 
the sense of Einstein's "free inventions," they are not free in Popper's sense.11
Does Torrance believe that our theories are stratified?12
So far, we have encountered two distinct occasions where we have had to take 
note of stratification inherent in our engagement with reality. The first of these was that 
the complexities of reality require a stratification of sciences and not just a single 
science.13 Each of the sciences are bound to each other by virtue of the fact that their 
objects are bound to each other; that is, what we study in biology is dependent, to a 
degree, on what we study in chemistry, which is in turn dependent, to a degree, on what 
we study in physics, and each science must be open to levels "above" them. For 
example, we shall be misled if we imagine that an increased heart rate should be 
explained only on the bio-chemical level to the exclusion of the fact that a long awaited 
letter has just arrived. However, we must not imagine that we can reduce one science to 
another without remainder. Each science must be preserved in its own integrity to do 
justice to the stratification of reality.
10 Torrance's criticism or rejection of the idea of a logical bridge between our theories and reality can 
be found in D&CO, 34, 112; JL&PL, 50-51; R&ST, 41, 49-50, 56-58, 76; T&C, xi, 79-80, 111-112, 
178; G&G, x-xi, 21-22, 80-82, 85.
11 See Chapter 4, footnote 84.
12 The most important discussions on this topic in Torrance are found in G&G, 156-159 and CDG, 82-
88. Also, see my discussion in Travis M. Stevick, "Truth and Language in the Theology of T. F. 
Torrance." (Participatio 2 (Supp. Vol.), (2013): 67-101).
13 Chapter 1.
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The second stratification was the stratification of the truthfulness of our 
statements, the truth of being and the Supreme Truth of God.14 From a slightly different 
angle, we could say that this is a stratification of epistemology, the ontology of creation,
and the ontology of God. Regardless of how it is rendered, it means that our statements 
rely upon the reality to which they refer for their validity and authority and that being 
itself, in order to be what it is and not something else, relies upon the God who created 
it. Even though there is a necessary openness of each level to the level or levels "above"
it, we may not reduce one level to another without remainder;15 for example, 
committing what Bhaskar calls the "epistemic fallacy," which is the belief "that 
statements about being can always be transposed into statements about our knowledge 
of being."16
Having considered stratifications between reality and our knowing of it and 
between the sciences, there is a third stratification that we must take seriously and this 
is the stratification of our theories within a given science. When engaging with reality, 
we do not think only on one level at a time. Indeed, to forget that all knowledge is 
multi-layered is to reduce science into absurdity, as absurd as the doctrine of the Trinity 
becomes if we imagine that when we say God is three, we mean it in exactly the same 
way we do when we say that God is one. Like the other stratifications, these levels are 
connected and open to one another but not reducible to one another. Torrance provides 
an account of three levels, not because there are only three levels possible but because 
most sciences do not require more than three levels.17 It should be noted that, where 
14 Chapter 4.
15 John Douglas Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas Forsyth 
Torrance. (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 88, expresses it this way. "Torrance describes the relation 
and process in the interactive levels as that of refinement and extension and continued relation 
whereby each level is 'open up' to the next and disclosive 'down.' No level 'below' has its truth in 
itself, but is true to the extent that it is open 'up' to the refinement and greater consistency found in 
the interactive found at the higher level, and that level is refined at the next higher, etc., all being 
grounded finally beyond the contingent in that sufficient reason for the contingent order of 
rationality and intelligibility 'below' it."
16 Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science. 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 2008), 16.
17 Additionally, Einstein's essay that Torrance draws from describes three levels (see following 
footnote). 
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Torrance speaks of this stratification, it is often within a distinctly Christian context, 
most usually when speaking of the doctrine of the Trinity. In exploring this aspect of 
Torrance's thought, I shall use the terms that we find in his works and also provide 
terms whereby his insights can be appropriated in a larger scientific context, including 
the natural sciences.18
The first level of our theoretical development is at our basic engagement with 
reality. When accounting for the development of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, 
Torrance calls this the "evangelical and doxological level,"19 though if we were to take 
that Christian conviction and generalize it to all knowledge, we might call it the 
"empirico-theoretical level." At this level, we are concerned with our basic, holistic and 
organic encounter with reality. In theology, this takes the form of reading and 
meditating upon the scriptures, prayer, worship in the church and the life of faith and 
discipleship, including obedience.20
To say that the most basic level of our knowledge is not just empirical but 
empirico-theoretical is to say that Torrance will have nothing to do with any notion of 
scientific knowledge that sees itself as being able to separate empirical and theoretical 
elements.21 As was discussed earlier, Torrance believes that even in our most basic 
experience we are not operating in isolation from theoretical convictions.22 It is true that
18 The application of this line of thought to the natural sciences is entirely appropriate, not least 
because one could make a very strong argument that, when Torrance explicates the three levels, it is 
an extended exposition of and commentary on, the section in Einstein's essay, "Physics and Reality." 
In Out of My Later Years, 59-97. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), titled, "Stratification of 
the Scientific System," 63-65.
19 Torrance's discussions of this level can be found in G&G, 156-157; CDG, 83-84, 88-91.
20 Thomas A. Langford, "T. F. Torrance's Theological Science: A Reaction." Scottish Journal of 
Theology 25, (1972): 155-70, 157-158, writing fairly early in Torrance's career, was concerned that 
obedience did not play enough of a role in Torrance's theology. While it never becomes a controlling 
concern for exposition, it is clear that it is not seen as unnecessary in light of Torrance's 
understanding of ultimate beliefs, objectivity and the need to allow the gospel to impact every facet 
of life.
21 T&C, 115. Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God, 7, also notes the importance of 
empirico-theoretical investigation.
22 Chapter 2.
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these convictions are largely tacit at this level and that it is not easy, and may not be 
possible, to specify where and how theory is playing a role in our experience at any 
point in time, but that is not to say that empirical and theoretical factors are identical. To
use the terminology of the philosophy of science, all of our observations are theory-
laden, but that is not to say that they are utterly theory-determined.23
The second level of our theoretical development is what Torrance calls, in the 
development of the doctrine of the Trinity, the "First Theological Level,"24 but might be 
generalized to say that, in any science, we are moving to the "First Theoretical Level." 
Of course, as has been made clear from the preceding discussion, this naming is not 
meant to imply that the first level is theory-free. Rather, it is to emphasize that this is 
the level where we move beyond an inchoate theory to a formulation that is explicitly 
and self-consciously theoretical in nature.25
What we do at this second level is to attempt to organize our experience and 
observations at the first level into some kind of unified account of the reality that gave 
rise to those experiences and observations. To put this task in the language of the 
philosophy of science, we set about constructing a theory that accounts for the 
experiences that obtained at the first level. "The purpose of such a theory is to enable us
to penetrate into the intelligible connections latent in reality that ground and control our 
basic experiences and cognitions, and illuminate them for us."26 It is important to note 
that it is inaccurate, in both natural and theological science, to portray the theories that 
develop at this level as if they were "literally true" accounts of the world.
As should be clear from everything leading up to this point, Torrance is well 
aware of the fact that we do not leap directly from our basic experience or apprehension
of God or some created reality to a fully formed and accurate theoretical construction.27 
There is no way to guarantee that our move from the first to the second levels will get 
us anywhere close to a "literally true" account of reality. Indeed, one of the first great 
attempts at unifying a field of experience in the modern era was that of Francis Bacon 
23 Torrance refers to "theory-laden experiment" in G&G, 45.
24 Torrance's discussions of this level can be found in G&G, 157; CDG, 84-85, 91-98.
25 TS, 10.
26 CDG, 84.
27 The fact that our theories/models change over time is evidence of this.
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in his Novum Organon, where he attempts to understand the phenomenon of heat.28 A 
modern reader may be struck by how someone who played such a major role in the 
development of empirical science could be, from our current perspective, so far off the 
mark. However, even this attempt is shown to be rooted in reality inasmuch as we have 
not abandoned the idea that there is something that is indeed true about all things that 
radiate heat. That insight has been made all the more secure, though we might speak 
about it today in significantly more refined terms. 
These considerations, however, do not change the fact that we do move to the 
second level and that we do achieve something by doing so, even if it is discovering 
how wrong we were. To the degree that we can learn, not only from our successes in 
theoretical construction but also from our failures, there would seem to be a resonance 
between Torrance on this point and the kind of critical rationalism advocated by Karl 
Popper. For Torrance, refutations have epistemological value, even if they are not our 
goal. In direct response to Popperian falsificationism, Torrance takes issue with 
Popper's insistence that we ought to invite the harshest criticism we can find for our 
theories. "Such an effort risks defeat but never seeks it; it is in fact his craving for 
success that makes the scientist take the risk of failure. There is no other way."29 Indeed,
it seems that it is because of the conviction that reality will "teach" us, even when we 
misread it that we continue to pursue science in different fields, in spite of repeated 
failure.
The first step to be taken here, then, is rather similar to that of which 
Einstein and Polanyi have spoken in their own spheres of scientific 
inquiry, namely, an empirico-intuitive movement of thought in which we
28 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum: With Other Parts of the Great Instauration. Translated by Urbach, 
Peter and John Gibson, edited by Urbach, Peter, John Gibson. (Chicago: Open Court, 1994), Book II,
Aphorism XI.
29 T&C, 121. For the kind of statement of Popper's that Torrance is opposing, see Karl R. Popper, 
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Fourth (Revised) ed. (Frome and 
London: Butler & Tanner Limited, 1976), 51. "If we have made this our task, then there is no more 
rational procedure than the method of trial and error - of conjecture and refutation: of boldly 
proposing theories; of trying our best to show that these theories are erroneous; and of accepting 
them tentatively if our critical efforts are unsuccessful."
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cultivate incipient insights into the objective patterns or configuration of 
our chosen field. These are what we call clues, informal glimpses of 
reality, pointers to reality, or aspects of reality pressing for recognition in
our minds. As we have seen, they are essentially of an anticipatory 
nature, anticipatory because they come from reality and draw us toward 
it. There are no formal rules for acquiring these enlightening intimations 
of reality. Only the great theologians who were also childlike in spirit 
have been able to come up with the basic insights and fundamental ideas 
that have advanced theological understanding.30
Torrance calls this anticipatory grasp of some important aspect of the object a 
"prolepsis" or a "proleptic grasp."31 According to Polanyi, this notion of a "prolepsis" or 
a "tacit foreknowledge" is a solution to the Platonic problem of learning in Plato's 
Meno.32 It is a way of (tacitly) knowing before (explicitly) knowing. It is something that
is highly personal, extra-logical and unformalizable. Indeed, it is the reason why the 
process of discovery is so entirely unpredictable. However, it is because of this intuitive
leap forward in response to reality impressing itself upon us that we are able to take a 
step into the unknown and discover things that we had as yet not been able to tell 
ourselves.33
30 R&ST, 83-84. Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of Physics: The Growth of Ideas 
from the Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 
in a work pointed out to readers in Torrance's CFM, use the term clues (or rather "clews") to describe
how science moves forward. Polanyi's book, The Tacit Dimension. (Magnolia, MA: Smith, 1983), 
speaks of "tacit foreknowledge" which seems to be the element of his thought which Torrance is 
referring to. 22-23, 30, 76.
31 In spite of Torrance's explicit mentioning of Einstein and Polanyi in the above quotation, it is clear 
that he traces the basic conviction, as well as the terminology, to Clement of Alexandria. Torrance 
connects the idea of a prolepsis to the thought of Clement in DM, 131, 141, 176-177; "TR,” 192; 
T&C, 197-198.
32 Plato, Meno. Translated by Sharples, R. W., edited by Sharples, R. W. Warminster, (Wiltshire: Aris &
Phillips Ltd., 1985), 80e.
33 This kind of forward motion can be found in T&C, 88-89; TS, 229-230.
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With the move from the second level to the third level or Second 
Theological/Theoretical (or meta-scientific) Level,34 we are, in a sense, doing something
similar to what we did with the move from the first level to the second. The difference 
is that now, instead of looking primarily to the mass of detail inherent in our empirico-
theoretical engagement with reality, we are dealing primarily with our explicitly 
theoretical treatment of it. Our goal in this transition is to probe more deeply into our 
field of study, to discern the most important factors of that field and to distill our 
theoretic representation to achieve a maximum of logical simplicity and comprehensive 
applicability. That is to say, we hope to have as few concepts as possible and be able to 
explain as wide a range of experiences as possible.
It is important to note, both for its significance in itself as well as its 
implications for further dialogue below, that Torrance sees the third level as being 
inescapably concerned with ontological claims. In his favorite example of the Christian 
doctrine of the Trinity, the transition to the third level involves answering questions 
about the actual being of God and not merely questions about God's interaction with us. 
That is to say that, for Torrance, it is not possible to move to the third level in our 
theoretical development without making concrete ontological claims. We cannot have 
third level theories and yet fail to make affirmations at the level of being.
It must be said that this account of these three levels within our scientific 
activity is not something that is self-evident, but it is an a posteriori reconstruction 
made on reflection of what has actually taken place over the centuries.35 Torrance 
himself grants this and makes no apology for it. Indeed, for Torrance, it would be 
methodologically inappropriate to attempt to specify ahead of time how theories must 
develop if they are to be valid. The only appropriate way to analyze such theories is a 
posteriori.
The connection between these three levels, and any others if they would happen 
to be needed, is again one of correlation. There are, and must be, points of overlap 
between the levels of our theories. If there were no such overlap and the levels were 
34 Torrance's discussions of this level can be found in G&G, 157-159; CDG, 85, 98-101.
35 Torrance cites Einstein as calling the task of natural science to be "the posterior reconstruction of 
existence by the process of conceptualisation." CT&SC, 7.
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utterly separate, then they would have nothing to say to one another. For example, in 
pre-Socratic philosophy, there was a tendency to develop cosmologies that had nothing, 
or very little, to do with the world that is actually experienced by human beings due to 
the excessive rationalism that characterized ancient Greek thought.36 This made such 
theories interesting as an intellectual exercise but of little use as far as engaging with 
the world in which we live. If our theories are to have any bearing on empirical reality, 
they must be connected, however indirectly, to that reality.
It must be stressed that, though the connection between conceptual levels is real,
it is not a correspondence in the technical sense of the term. There is no one-to-one 
relation between the levels. Indeed, if this were so, it would imply that we are not, in 
fact, dealing with three levels but only one, though that one level takes three different 
forms for our conceptual convenience in different contexts. This mistake would seem to
conceptually related to the modalist heresy in the early church.
At each of these levels, we attempt to develop disclosure models to engage with 
the same reality, though they differ from one another inasmuch as they are dealing with 
that reality at different levels and entail different degrees of abstraction and 
comprehensiveness.37 It might be said that the disclosure model at each level is the 
product, though in a non-reductionistic way, of the one "below" it.38 It is the complex 
question posed to reality at the evangelical-doxological or empirico-theoretical level 
that yields the insights we organize into a question or model of a higher order that 
functions as a theory or doctrine at the first distinctly theoretical/theological level. This 
level is always grounded in and kept in check by the one below it. It is through careful 
examination of what comes to light through these first two levels that we "freely 
36 Examples of this kind of theory can easily be found in the thought of Heraclitus, Parmenides, Zeno, 
and many others.
37 While Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God, 113, speaks of the results of our thinking at 
the second level, or first theoretical level, as being a disclosure model, he does not say that the 
empirico-theoretical level or the meta-scientific level are also disclosure models. The fact that every 
level of our engagement with reality is a disclosure model is important, for neither our basic 
empirico-theoretical data nor our unified theories are exempt from the need to be open to revision.
38 Cf. Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 168-170.
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create," to use Einstein's term,39 a disclosure model at the third level that we hope will 
give us the tools we need to reach a more comprehensive grasp of our object. It must be
noted that this third level is more abstract and thus is developed at the cost of a loss of 
concrete applicability; that is to say, there are fewer empirical correlates, and those that 
exist are less self-evident, for theories at the third level than for statements made at 
either of the lower levels.40
Because these levels or models are always rooted in the levels below them (but 
can and must never be reduced to them), there are points of contact between them and 
yet the upper levels can change without necessarily changing the lower levels. This 
happens with some frequency such as in theology whenever there are shifts in doctrine 
but with no corresponding shift in canonical scripture or in natural science when there is
a change in scientific theory with no change in the reality being investigated or, more 
precisely, no change in the "body of knowledge" from which those theories spring. An 
example of this is the change from a geocentric to a heliocentric model of the solar 
system without attempting to revise Tycho Brahe's data. What is still more significant is
that the upper two levels can change independently of one another. Higher level theories
or doctrines can change without a change in the lower level theories or doctrines. In the 
same way, mutatis mutandis, the lower level theories or doctrines can change without a 
change in reality or scripture.
Torrance expresses this in his own words.
At each of these stages the concepts we develop are integral to a whole 
cultural and rational system, so that advance can be made only with a 
radical shift in the basic fabric of thought together with a logical 
reconstruction of prior knowledge. This is not to claim that the basic 
concepts we reach in immediate intuitive experience of the world are 
changed, any more than our basic rationality alters, but that we reach a 
deeper and more appropriate understanding of our basic concepts and 
through them of the dynamic, multivariable world with which we are so 
39 Albert Einstein, "Autobiographical Notes." In Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, edited by 
Schilpp, Paul Arthur, 1-94. (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1970), 13.
40 TS, 236.
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marvellously and intelligibly coordinated. This is why scientific inquiry 
advances only as it clarifies and deepens the foundations laid in the past. 
Otherwise it would be little more than a very sophisticated game without
any empirical application to actual existence at all.41
Torrance mentions in a few places that lower level theories or doctrines can be 
changed without a change in the higher level ones. Indeed, one could say it is on the 
basis of higher level theories that we make such changes at lower levels. A concrete 
example of this is the doctrine of transubstantiation. It was put forward because, in the 
framework of thought that was dominant at the time, there seemed to be no other way to
speak of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Torrance believes that, now that we
have more deeply understood the upper levels of theology, we realize that we must now 
kick such an understanding away, regardless of how helpful it might have been in the 
past.42
Are there examples of this kind of development taking place?
More must be said regarding the issues raised by Torrance's use of multiple 
levels in theory construction but it is appropriate to pause for a moment and examine 
some examples of theoretical development in history. It matters very little if Torrance's 
understanding of theoretical development is conceptually consistent if it is not an 
appropriate account of reality. We shall consider first an example from Christian 
theology for which Torrance made his position explicit. Next, we shall direct our 
attention to a well-known example from the natural sciences and explore how 
Torrance's position might make sense of it.
41 R&ST, 148.
42 In Einstein's text, it is claimed that "As regards the final aim, intermediary layers are only of 
temporary nature. They must eventually disappear as irrelevant." "Physics and Reality," 64-65. 
Alister McGrath makes a similar, though perhaps more bold, claim that our theories can even 
transform our experiences at the basic level. The Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundation of 
Doctrinal Criticism. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 66-72.
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Later in his career, one of Torrance's main theological concerns was the 
Christian doctrine of the Trinity. He provides an account of the development of the 
doctrine as an organic response of the church to the sustained interaction of God with 
humanity as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.43 In this case, we might say that the transition 
from the first to the second levels was an attempt to answer the question, "Why is it that
we seem to experience the one God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit?" The attempt to 
bring this experience into some kind of theoretical coherence yielded the answer, "We 
have such ordered experiences because God actually interacts with us in a three-fold 
way."
As the church transitioned from the second to the third levels, it might be said 
that they were asking the question, "What is the reality that lies behind this three-fold 
encounter?" Orthodox Trinitarian theology has answered that question by saying that 
the reason that God interacts with us in a three-fold way is because God actually is 
Triune in being, that the terms "Father," "Son," and "Holy Spirit" are not just 
convenient ways to speak of how the activity of God is ordered, but are names for 
distinct, though inseparable, Persons in the Being of the one God.
It is important to note that this is not the only possible way to make the 
transition from the second to the third level. Modalism, for example, provides a 
different approach. According to Modalism, there is no fundamental reality to the 
distinctions between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. They are merely "faces" or "masks" 
of the One God who elects to interact with us in a three-fold way. We shall return to the 
importance of both the similarities and differences of Orthodox Trinitarianism and 
Modalism below.
At this point in the discussion, it is important to note that the evangelical-
doxological experience of the early Christians was not value-neutral but was already 
laden with theoretical issues that pressed for clear articulation and understanding. It is 
also important to note that organizing the experience at the first level into a theoretical 
account at the second level is not sufficient. Indeed, that theory becomes itself a 
compound question that must be answered.
43 For an account of the experience at the first level that the explicit doctrinal development was 
attempting to deal with, see the first three chapters of CDG.
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In order to see how this move from the first level to the second level might take 
place within the natural sciences, let us consider what may seem to be the 
comparatively simple question as to how to explain our experience of the sun as rising 
in the East and setting in the West. The fact that the sun can be observed to do this is 
obvious to all. If one were to reflect, based only on their experience of the sun's motion 
across the sky, and not as someone who has already been educated to believe otherwise,
it would seem natural to conclude that the sun goes around the earth. It is important to 
understand that this commonsense account has much to recommend it, a priori. The 
fact that modern Western people are currently dissatisfied with such a system must not 
be read, anachronistically, as implying that it was not empirically adequate or scientific,
at least as regards the needs of science at the time. Though the conclusion that the sun 
travels around the earth is a reasonable explanation of our terrestrial experience, our 
experience does not demand such an explanation. History shows us that there exists a 
second explanation of the experience that is more acceptable to modern minds.
As was considered in chapter two, all knowledge is relative to a set of ultimate 
beliefs (in the broader sense). Some of these beliefs, which remained implicit at the first
level, become more explicit with the transition to the second level. One of these 
convictions is that the earth does not seem to move. Indeed, there were arguments to 
this effect. If the earth makes a complete rotation every day, it was argued that a tower 
from which a rock is dropped "would travel many yards to the east in the time the rock 
would consume in its fall, and the rock ought to strike the earth that distance away from
the base of the tower."44 If one were to rely purely on the direct experience of countless 
individuals and some commonsense theoretical convictions, a geocentric view of the 
universe is not only possible but plausible. Many of the greatest scientific advances 
were opposed by people who were not ignorant but deeply reflective and rational.45 For 
44 Galileo Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, (Berkeley, 1953), 126, quoted in
Feyerabend, Against Method. 3rd ed. (London: Verso, 1993), 56.
45 See Paul K. Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society. (London: London NLB, 1978), 40-53, for an 
interesting defense of those who affirmed the Ptolemaic cosmology against Copernicus and Galileo. 
Additionally, see Torrance's point that Clerk Maxwell's field theory was opposed by Lord Kelvin 
who called it "mysticism." See PCT, 22; CFM, 110-111, 152.
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our purposes, this example will help us to see how theories change and how to make 
sense of that change.
We find that Torrance's account of theoretical development also makes sense of 
the transition from the second to the third level in this case. At this stage, a concept 
which seems promising for unifying and conceptually simplifying the totality of 
scientific knowledge is chosen and the experiences to be explained are reexamined. The
question is raised, "If the earth is stationary while the sun revolves around it, how are 
we to understand the motion of the heavenly bodies?" Within the geocentric theory, the 
location of the earth in the center of the universe is not just a theoretical account of why
the sun goes up in the East and sets in the West. Rather, it functions as a fundamental 
axiom of astronomy. All explanation of celestial phenomena was to be made against the
background of the belief in a fixed earth around which the heavens rotated.
It must be noted that, as far as theories go, the geocentric theory of the solar 
system was not unsuccessful. It was a coherent system that was able to predict the 
astrological phenomena that most people cared about at the time as well as any other 
system thus far.46 It was consistent, accurate, and abundantly empirical. After all, we do 
not observe planets orbiting around the sun. We have no access to the kind of outside 
perspective that would be required for such an experience. The only place, until 
recently, we had to make astronomical observations was from the surface of the earth. It
is not hard to see that the notion that circular orbits were to be preferred over orbits full 
of epicycles could be seen as nothing more than a preference of an abstract concept 
over the evidence of one's own eyes.47
46 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 68. The adjustments made to the system over time were no more radical than the way 
"primitive" cultures can explain away experiences which clash with their worldview. See Michael 
Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958), 286-289.
47 Feyerabend quotes Galileo as interpreting his position in precisely this way. "Nor can I ever 
sufficiently admire the outstanding acumen of those who have taken hold of this opinion 
[Copernicanism] and accepted it as true: they have, through sheer force of intellect, done such 
violence to their own senses as to prefer what reason told them over that which sensible experience 
plainly showed them to the contrary." Copernicus, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World 
Systems, (Berkeley, 1953), 328, cited in Feyerabend, Against Method, 82. Also Michael Polanyi, 
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Though geocentric theories of the solar system such as those opposed by Galileo
have been all but entirely discredited in contemporary science and culture, Torrance's 
account of how theories get developed and become rooted as ontological as well as 
epistemological commitments makes sense of why a rival theoretical system might not 
be welcomed with open arms. The rejection by the scientific community of geocentrism
for heliocentrism suggests that we do not only need a new theory at the second level 
which makes better sense of the evidence but also a new way of understanding such 
theories at the third level. Conflicts between interpretations are seldom resolved by 
asking the question, "Which theory provides a better account of the evidence," as 
Duhem and Quine have shown,48 and are often battles that represent conflicting 
ontological commitments as well as conflicting epistemological commitments.
What choices does one have regarding the third level?
It is entirely plausible that a person may, upon reflecting on Torrance's account 
of the stratification of our theories, desire simply to avoid the third level altogether. A 
reaction of this kind is probable if one has sympathies with the empiricist tradition and 
views any claim that explicitly goes beyond experience with suspicion. If we may force 
people who, as far as can be discerned, had no awareness of Torrance's thought into his 
framework Bas C. Van Fraassen, with his position called "Constructive Empiricism," 
seems to be just such a person.49
Described briefly, Constructive Empiricism is a non-positivist development of 
the empiricist tradition. There is no attempt to claim that merely reporting experiences 
is sufficient for scientific practice. However, nothing more is to be claimed for our 
Personal Knowledge, 3-4.
48 Pierre Duhem, "Physical Theory and Experiment." In Can Theories be Refuted: Essays on the 
Duhem-Quine Thesis, edited by Harding, Sandra G., 1-40. (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 
1976), and W. V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In From a Logical Point of View. Revised
ed., 20-46. (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1953).
49 For Van Fraassen's exposition of Constructive Empiricism, see The Scientific Image. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980).
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theories than empirical adequacy. Our theories ought to be interpreted literally,50 but we 
should not ask if they are true, only if they are empirically adequate.
From one point of view, it might not seem that Van Fraassen would have a 
difficulty with developing the kind of higher level theories that Torrance describes at 
the third level of our theoretical development. Indeed, it would seem that such a theory 
could be interpreted as nothing more than an account of experiences as comprehensive 
and simple as possible and need not be any more "true," rather than merely empirically 
adequate, than theories at a lower level. Van Fraassen believes that the most important 
role that theory plays within scientific practice is that it informs experimental design.51 
It could be claimed that a third level theory is no less appropriate for planning 
experiments than a second level theory.
Whether this is an acceptable position to others or not, it certainly would not be 
acceptable to Torrance on his own interpretation of the third level of our theories. For 
Torrance, we are concerned with ontological claims at the third level, with tapping into 
the inner logic of reality and giving expression to its inherent intelligibility. For 
Torrance, one cannot have a third level theory without making ontological claims of one
kind or another.
Indeed, it would seem that Torrance does not believe that it is possible to refrain 
from making the transition from the second to the third level of our theoretical 
development. Rather, it would seem that it is at this point where our ultimate or 
penultimate beliefs come to the surface and condition everything else we believe. For 
Torrance, we cannot avoid the fact that there are certain things we believe about reality. 
This becomes a significant problem when one is unaware of these beliefs. When one is 
unaware of the convictions that shape their thinking, they are not being epistemically 
neutral but are having their epistemological values shaped without their critical 
engagement and, thus, they are being accepted uncritically.52
50 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 10.
51 Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 73.
52 CT&SC, 13. Bhaskar makes a similar statement about a particular instance of this phenomenon. 
"Humean empiricism is not neutral in its consequences for scientific practice. Taken consistently, it 
does generate a methodology; not indeed Hume's (or Newton's), but Mach's." Realist Theory of 
Science, 42.
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Torrance's conviction that, whatever may be the case at the second level of our 
theoretical development, it is not possible to make third level theories without 
ontological commitment means that, for Torrance, if we are confronted with more than 
one theory which is empirically equivalent, we are not able to withhold judgment.
Torrance does not always fit in with the mainstream of what goes by the name of
"scientific realism," but he is undoubtedly a realist when it comes to the so-called 
problems of empirical equivalence and of underdetermination of theory by evidence. In 
Richard Feynman's The Character of Physical Law,53 to cite an accessible example,54 we
are presented with three ways to describe the effects of what we call gravity that are 
empirically equivalent but psychologically and philosophically quite different, which he
calls "Newton's law, the local field method and the minimum principle."55 Feynman 
concludes that they are scientifically equivalent, that there is no clear choice as to which
of them is the "right" way to calculate the motion of, say, a planet. This may be so, but 
only if we limit ourselves to the case where we are concerned merely with empirical 
adequacy rather than truth. To claim that these procedures are equivalent is to limit our 
consideration to only the first and second levels of our theoretical development. If we 
were to ask the question as to what it is that gives rise to this experience, which is 
surely unavoidable in the advance of science, we cannot stop there but must move to the
third level.
As long as we are of the opinion that science is merely an analysis of 
phenomena, we need go no further than Feynman's account. However, though these 
models are equivalent at the first level of empirico-theoretical engagement with reality, 
even this first theoretical level has produced wildly different accounts. There is a way of
choosing between them, but doing so commits us to precisely the kind of ontological 
perspective that people like Feynman are hoping to avoid. It is worth emphasizing again
that attempting to refrain from assuming an ontological position is itself an ontological 
position, namely that phenomena are all there is.56 Torrance's model for theory choice 
53 Richard Feynman, The Character of Physical Law. (London: Cox and Wyman, Ltd., 1965), 44-47.
54 Those wishing to explore the issue of empirical equivalence in more depth might see André Kukla, 
Studies in Scientific Realism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 58-91.
55 Feynman, Character of Physical Law, 47.
56 It would seem that Torrance would be in agreement with Bhaskar's statement, "But if transcendental 
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based on ontological convictions at the third level is an entirely realist, as opposed to 
anti-realist, position. However, because of the in-built flexibility of disclosure models, 
he is able to avoid the pitfalls of other realist accounts that collapse the moment the 
historical development of theories is discussed.
What is the problem of underdetermination?
In this analysis of how we make a decision regarding third level theories we are 
concerned with the problem in the philosophy of science known as the 
underdetermination of theory by evidence. André Kukla suggests that
The main argument for antirealism is undoubtedly the argument from the
underdetermination of theory by all possible data. Here is one way to 
represent it: (1) all theories have indefinitely many empirically 
equivalent rivals; (2) empirically equivalent hypotheses are equally 
believable; (3) therefore, belief in any theory must be arbitrary and 
unfounded.57
It should be noted that realists have argued that underdetermination is not as 
great a challenge to realism as anti-realists have suggested. Albert Einstein suggested 
that, in actual scientific practice, the problem of underdetermination simply never 
arises.
The supreme task of the physicist is to arrive at those universal 
elementary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure 
deduction. There is no logical path to these laws; only intuition, resting 
on sympathetic understanding of experience, can reach them. In this 
methodological uncertainty, one might suppose that there were any 
number of possible systems of theoretical physics all with an equal 
realism is correct, and ontology cannot in fact be reduced to epistemology, then denying the 
possibility of an ontology merely results in the generation of an implicit ontology and an implicit 
realism." Realist Theory of Science, 40.
57 Kukla, Studies in Scientific Realism, 58.
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amount to be said for them; and this opinion is no doubt correct, 
theoretically. But evolution has shown that at any given moment out of 
all conceivable constructions one has always proved itself absolutely 
superior to all the rest. Nobody who has really gone deeply into the 
matter will deny that in practice the world of phenomena unambiguously
determines the theoretical system, in spite of the fact that there is no 
logical bridge between phenomena and their theoretical principles; this is
what Leibniz described so happily as a “pre-established harmony.” 
Physicists often accuse epistemologists of not paying sufficient attention 
to this fact. Here, it seems to me, lie the roots of the controversy carried 
on some years ago between Mach and Planck.58
It is important to note that this claim was made fairly early in Einstein's career59 and that
it would not be long before quantum phenomena developed rival schools of 
interpretation, at least one of which was distasteful to him.60 However, it is relevant that 
Einstein believes that science will organically and pragmatically solve the problem of 
underdetermination if left to its own devices.
Another approach is that represented by theologian Alister McGrath, who 
suggests that, when faced with two empirically equivalent rival theories, we ought to 
refrain from making a judgment until further evidence comes to light.61 This has been 
the wisdom that has informed the tradition of devising and conducting so-called 
"crucial experiments" to decide between theories which are, at a given point in time, 
empirically equivalent.
However, it is not the case that theories which are empirically equivalent are 
always so accidentally, that is, due to evidence available at a particular point in time. It 
is not only possible that theories can have rivals which are necessarily empirically 
58 Albert Einstein, "Principles of Scientific Research." In The World as I See it, 123-127. (New York: 
Covici Publishing Company, 1934), 125-126.
59 The statement was made in an address in honor of Planck's sixtieth birthday, which was in 1918.
60 The Copenhagen school, which has become dominant over its rivals such as the Bohmian 
interpretation, was famously resisted by Einstein throughout his life.
61 Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology, Vol. 2 - Reality. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2002), 169.
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equivalent but that all theories have such rivals.62 If this is so, then the problem of 
underdetermination is a real one and a solution of some kind must be found.
To give an example that is particularly relevant against the background of 
Torrance's theology, it can be said that Modalism and Orthodox Trinitarianism are third 
level theories which are empirically equivalent at the first and second levels.63 Both 
operate with the same set of experiences, recorded in the Biblical witness. Both 
organize those experiences into essentially equivalent accounts at the second level, for 
both will grant that God's interaction with humanity is as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
Their differences arise in the transition to the third level, where Trinitarianism claims 
that this economic triunity is rooted in an ontological triunity in God's own life whereas 
Modalism claims that, in God's own being, God is one and without inherent 
distinctions.
There is no Biblical statement that can serve as an unambiguous means to force 
a decision for one alternative against the others. Any ontological claim made by a 
Trinitarian can be accounted for by the Modalist by saying, "God behaves toward us as 
if that were the case, but this does not mean that God actually is this way." This "as if" 
clause has its parallel in the philosophy of science. Anti-realist interpretations of 
62 One example of such empirically equivalent rivals in natural science is the way to explain the force 
of gravity mentioned in Feynman, The Character of Physical Law, 44-47. Each method is 
philosophically different and, if interpreted realistically, are entirely different theories. However, 
they are empirically equivalent and there is no example in which the different interpretations of 
gravity will produce different empirical predictions.
It should be noted, however, that this use of “empirically equivalent rival” is not uncontested. What 
will here be called a necessarily empirically equivalent rival could, from another perspective, be 
called a different interpretation of the same theory. While the latter interpretation has much to 
recommend it, the theological example in what follows, of orthodox Trinitarianism and Modalism, 
inclines this theologian to treat such “interpretations” as different theories, as they have been treated 
as such in the history of the church.
63 It if is argued that modalism in the form articulated in this section has no historical advocates, it is of
no concern. If that is so, it need merely be said that Modalism and Orthodox Trinitarianism can be 
made empirically equivalent to one another.
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theories claim effectively the same thing. "Reality behaves as if the theory were literally
true, but that does not mean that it is actually so."64
It need hardly be mentioned that a Trinitarian will not find the Modalist response
satisfactory any more than the scientific realist will find the anti-realist response 
satisfactory. However, psychological satisfaction or dissatisfaction is not strictly 
relevant to the standard problem of underdetermination, which arises due to the 
empiricist conviction cited above that "empirically equivalent hypotheses are equally 
believable." It is interesting to note that both sides of such a disagreement can appeal to 
Ockham's Razor in support of their view. The modalist or scientific anti-realist can 
claim that their account is simpler because it requires the existence of fewer entities 
and, as such, it is a metaphysically simpler account. The Trinitarian or scientific realist, 
by contrast, can claim that their position requires fewer epistemological leaps and, as 
such, it is an epistemologically simpler account.65
It would seem that Torrance would approach such a situation by saying that the 
two positions are informed by mutually exclusive penultimate beliefs. Whether either 
view is required by reality is not certain but it is certain that it is not possible that they 
both are.
There would seem to be, for Torrance, a real problem with contenting ourselves 
with mere empirical adequacy for our theories; namely, that it does not take account of 
the influence over our thinking and believing exercised by our ultimate and penultimate
beliefs. This conviction, that empirical adequacy is not the only epistemological virtue 
and thus that underdeterminacy is not truly a "problem," makes it clear that, whatever 
resonances there are between Torrance's thought and particular anti-realist thinkers, 
Torrance is telling the truth when he claims to be a realist.
If a decision cannot be made between two theories based on empirical 
considerations alone, is there anything else that can inform our theory choice? As has 
64 It must be noted that, while those such as Van Fraassen, see Kukla, Studies in Scientific Realism, 59, 
consider a realist and an anti-realist interpretation of a theory to be empirically equivalent rivals, 
others such as Laudan and Leplin have rejected this. "Empirical Equivalence and 
Underdetermination." The Journal of Philosophy 88, no. 9 (Sep. 1991), 455-456.
65 Other philosophical traditions might call this epistemological simplicity "superior explanatory 
power."
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already been hinted at above our ultimate and penultimate beliefs, or what some might 
call psychological considerations, can play a major role.
With regard to our example, it is easy to make a decision between Modalism and
Trinitarianism if one appeals to the behavior of a body of people.66 If a body of people 
conducts itself in such a way that it relies upon a particular interpretation at the third 
level, then it will find the fact that another view can be constructed as empirically 
equivalent untroubling. In this case, the fact that the Christian Church has historically 
proclaimed that the core of the gospel is that, in Christ, God has actually revealed God's
self to us within our world of space and time in a true and faithful way, the Modalist 
position is simply untenable. While a Modalist may believe that Trinitarianism makes 
too many metaphysical claims, a Trinitarian will be left with the persistent concern that 
Modalism can be of no use to humanity since it maintains that, even in Christ, God does
not reveal God's self to us as God is in God's own life.
In light of these considerations it would seem that, for all his deep concern that 
we express ourselves as accurately as possible, Torrance is more concerned with 
behavior than with mere intellectual analysis.67 If someone has sympathies with 
epistemological simplicity and would otherwise be inclined to affirm Modalism but 
they live their lives as if, in Jesus Christ, God has faithfully revealed God's self to 
humanity, it would seem that, while Torrance might desire that they change how they 
express themselves they are, in fact, Trinitarian even if they do not describe themselves 
as such.68
66 "The theories we develop are never complete, so that even if two of them are empirically equivalent, 
they will be accompanied by research programmes which are generally very different." Van 
Fraassen, The Scientific Image, 202.
67 This is evident in Torrance's insistence that John Philoponus was not a monophysite, in spite of some
linguistic tendencies that might imply such a position. G&G, 61.
68 It would seem that, though Torrance never expresses this conviction so explicitly, he would be in 
significant agreement with John Wesley, who claimed that every Christian is inherent Trinitarian. 
"Not that every Christian believer adverts to this; perhaps at first, not one in twenty; But if you ask 
any of them a few questions, you will easily find it is implied in what he believes." John Wesley, 
"Sermon 55: On the Trinity." In The Works of John Wesley, edited by Outler, Albert C. Vol. 2, 373-
386. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1985), §18, 385.
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This rather lengthy analysis of the transition from the second to the third level in
our theoretical development has sought to articulate the elements of realism in 
Torrance's thought. For Torrance, there is no way to avoid making ontological 
commitments. However, it seems that this affirmation traps Torrance back into the 
troubles raised by anti-realist critiques of scientific realism. How can one have any 
confidence in one's ontological commitments expressed in their theories when theories 
change over time?
The reason that Torrance's belief that higher level theories carry ontological 
commitments does not trap him in such an unpleasant position is that, for Torrance, all 
our theories, no matter high their level, are ultimately disclosure models. We are never 
able to conclude that we have captured the truth of being in our statements, for reality 
never fails to outstrip and relativize our statements about it.
What does Torrance mean by describing a theory as a "Limiting Case?"
In chapter four it was argued that Torrance's position does not require that 
replaced theories be labeled purely as "false." It was claimed that replaced theories can 
still be considered "truthful" to the degree that they are “rooted in reality.” In this case, 
the fact that a theory is replaced is not to be understood primarily as a failure of that 
theory but rather as its success. The replaced theory has served its function, directing us 
outside of itself to the reality that lies beyond it. It is precisely because the theory was 
rooted in reality that this reference was possible and it was on the basis of what was 
learned from additional experience with reality that the theory was deemed inadequate 
and needed to be replaced.
Torrance will occasionally refer to replaced theories as continuing to be useful 
as "limiting cases" of subsequent theories.69 In particular, he highlights Newtonian 
physics as a theory of this kind. It is possible for Newtonian physics to function as a 
69 For Torrance's use of the phrase “limiting case,” see D&CO, 27-28; T&C, 45, 180, 321-322; G&G, 
103, 171-172; CDG, 85-86; ST&R, 16-17. Torrance claims the term comes from Von Weizsäcker in 
TS, 265-266.
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first approximation of Einsteinian physics which is entirely appropriate and empirically 
adequate in circumstances where the difference in the results generated by Newtonian 
and Relativity physics is negligible for the task at hand.70
This means that, though Newtonian thought must now be relativized by 
subsequent developments and its ability to continue to be useful is not something it has 
in itself but is the result of interpreting Newton in an Einsteinian framework of thought, 
it is important that we do not merely condemn Newtonian thought as "false."71 Newton 
achieved something very important and that achievement will never be wholly lost, 
though it has had to be reinterpreted. The world can never turn its back on Newton or 
his system. We have only been able to move beyond Newton by making extensive use 
of Newton. Some of Newton's scientific insights shall remain, though it is only possible
to see which insights will remain a posteriori. We saw that this is also the case in 
theological development with the example of the doctrine of transubstantiation, 
discussed above.
This helps to explain why Tapio Luoma believes there to be some confusion 
about the status of the Nicene homoousion in Torrance's theology, as to whether it is a 
disclosure model or something else.72
In the ultimate analysis, Torrance is reluctant to suggest what kind of 
reevaluation there possibly could be with regard to the homoousion. 
Therefore one can claim that although the homoousion meets the 
requirements of a disclosure model as set by Torrance, they cannot 
ultimately be identified because of the normative character and status the
patristic term has gained over the centuries. In other words, the 
homoousion is in essence more than a disclosure model - it is “a 
fundamental dogma, which once it comes to view becomes normative 
70 The use of the term "approximation" should not be interpreted as implying that Newtonian physics is
useful because it is "approximately true." Rather, its continued usefulness is based on pragmatic, 
rather than theoretical, considerations.
71 This is important to note because, under a strict correspondence theory of truth, this is precisely what
we would have to do.
72 Tapio Luoma, Incarnation and Physics: Natural Science in the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 39.
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for all faithful theological statement, for it enables it to be made in true 
correspondence with its proper object and in consistent relations with 
other faithful statements.” Thus the homoousion is certainly an absolute 
concept which cannot, in practice, be altered or replaced or even given 
any deeper reevaluation without severely damaging the current self‐
understanding of the Christian Church. This leads us to make the claim 
that in this respect Torrance's thought remains imprecise because, as was 
shown, on the one hand he considers it as a revisable concept but on the 
other he allows it as a normative authority.73
Luoma suggests that the homoousion would be more accurately described as an 
"authoritative and normative methodological tool" for Torrance.74
In order to understand the role of the homoousion in Torrance's thought and how
it relates to Torrance's concept of disclosure models, let us consider a metaphor utilized 
several times in his later academic career.
In the Nicene formulation of the homoousion something absolutely 
fundamental took place in the mind of the early Church. It was a decisive
step in deeper understanding of the Gospel, taken in the continuity of the
apostolic tradition, upon which the Church, in obedience to God's saving
revelation in Jesus Christ, could not go back. It was an irreversible event 
in the history of Christian theology. The significance of what happened 
may be indicated by reference to what we do with a jig-saw puzzle. We 
assemble the scattered pieces together, fitting them appropriately to each 
other until the pattern they conjointly make comes to view. If we then 
break it all up and throw the pieces back into disorder, we may have little
difficulty in fitting them all together again, but it will be impossible for 
us to do that without recalling the picture we reached the first time. 
Something irreversible would have taken place in our mind and memory,
73 Luoma, Incarnation and Physics, 41.
74 Luoma, Incarnation and Physics, 41.
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which could not but influence all subsequent attempts to recover the 
coherent pattern made by the different pieces.75
Torrance believes that something irreversible took place at Nicaea, something 
which can never be undone or forgotten entirely. Though Torrance admits the possibility
that there may come a time when even something as central as the homoousion may 
need to be revised, this is not to say that it will ever be entirely condemned as "false." 
Key insights of the homoousion will be retained in the future for it is economically 
rooted in reality. However, as the church has not yet gone through that paradigm shift, it
is impossible to predict precisely which elements of the homoousion will be taken up 
into a subsequent theory. It is because of this that Torrance is not being inconsistent 
when he claims both that the homoousion is neither sacrosanct nor irreformable and 
also that it remains the fundamental theological conviction for Christian faith.76 The 
homoousion represents a disclosure model that has manifested itself as being deeply 
rooted in reality but, as the insight it represents will never be lost, even if we should 
find that we must go beyond it, it need not be vested with a quasi-supernatural status.
Has anyone else undertaken research advocating the stratification of our theories?
We return now to our dialogue with Roy Bhaskar because we find that another 
fascinating parallel between these two men is in the significance they place on the fact 
that the world, and our knowledge of it, is stratified. Bhaskar distinguishes between 
three "domains:" the domain of the empirical, the domain of the actual and the domain 
of the real, each of which is contained by the ones after it.77 To summarize, the 
experiences that we have are not arbitrary but arise from actual events outside of 
ourselves. These are also not self-generating but arise because of the mechanisms or 
tendencies that exist at a deeper level. These mechanisms or tendencies are neither 
75 TF, 144. Cf. MC, 4; “TR,” 185; CDG, x; ST&R, 168.
76 Luoma, Incarnation and Physics 40; Thomas F. Torrance (ed.), The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies
in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed A.D. 381. (Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1981), xiii. See also 
DM, 253.
77 Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 229.
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empirical nor actual, as they are not "experienced" and they do not "happen," but they 
condition everything that happens or is experienced.
Not every experience necessarily yields a clear picture into the domain of the 
real, as distinct from the other two levels. However, once we gain an insight into the 
real structures of the world, we interpret our experiences in light of them. What appear 
to be contrary experiences can then be interpreted as arising due to the fact that we do 
not always operate within experimentally closed circumstances. Once we have come to 
the conviction that there is a real mechanism underlying our experience, we become far 
more likely to judge our experience in light of the mechanism rather than the 
mechanism in the light of our experience. Thus, Bhaskar is arguing for a realist theory 
of science rather than an empiricist one. Once we allow theory to explicitly influence 
our engagement and even call our experience into question, we have moved beyond 
empiricism into a form of realism.
Torrance's stratification of our theories has strong resonances with Bhaskar's 
stratification of "domains." It is important to note that the use of the word "resonance" 
here is deliberate. Torrance consistently uses terms that skew toward what could be 
called the subjective-pole of realism while Bhaskar tends to speak in a way that favors 
the objective-pole. This means that, in spite of the fact that Bhaskar is not seeking to 
defend what Polanyi has called "objectivism," he tends to lean further in that direction 
that Torrance.
For example, in the preface to his Realist Theory of Science,78 Bhaskar describes 
two strands of thought in the philosophy of science, the key insights of which he hoped 
to weave together. The former "emphasizes the social character of science and focuses 
particularly on the phenomena of scientific change and development" and is 
accompanied by a list of names, several of which, such as Kuhn, Popper, and Polanyi, 
are mentioned by Torrance in one way or another. The other "stresses the difference 
between explanation and prediction and emphasizes the role played by models in 
scientific thought" and is accompanied by a list of names that do not play any role at all 
in Torrance's writing. The fact that, for Bhaskar, Torrance would likely appear to fit into
78 Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 9.
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this first group might explain the difference in their ways of speaking of this 
stratification.
Bhaskar's domains of the empirical, actual, and real precisely parallel Torrance's 
evangelical-doxological (or empirico-theoretical), First Theological (or Theoretical), 
and Second Theological (or Theoretical) levels. It is necessary to grasp this parallel in 
order to understand a pithy slogan in the concluding pages of Bhaskar's book, 
"Epistemological relativism, in this sense, is the handmaiden of ontological realism and 
must be accepted."79 If we are realists, in Bhaskar's sense, we must not become so 
devoted to a particular expression of reality that we begin to collapse the domain of the 
real into nothing more than the domain of the empirical. That is, we must not commit 
what Bhaskar calls the "epistemic fallacy," which says that all statements about being 
can be translated without remainder into statements about our knowledge of being.80 The
parallel issue in Torrance's thought is given concise expression by David Munchin. 
"Torrance is consistent, in that he admits this [Pannenberg's charge of] 'relativity' at the 
epistemic level, but denies the possibility of the philosophic-ontological relativism 
inherent in much post modern thought, which seeks to drive epistemic relativity down 
to the ontic level."81
The question must be raised as to what this epistemological relativism looks like
for Bhaskar. It would seem that this kind of relativism cannot characterize the domain 
of the real for it is precisely on the basis of that domain that Bhaskar claims requires 
epistemological relativism. It seems equally difficult to have such relativism in the 
domain of the empirical. After all, Bhaskar denies that theories are merely convenient 
arrangements of empirical data;82 indeed, theory is necessary to help us understand 
which experiences are epistemically significant. The only other option would seem to 
be that epistemological relativism takes place in the domain of the actual. If, when he 
79 Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 249.
80 Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, 16.
81 Munchin, Is Theology a Science? 239.
82 The fact that Bhaskar denies the adequacy of the classical positivist understanding of theory is 
manifest in his approving remarks that Transcendental Idealists realize the need for a "surplus 
element" to make their experiences hold together. The fact that they realize this is to their credit, 
though Bhaskar thinks they need to push things further. Realist Theory of Science, 148-163.
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speaks of the domain of the actual, we may interpret Bhaskar as always speaking of our 
a posteriori theoretical reconstruction of the domain of the actual, then it is possible to 
understand how ontological realism and epistemological relativism can go hand-in-hand
and indeed, how the former can demand the latter. However, Bhaskar does not make 
this clear.
Torrance, on the other hand, with his more explicitly theoretical language, seems
to be able to make it clearer how ontological realism, or convictions at the second 
theoretical level, demands epistemological relativism, or relativism concerning 
convictions at the first theoretical level. A clear example of this is the medieval 
development of the doctrine of Transubstantiation.83 The church had an unshakable 
conviction that, at the celebration of the Eucharist, Christ is present with his people. At 
the time, when Aristotelian metaphysics dominated academic thought, there was no way
to speak of this presence except in terms of substance and accidents, and so 
Transubstantiation, at that time, was not only a faithful response of that realist 
conviction, it was the only faithful response to it.
As a Reformed theologian, it hardly needs to be mentioned that Torrance does 
not affirm Transubstantiation. However, the critique of Transubstantiation arises from 
the very same level (the third level) that gave rise to it in the first place. The same 
conviction regarding the presence of Christ at the Eucharist called into question the 
Aristotelian categories that had so profoundly shaped the discussion. It was only 
because Aristotle had been significantly criticized by the Reformers that a new way of 
thinking about the presence of Christ at the Eucharist, the doctrine of the Real Presence,
was possible. 
In the advance of human thought we develop theoretic constructs and 
connections which may well be necessary within certain limits, but 
which are later found to be no more than intermediate devices, ladders 
by which we climb from one level to another but which can be, and must
be, kicked away when they have done their job.84
83 T&C, 326-327.
84 R&ST, 155. See also T&C, 67 for an application to the natural sciences.
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What are the implications of Disclosure Models for Torrance's philosophy of 
science?
 Torrance's disclosure models are a self-consciously realist tool for scientific 
investigation. They presuppose a reality to which the disclosure model gives us access. 
The question that must be asked is whether Torrance's position provides a satisfactory 
account of the problems in the philosophy of science, particularly those surrounding 
scientific realism. In order to answer that question and evaluate whether Torrance's 
position is satisfactory, we shall examine how it handles the problems traditionally 
faced by both scientific anti-realism as well as scientific realism.
It was argued above that the single greatest problem faced by scientific anti-
realism, at least from the point of view of a realist, is that it makes our theories 
functionally separate from reality. Torrance's disclosure models avoid this difficulty 
because, though it is important to seek disclosure models which are empirically 
adequate at the time they are affirmed, the fact that the disclosure model distinguishes 
itself from reality and is to be understood as relativized by that reality in the course of 
investigation makes it clear that disclosure models are not concerned merely with 
providing a convenient arrangement of our experiences but with actually making 
contact with reality and thereby demonstrating that they are rooted in reality (or, one 
may prefer to say, truthful).
The historical development of theories, within a given field, which are 
incommensurate with one another can be seen as a problem for scientific realism. It 
would seem that if we affirm realism for our current theories it means that we condemn 
a realistic interpretation of previous theories. Additionally, if the time comes that a new 
theory should arise, incommensurate with one we hold now, would not the suggestion 
that theories, at least our best ones at any given time, should be interpreted realistically 
imply that this new theory is to be seen as real, thus condemning such an attitude 
toward our current theory?85 Articulated in this way, it would seem that the phenomenon
of incommensurability makes some forms of scientific realism self-defeating.
85 This is a form of Putnam's Pessimistic Meta-Induction.
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Torrance's theory of disclosure models reveals this concern to be a false one. 
Disclosure models imply that the reality they direct us to is far deeper and richer than 
we could ever predict. This means that new information will come to light through our 
use of such models that reveals that reality is not exactly what we expected it to be. 
Unless we have always, since the very beginning of scientific investigation, been on a 
direct trajectory toward a perfect understanding of reality with no false starts or 
overcorrections, we would expect that such a reality will not only reveal that our 
theories are inadequate in the sense that they are not "fine grained" enough but that they
have missed some piece of information that transforms everything we knew before. 
Thus the presuppositions that are implicit in disclosure models lead us to expect that 
such incommensurate theories will arise. Indeed, on such presuppositions, it would be 
far more surprising if they did not arise.
Closely related to the problem raised by incommensurability is that of meaning 
variance. As theories develop, terms take on new meaning, such as was the case with 
"atom" as discussed already.86 How can we take realism seriously if it keeps changing 
what it means by the terms being used? Does not the fact that terms can change 
meaning so often mean that scientific realism is unreasonable?
Such an objection is compelling only if Torrance's realism were primarily about 
our theories as such and not about that which lies behind and beyond those theories. 
Again, it is precisely because our terms keep changing that Torrance's realism seems 
justified. Terms do not change, like "atom," because our theories have failed to make 
meaningful contact with reality. Rather, they change precisely because they have 
succeeded in facilitating that contact. We approach reality with a "primitive" atomic 
theory and we realize that there are subatomic particles. We construct a model that 
makes sense to us and approach reality again, say with Thomson's "plum pudding" 
model. We find that this works better but produces phenomena that we would not 
expect, such as the pattern of scattering of alpha particles when fired at a thin layer of 
86 Chapter 4.
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gold foil, as revealed by the Geiger-Marsden experiment.87 It is precisely because we 
are unable to collapse reality into our statements about reality that our terms change.
This means that Torrance's position provides a solution to the problem of 
reference. When we say "atom," we could be using it in any of the senses the term bears
but precisely which sense is being used at any given time will be determined by the 
context. In some fields, the internal structure of the atom is only nominally useful and 
so it is understood at a comparatively "low" level of detail. In others, such internal 
structure will be precisely what is under investigation and thus be extremely important. 
Torrance's notion of a "limiting case" discussed above implies that we need not use 
terms univocally; they can, and do, bear many levels of interpretation. If reality is 
stratified as it was described to be in chapter one, we ought to expect this stratification 
of meanings for our terms.
As was discussed at some length above, Torrance's view navigates the problem 
of underdetermination by self-consciously acknowledging that we find certain non-
empirical considerations to have epistemic value. Additionally, it should be noted that, 
once again, the relative poverty of our theories when compared to reality shows that, 
though the underdetermination of theory by evidence is a real phenomenon, it is not a 
problem for Torrance's realism. If our theories are always directing us to a reality which 
transcends them, we should expect there to be, at any point in time, empirically 
equivalent rivals for our theories. If such were not the case, it would seem to imply that 
real progress could never take place. If Einstein's theory could be anachronistically 
imported into the early eighteenth century, it could been claimed that the choice 
between it and Newtonian physics is underdetermined by evidence. Unless we think we 
have already reached a final or ultimate theory, which disclosure models do not, by their
very nature, assume, we should expect that there is an as-yet-unheard of theory that, if 
we had access to it, would be empirically equivalent with regard to the evidence we 
have at a given moment in time to our current theory, yet is more deeply rooted in 
reality.
87 H. Geiger, "On the Scattering of the α-Particles by Matter." Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
London (August 1908), 174-177.
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Does Torrance's realism demand the traditional "problems" of scientific realism?
What is particularly fascinating about Torrance's realism is that it not only 
avoids the traditional problems faced by scientific realism but it seems to do so in a 
more satisfactory way than anti-realism seems capable of. It is true that scientific anti-
realism is not damaged by the critiques it makes of scientific realism but there would 
not seem to be any reason, on the anti-realist perspective, to expect, a priori, that those 
critiques should have an actual historical and empirical basis. That is to say, the 
strongest arguments in favor of anti-realism are built upon phenomena that it uses but 
could never have produced or predicted on its own.
By contrast, Torrance's realism does not only avoid the damaging effects of anti-
realist critiques of scientific realism, it actually demands the phenomena upon which 
those critiques are based. Torrance's realism implies that, over time, there will be 
changes in our theories, that those changes will likely result in significant 
incommensurability between theories, that our terms will change their meaning over 
time, and that any evidence we have at any point time will not uniquely determine a 
particular theoretical account of that evidence. It does all this from a self-consciously 
realist perspective.
To whatever degree the ability to make predictions is valuable to a perspective 
in the philosophy of science, Torrance's position would seem to be more valuable than a
strict anti-realist one. While it is not possible to predict what future theories will look 
like, Torrance's realism predicts, based on its own convictions, that there will and must 
be new theories while anti-realism's prediction of new theories is more accurately 
described as a "suspicion" that there will be such new theories.
To whatever degree the ability to explain why things are the way they are and 
not some other way is valuable to a perspective in the philosophy of science, Torrance's 
position would seem to be more valuable than a strict anti-realist one. While Torrance's 
realism makes it clear that theories change due to the fact that reality far exceeds the 
ability of our theories to describe or explain them, anti-realism has difficulties 
explaining why our theories ought to change over time. To do so, it would seem that 
there would need to be some theory-independent reality that can challenge our 
theoretical constructions. However, if it is affirmed that such a reality exists and that we
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have access to it, it would seem to imply something not altogether unlike Torrance's 
realism.
Torrance's realism thus seems to provide a robust and consistent interpretation of
the relation between our theories and reality, While it would be irresponsible to claim 
that Torrance's philosophy of science is the final word or even to claim that any one of 
its implications is unique in the literature, it is certainly a noble attempt to make sense 
of both divine and created being in a way that remains rooted and grounded in Christian
faith.
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Conclusion
It has been the concern of this thesis to unpack and explore the major 
implications of Torrance's central epistemological claim that to know something 
authentically is to know it according to its nature (kata physin). This seemingly 
innocuous claim, as we have seen, has led to a somewhat lengthy discussion on a 
variety of topics.
First it was seen that kataphysic knowledge, as portrayed by Torrance, differs 
significantly from other forms of realism, lacking a significant number of characteristic 
terms and arguments to establish the reality of entities postulated by our theories. Next 
it was noted that, while much of what has gone by the name of "realism" has little to do 
with Torrance's position, it is not without antecedents but can be found, in various ways,
in thinkers such as Athanasius, Anselm, Kierkegaard, and Clerk Maxwell, though the 
claim that these thinkers anticipate Torrance's own position to one degree or another has
been shown to depend, at least in part, on Torrance's own idiosyncratic reading of their 
work. It was also argued that kataphysic thinking stands opposed to a variety of forms 
of dualism as well as the kind of positivism found among several thinkers in the first 
half of the twentieth century, such as A. J. Ayer. It was also argued that criticisms to the 
effect that Torrance himself harbors hidden dualistic tendencies, as suggested by John 
Douglas Morrison, are unfounded, at least in the form he articulates.
If it is true that authentic knowledge is gained only when we know something in 
accordance with its own nature, this has implications for our understanding of the 
stratification of our sciences. We found that, unless we are willing to condemn all the 
scientific knowledge we have gained thus far as inauthentic, we must reject a radical 
reductionism that claims that all our sciences can be reduced, whether in practice or in 
principle, to a single basic science. The order that arises at each level of our scientific 
inquiry seems to compel us to conclude that physical, chemical, and biological 
phenomena, to speak of no others, arise from distinct natures and it would be 
inappropriate to collapse them into just one.
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Although Torrance sees his position as essentially uncontentious, it would be a 
mistake to believe that it is truly theory-independent. There are particular convictions it 
rests upon, without which it would be entirely unintelligible. If we are to know 
something truly only when we know it according to its nature, two things must be the 
case. First, the object of our inquiry must exist even if we find, through investigation, 
that it is not as we thought it was at first. Second, we must have some kind of epistemic 
access to it. This is not to say that this access guarantees that we will immediately grasp
this reality in all its depth, because our preconceived notions need to be broken down in
order to know it in a manner true to its own nature. However, we must have epistemic 
access that is reliable. Without this we would be unable to make subsequent contact 
with the reality under investigation in order to test and correct our theoretical 
representations of it.
This acknowledgement that Torrance's position depends upon conditions which, 
in their very nature, can be neither verified nor falsified, pushed us to investigate the 
place and function of what Torrance calls "ultimate beliefs." We saw that, according to 
Torrance, ultimate beliefs are beliefs that we are obligated to hold due to the fact that 
reality is what it is and not something else. Such beliefs are unavoidable but do not 
falsify knowledge gained in light of them. Torrance also acknowledges the existence of 
penultimate beliefs, beliefs which seem to be ultimate but for which reasonable 
alternatives exist. Both one's ultimate and penultimate beliefs together form the 
background of the entirety of one's knowledge at any given time and are what Torrance 
calls one's framework of thought.
The moment that anyone, especially a theist, acknowledges that unverifiable and
unfalsifiable beliefs not only play a role in knowledge but play an indispensable role in 
knowledge, two concerns may be brought forward: that this theist is a fideist or that 
they are a foundationalist. To my knowledge, Torrance has never been explicitly 
charged with the former but it was shown that he would reject such a charge unless it 
was phrased in such a way as to claim that natural scientists are, by the nature of their 
discipline, also fideists. Since few would seem to be willing to make this charge, it may 
be dismissed. Some, such as Ronald Thiemann, whose critique was followed up by 
Morrison, have brought the charge of foundationalism against Torrance. As we have 
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seen, this charge rests upon a significant misunderstanding of Torrance's position and a 
more careful reading of Torrance's work reveals it to be mistaken.
The inescapability of ultimate and penultimate beliefs carries with it an inability 
to utterly transcend the subject-object relationship. This, in turn, challenges the 
traditional notion of objectivity which would attempt to isolate objective elements in 
our knowledge from subjective elements. If this cannot be done, one is tempted to 
believe that there can be no escape from a radical subjectivism. Torrance makes it clear, 
however, that though we cannot transcend the subject-object relation, we need not be 
entirely trapped within it. We are able, through considering subject-subject-object 
relations, sometimes called intersubjectivity, and subject-object-object relations, to keep
our subjective whims and fantasies in check to a significant degree.
This acknowledgement, that one can never utterly separate objective elements of
our knowledge from subjective elements seems to play havoc with the traditional notion
of "truth." If we cannot ever transcend the subject-object relation, we are never able to 
state entirely unambiguously what "is the case." If this is so, then the understanding of 
truth going back to Aristotle, where truth "consists in saying of that which is that it is, or
of that which is not that it is not" while falsehood "consists in saying of that which is 
that it is not, or of that which is not that it is" is never strictly applicable.
Torrance rejects the idea that truth is primarily something that characterizes our 
statements but rather is something that is a property of reality itself. By being what it is,
reality possesses a "truth" far deeper and richer than we could ever hope to articulate in 
statements. This seems to be congenial to Torrance's Christian faith which claims that 
truth is primarily to be found in the person of Christ rather than any statement about 
Christ. While some will doubtless be displeased with such a transformation of the 
concept of truth, preferring to speak of "reality" rather than "truth of being," it brings a 
significant degree of simplicity and clarity to Torrance's thinking, though we have found
that it is important to distinguish Torrance's use of “truth” from other ontological 
understandings of truth, such as that found in the work of Thomas Aquinas.
If the truth of being, or reality, is allowed to have priority over all our statements
about it, it explains why we are not able to transcend the subject-object relation. If our 
knowledge is gained primarily by contact with reality rather than through statements 
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about reality, then we can never abstain from acknowledging that it is always we, the 
knowing subjects, that know reality, thus acknowledging the inescapability of the 
subject-object relation. This, in turn, is what gives rise to ultimate and penultimate 
beliefs, the stratification of our sciences, and the rejection of dualism and positivism.
More significant than its ability to shed light on Torrance's other concerns, this 
alternative notion of truth undergirds an epistemological tool that seems to provide one 
way to cut through a longstanding debate within the philosophy of science. The 
granting (or acknowledging) of the priority of the truth of being over the truth of 
statement paves the way for the development of what Torrance calls "disclosure 
models." Disclosure models function in many ways like scientific theories and 
paradigms in the sense that they seek to give an account of how things are, 
independently of them. What differentiates disclosure models from some accounts of 
scientific theories is that the former are self-consciously tentative and acknowledge the 
fact that, by their very nature, they fall short of the reality of which they are hoping to 
provide an account.
We have seen that Torrance claims that it is not appropriate to engage with 
reality on the basis of the assumption that any single disclosure model will be entirely 
appropriate. Just as reality is stratified, so are our theories. As we continue to engage 
with the object of our study, we take our basic empirico-theoretical data (we call this 
data “evangelical-doxological” within the context of Christian theology) and organize it
into a coherent model which we then pose as a complex question to reality. In this way, 
we engage in something like Popper's falsification program (though it is more flexible 
than Popper's approach) where we test our disclosure models for accuracy and 
comprehensiveness. Eventually, we are pressed by our scientific engagement with a 
given reality to develop a higher theoretical model of that reality, as simple and as 
comprehensive as possible. Though the nature of this higher level theory requires it to 
be tested in a somewhat different manner than lower level theories, it is still subject to 
revision in light of new discoveries and insights.
Torrance's theory of disclosure models seems to account for actual scientific 
practice admirably. It allows for the very real desire that we should be able to verify and
falsify our theoretical claims without making such concerns monolithic. It places the 
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emphasis on reality rather than any particular theoretical formulation of reality. We have
also seen that Torrance's disclosure models provide one way to cut through some of the 
debate between scientific realism and scientific anti-realism in the form it has taken 
since Kuhn brought the notion of paradigms and paradigm shifts to general attention.
We brought Torrance into dialogue with the mainstream of secular philosophy of
science throughout his career in order to reveal ways in which Torrance's distinctly 
Christian convictions enabled him to think about science in a different way than that 
found within that mainstream and provided different solutions to perennial problems. 
Though Torrance displayed passionate interest in the findings and practice of natural 
scientists, his contribution to the theology-science dialogue could have been increased if
he had engaged more fully with natural science beyond his favorite handful of topics 
and scientists within the physical sciences.
While it seems clear that we must move beyond Torrance's understanding of 
science and epistemology at points and correct him at others, it seems he provides a 
helpful model of the kind of way a theologian can creatively engage with the findings 
of modern science. It remains the task of those who would follow in Torrance's 
footsteps to one degree or another to learn not only from his insights, but also from his 
blind spots.
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